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ABSTRACT 
The exercise of autonomy and self-regulation is seen in the literature as one of the basic 
criteria of professionalism. Since in modern states Medicine has generally been the 
occupational grouping which has most completely attained that status, it is seen as the 
model or archetype of professionalism.  This study focuses on just one aspect of medical 
autonomy, that relating to the right of medical professionals to be accountable only to 
their fellow professionals as far as the maintenance of practice standards are concerned. 
In this thesis, the theory underlying this system of "peer review" is examined and then its 
application during the course of the 20th century is traced in one particular jurisdiction, 
that of the State of New South Wales in Australia. The reason for the focus on NSW is 
that in this jurisdiction, medical autonomy existed and was exercised in a particularly 
pure and powerful form after it was instituted in 1900. However, it was also in NSW that 
for the first time anywhere in the world, an institutional challenge to medical disciplinary 
autonomy emerged with the establishment in 1984 of the "Complaints Unit" of the 
Department for Health. The thesis of this study is that as a result of this development, 
which within a comparatively short space of time led to the emergence of a system of 
"co-regulation" of medical discipline,  medical disciplinary autonomy and peer review 
had within a decade, been so severely challenged as to be almost extinct in this State.  
 
In the light of theoretical frameworks provided by Weber, Habermas and the American 
scholar Robert Alford, the study examines the long drawn out struggle to institute 
medical autonomy in NSW in the 19th century, its entrenchment by subsequent legislation 
over the next eight decades and the "counter-attack" staged by the emergent forces of 
consumerism, supported by the forces of the ideology of "Public Interest Law, in the last 
two decades of the century. The study concludes with a discussion of the implications for 
definitions of professionalism which might result from the loss by Medicine in NSW, of  
its right to exclusive control of medical discipline and the consequent disappearance of 
medical peer review.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The medical profession featured strongly in the "indemnity crisis" in Australia in 2002. 
Perhaps because such a wide range of activities were affected by that crisis, including 
even iconic pastimes such as swimming at Bondi beach and horseracing, the novelty of 
the situation with regard to medical practice was little remarked on. The extent of the 
threat was well canvassed however. For instance under a banner headline "Patients now 
face risks, say surgeons" the Sydney Morning Herald on Monday, June 17, 2002 carried a 
front-page article which reported: "Surgeons are calling for a national medical insurance 
scheme to fix the indemnity crisis, warning that advanced medical techniques may be 
shunned and many doctors forced out, with no young people willing to take their place." 
At the other end of the spectrum, a visit to a local surgery revealed a state of more than 
mild panic among general practitioners who as a result of the collapse of a major 
insurance company faced the prospect of financial ruin if they were successfully sued for 
the smallest error in their practice. Even an undertaking by the Commonwealth 
Government that it would meet all claims until the situation was sorted out, failed to calm 
the apprehension.  
 
In historical terms, the vulnerability of the medical profession to litigation constituted a 
new situation. Practitioners have of course, always been open to being sued by 
dissatisfied patients. But by the turn of the 21st century, not only was there a new spirit of 
litigiousness abroad, but conventions such as medical autonomy and peer review, which 
had always sheltered practitioners from the harsher winds of litigation, had either 
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disappeared or been emasculated. The indemnity crisis of 2002 was particularly acute in 
New South Wales, where actions by the State government and consumer advocates have 
gone perhaps further than anywhere else towards breaking down the system which, for 
most of the 20th century, had largely exempted the medical profession from 
accountability to its clientele.  
 
The way this had happened forms the subject matter of this thesis. The methodology 
adopted is to trace general developments through those in two particular institutions, 
these being the Medical Registration Board and the New South Wales Health Care 
Complaints Commission. A momentous although little remarked development, occurred 
on July 1, 1994 when the two bodies officially began sharing responsibility for the 
discipline of the medical profession.  In fact, that sharing had been taking place on an 
unofficial basis over the best part of a decade, during which time the system known as 
"co-regulation" or "collaborative regulation", had emerged.  In historical terms this was 
unprecedented, bringing into question some of the most deep-rooted and fundamental 
aspects of the professional status medicine had always enjoyed, namely autonomy and 
peer review. The thesis being argued in this study is that the legislative introduction of 
"co-regulation" in 1994, meant that both medical autonomy and peer review had been 
severely challenged if not altogether extinguished in this State of New South Wales 
(NSW). 
 
An in-depth discussion of medical autonomy and peer review occurs in Chapter Two. At 
this point it can be noted that the peer review principle is an old one in the English-
speaking world. One of the earliest recognitions by the state that the medical profession 
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possessed "such an unusual degree of skill and knowledge … that non-professionals are 
not equipped to evaluate or regulate it" (Freidson, 1970 p137) was evident in the royal 
charter granted to the College of Physicians in 1523 in England. The word "royal" 
signified a crucial condition for the entrenchment of peer review: it can exist only where 
the state officially grants a profession exclusive rights to control its field of work. Such 
control is two-faceted; on the one hand  "external control" empowers the profession to 
exclude anyone but its own members from that field of work; on the other hand,  "internal 
control" gives to the profession in Freidson's words, exclusive rights to take "proper 
regulatory action", against those of its members found guilty of "deviant performance" 
(Freidson, 1970 p137). It logically follows that if anyone or any agency outside the 
profession is given the right to monitor or control the actions of professionals, not only 
does this bring the autonomy of the profession into question, but the principle of peer 
review ceases to apply. The postulation of this thesis is that the system of "co-regulation" 
described above, brought about exactly that situation in NSW. 
 
 In arguing that point, this study is structured around several major themes. These are: 
1. Theoretical considerations related to the notion of medical peer review and medical 
autonomy (Chapter Two). 
2. The origins and institution of medical autonomy and peer review in New South Wales 
(Chapters Three and Four). 
3. The results of the exercise of autonomy and medical peer review in practice (Chapter 
Six). 
4. Changes in societal thinking affecting the standing of professions (Chapter Seven). 
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5. Challenges by government and consumer advocates to medical autonomy and peer 
review (Chapter 8).  
Rationale 
There are a number of issues which justify the investigations undertaken in this thesis. 
For instance, while the origins and institution of medical autonomy in NSW (point 2 
above), has received a good deal of attention from researchers, they left much scope for 
the postulation of broader understandings of the developments they dealt with. The 
earliest of these researchers were Hilder (1959) and Cummins (1969).  Their work 
appeared in published form, as did that of Lewis & MacLeod (1988). Two unpublished 
but thorough and comprehensive accounts are the Masters thesis of Davis (1983) entitled 
The Professionalisation of Medicine in N.S.W. 1870-1900 and the doctoral thesis of 
Lloyd (1993) Medical Professionalisation in New South Wales, 1788-1950. The work of 
Hilder (1959) and Cummins (1969) are semi-official histories and are almost purely 
descriptive, containing very little either political or sociological analysis. Lewis and 
MacLeod's (1993) work is much more scholarly and well researched and they, together 
with Davis (1984) and Lloyd (1993) have provided the most analytical and in-depth 
studies of this field. However, using aspects of the theories of Weber and Habermas, I 
believe I have been able to highlight aspects of the attainment of medical autonomy in 
NSW which have not been covered so far.  Moreover, on the purely empirical level, I 
have made use of primary research material, particularly the record of parliamentary 
debates in Hansard which received only passing attention in earlier studies. This material 
throws new and important light on the historical developments which contributed to 
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medicine's professionalisation process in NSW and which will I believe, significantly add 
to the understanding of that process. 
 
It might also be remarked that this thesis was written at a time when attitudes to 
traditional or alternative medicine were changing. Writing at an earlier date the authors 
mentioned above, along with others such as Pensabene (1980) tended to see anything 
outside of the scientific paradigm of medical practice as mere charlatanry or, in colloquial 
terms as "quackery". However, I have thought it important to extend a more sympathetic 
treatment to non-scientific medicine. An indication that societal attitudes on this point are 
changing emerged while this study was being written; early in 2002 the Australian 
Medical Association issued a position paper which reversed their former total opposition 
to alternative or complementary medicine (Australian Medical Association, 2002). That 
move, which attracted a good deal of attention, is discussed more fully in Chapter Four, 
where I argue that only when serious attention is given to non-scientific epistemologies, 
can a full understanding of the processes and the shape of medical autonomy in NSW in 
the 19th century be fully understood. This issue will also be discussed more fully later in 
this chapter.    
 
Apart from new interpretations about developments in the period before 1900, by looking 
fairly closely at developments in the State's health care system after that date, this thesis 
moves into little explored if not altogether unexplored research territory. Although the 
title of Lloyd's 1993 thesis sets out an intention to cover the professionalisation of 
medicine in NSW up to 1950, his focus moves away from NSW after the 1920s and on to 
developments at the national and federal level. Thus for instance, he makes no mention of 
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the landmark 1938 Medical Practitioners' Act in NSW, his omission being indicative of 
the fact that this Act and the important 1963 Amendment Act, constitute a terra nullius as 
far as research is concerned. The account of the development of medical regulation and 
the exercise of medical autonomy and peer review in NSW I believe will add useful 
information on the medical history of this period.  
 
Coming to a more recent period, particularly the last two decades of the 20th century, it 
can be said that to date no author or authority has attempted to assess the importance of 
the system of co-regulation in NSW, covered in the last section of the thesis. This is 
understandable; NSW constitutes a fairly small jurisdiction in global terms, and those 
outside Australia may have difficulty in appreciating the unique nature of developments 
in each State to which the country's federal structure gives rise. None the less, as is 
explained in Chapter 7, the NSW system of co-regulation is unique within Australia; 
while all other States and Territories (with the exception of South Australia) have 
developed health complaints mechanisms of their own, none have been given the co-
regulatory powers over medical discipline exercised by the NSW HCCC.  Moreover, 
while systems of co-regulation have been developed in a small number of American 
States (Feinstein, 1985) no other jurisdictions outside of Australia apart from New 
Zealand, have developed independent and statutory health complaints bodies like those in 
Australia. Thus the system of co-regulation may well be unique anywhere in the world 
and in purely administrative terms, that provides reason enough for the particular 
attention given to it in this study.  
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Moreover, in sociological terms the system of co-regulation constitutes a development 
which I would argue ranks not far behind the significance of the issues of 
deprofessionalisation, corporatisation and proletarianisation which have attracted a good 
deal of scholarly attention. According to Burnham in his compendium on medical 
professionalisation, How the Idea of Profession Changed the Writing of Medical History  
(1998 pp116-7), the deprofessionalisation argument grew out of fears that the 
undermining of the autonomy and knowledge-claims of professional workers would 
reduce them to the performance of "controlled tasks - dependent on others - so that they 
would end up just like workers within the bureaucratic society" (pp116-17). This 
possibility had been advanced a quarter of a century earlier by writers such as 
Oppenheimer (1973), who postulated that any loss of autonomy and status would mean 
that the medical profession was being "proletarianised", provoking "defensive reactions 
which can be considered the beginnings of a working-class consciousness". In a similar 
vein, although using different terminology, Haug (1975,) (1976), (1988) argued that the 
loss of medical autonomy was a result of increasing numbers of doctors being employed 
by large corporations in the private sector, and thus being subject to managerial direction 
just like other employees. Her argument was supported by McKinlay & Stoeckle (1988) 
and Wolinsky (1993). 
 
From this point of view, the situation of co-regulation in NSW described above can be 
seen as a more serious challenge to medical autonomy than any of the arguments about 
deprofessionalisation because it has deprived Medicine of the sole right to discipline 
erring or miscreant practitioners, which constitutes the essence of peer review. However, 
the word "challenge" is used advisedly, because it is not being argued that co-regulation 
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betokens the end of the medical autonomy in NSW. The exercise of discipline is only one 
aspect of the operations of the State MRB, which continues to operate autonomously in 
that it is a self-funding statutory corporation which is independent not only of 
government but also of the medical profession. (Medical Registration Board NSW, 2000 
p6). However, whatever the legal position, the thesis of this study is that the situation 
which has been in place since 1994 when co-regulation was officially instituted, signals a 
significant aberration from the notion of autonomy as set out in the texts comprising the 
vast corpus of writing on the professions and on professionalisation. 
Literature review and original research 
The overall conceptual framework of this thesis is derived from the literature on 
professionalism in general and the medical profession in particular. This is important 
because while the present study does not focus on professionalism as such, autonomy is 
generally agreed to be a distinguishing mark of the professions. Burnham (1998) has 
rightly pointed out that in any account of the history of Medicine, it is always a mistake 
not to deal with professionalism and professional development. As far as professionalism 
in its more general sense is concerned, I have paid limited attention to the literature of 
earlier functionalists such as Carr Saunders & Wilson (1932), Parsons (1939) and 
Durkheim (1957) since they fall into what Brante (1988) describes as the naïve school, in 
that they gave to professionalism "an image of a largely autonomous self-regulating and 
self-perpetuating institution, the altruistic members of which are filled with a desire to 
work for the common good in the most effective way" (p122). It might be remarked that 
whatever the shortcomings of his "naïvist" approach, Parsons (1939) was right in seeing 
that higher education was and is a central factor in professionalism, since "[e]ducation 
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and competence justify demands for influence and power, and demands for occupational 
monopoly within certain sectors" (p123). Parsons’ conclusions are supported by Larson 
(1977) one of the chief proponents of what Brante described as the "cynical" school, i.e. 
those to whom "doctors appeared as the wielders of power, not servants of the public 
good" (Macdonald, 1988 p4). 
 
Supreme among such writers of course is the American sociologist Eliot Freidson, who 
turned the tide against functionalism with his Profession of Medicine in 1970, although as 
Macdonald points out "Freidson himself makes very little use of the word "power", 
preferring the term "organized autonomy" (1995, p5). I find it useful to link the views of 
Freidson and Larson with those of Weber, relating to his concept of economic or social 
closure, referred to later. Freidson's work was particularly valuable because of its focus 
on the phenomenon of medical autonomy. The studies of the Australian sociologist Ann 
Daniel, particularly her Medicine and the State; Professional Autonomy and Public 
Accountability (1995) are also important in this regard.    
 
On the other hand, for my purposes neither Daniel's nor Freidson's analyses go far 
enough, since they deal with professionalism and professional autonomy in a general and 
theoretical sense and do not look closely enough at the "mechanics" of autonomy - how it 
is (or was) realised and embodied in the day-to-practices of both the medical profession 
as a whole and of individual doctors. The same can be said of the work of others who 
have focused on autonomy, particularly Boreham (1983; Wolinsky 1993; Southon, 1992  
and Southon & Braithwaite 1998). While Wolinsky (1993, p12) sees that professional 
autonomy does not exist as a self-evident or self-enforcing theory and that it has to be 
 10
legally instituted, he too does not go on to describe or investigate how this is concretely 
embodied in the form of regulatory bodies established by legislation and which operate as 
statutory authorities. Not only the institution, but also the functioning of these bodies is 
crucial to understanding the challenges to autonomy investigated in this study, and 
therefore I have paid particular attention to this issue. 
 
Another issue which these authors did not consider in sufficient depth is that of the 
historical roots of medical autonomy which reach back a surprisingly long way.  In the 
English-speaking world, the first body which was charged by the State with enforcing 
medical regulation and which operated on an autonomous basis, was the Royal College of 
Physicians, founded in 1518. While there may be doubts as to whether such an institution 
had any bearing on modern medical practice, it is interesting to note that over 350 years 
later, one MP in the NSW parliament quoted the 1518 regulations in support of an 
attempt to institute medical regulation in NSW in 1886! (NSWPD, 1:23 19/10/1886, 
p5861)1 As will be demonstrated, arguments in favour of medical regulation remained 
basically the same over the space of three and a half centuries. Moreover, recent works by 
Pelling (1998) and Holmes (1982) indicate that not only the traditions but also the forms 
that medical autonomy took in the 16th century, were clung to until well into the 20th 
century, something confirmed by Berlant (1975) in his study of the Royal College of 
Physicians.  
 
                                                 
1 See p 13 for an explanation of the reference system adopted for citations from “Hansard”. 
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Medical autonomy (discussed later in more detail) has to be seen on two levels: firstly, 
there is the institutional autonomy exercised by those bodies charged with the 
maintenance and enforcement of medical regulation, the Medical Regulation Boards 
(referred to as MRBs from this point). Secondly, as Southon and Braithwaite (1998) 
argue, individual practitioners are also seen to be, and indeed regard themselves as, 
autonomous as far as their practice issues are concerned. The existence of this second 
type of autonomy it is further argued, is dependent on the existence of institutional 
autonomy in the first place. Thus, in examining medical professional autonomy, both of 
these dimensions need to be investigated. To do so entails an investigation of the 
operation of MRBs, which are the institutional expressions of medical autonomy. My 
examination of MRBs was grounded in the fact that these bodies are statutory or 
corporate authorities - that form of governance which accompanied and indeed 
characterised the enormous growth of government in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
It therefore seemed worthwhile to examine the work of Australian scholars in the field of 
public administration who specialise in the analysis of statutory authorities.  
 
There was a great burst of such writing in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Spann 
(1979), Corbett (1975) and particularly Wettenhall (1963),  1981,1983, 1988) which 
proved useful in providing an understanding of the origins and operational context of 
statutory authorities. That in turn helps with the understanding of how MRBs were 
established and how they operated. However, as specialists in public administration, none 
of these authors were particularly interested in medical regulation and none made more 
than passing references to MRBs themselves. What they probably would have found 
extraordinary had they paid more attention to the MRBs, was the degree of their 
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autonomy, particularly in the early years of the 20th century, in which they appear not 
even to have reported to parliaments on their activities.  
 
As far as literature relating to the MRBs themselves is concerned, the most fruitful area 
for research is that relating to the early model for these types of body, the British General 
Medical Council, established by an Act of the British parliament in 1858. Although it was 
not the first, it forms the archetypal model of such bodies. However, while there is a fair 
corpus of literature on the General Medical Council (the GMC from this point onwards), 
ranging from scholarly accounts such as those of Parry and Parry (1976) and Stacey 
(1992), to the semi-official histories of Heseltine (1949) and Pyke-Lees (1958), there is 
very little analytical and scholarly literature on the MRBs of Australia. The only 
published histories of Australian MRBs are those of Frankael and Wilde (1994) on the 
MRB of South Australia and the semi-official histories of Hilder (1959) and Cummins 
(1969) referred to earlier. However, as noted earlier, these works tend to be wholly 
descriptive and make no attempt to set their data in the context of social, political or 
administrative developments. While Lloyd (1993) examines the establishment of the 
NSW MRB in some detail, he says little about its later operations. Only very recently has 
more attention been paid to the workings of MRBs in edited volumes such as that of 
Smith's Health Care, Crime and Regulatory Control, (1998). Even here attention is 
focused on contemporaneous developments, little or no attention being paid to the history 
of MRBs, while there is no attempt to see them in the comparative context of other 
statutory authorities.  
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For the purposes of this study, one shortcoming of the work of Davis (1984) Lewis & 
MacLeod (1988) and Lloyd (1993), is that they focused very narrowly on the activities of 
the medical profession in attempting to achieve their goal of professional autonomy and 
did not pay attention to the broader processes and contexts of bureaucratisation discussed 
in Chapter Two. I contend that a complete understanding of this process means that it is 
crucial to understand what those in government were thinking and doing, and that 
governments should not be treated, as they are in even the work of Freidson, as distant 
and shadowy entitities which merely reacted to the push and pull of outside forces.  
Freidson tends to see governments as "neutral referees" in the way they were depicted by 
Dahl (1962) in his work on pluralism, rather than being extremely proactive players in 
administrative as much as in party politics.  
 
On that score however, documentation which could throw light on thinking and 
politicking on medical issues within governments at the time medical professionalism 
was being instituted, such as cabinet briefings and minutes or ministerial correspondence, 
is non-existent. All too often the researcher simply finds the dreaded word "culled" when 
searching for such documentation in the State archives. Thus the nearest one can get to 
the "inside story" of what was happening in the inner sanctums of government is 
provided by the NSWPD reports of debates in the two houses of the NSW parliament. 
Obviously Lloyd (1993) and Lewis & MacLeod (1988) did use these sources but were 
possibly daunted by the tediousness of perusing debates in detail.  This is particularly true 
of the period before the first NSWPD reports were published in 1880; up until then only 
near-verbatim reports of parliamentary proceedings were printed in the Sydney Morning 
Herald, which although indexed in a separate government publication, are much less 
 14
easily accessible than are NSWPD reports. However, I did consider it worthwhile to read 
all the debates relating to Medical Practice Acts from 1873 onwards, an exercise which 
yielded rich rewards in terms of hitherto hidden knowledge and understanding of issues 
related to the regulation of Medicine in NSW for well over a century.2 
 
Coming to actual historical developments, the subject matter has demanded that the bulk 
of the research be based on original documentation, since there are very few secondary 
sources apart from those of Hilder (1959) and Cummins (1969) covering developments in 
medical regulation in NSW after 1900.  Lloyd's (1993) thesis on the professionalisation 
of medicine in NSW up to 1950 is of course, strongly analytical, but his focus moves 
away from NSW to the national scene after the 1920s. In attempting to fill the gaps in the 
medical history of NSW after that point, I investigated the original papers of the NSW 
branch of the Australian Medical Association (referred to from this point as the AMA) 
and the NSW MRB. Both proved somewhat problematic; the AMA papers, stored in the 
Mitchell Library, Sydney, have not yet been classified or catalogued, only rough guides 
to their subject matter being available. Thus although I believe I was able to do some 
useful original research here, finding information was a somewhat hit-and-miss affair. It 
is to be hoped that resources will be made available at some stage to finance the sorting 
and cataloguing of this valuable material.  
                                                 
2 The usual method of referencing Hansard (NSWPD) as set out for instance, in The Australian Guide to Legal 
Citation (Melbourne University Law Review Association, 1998) seemed to be to be somewhat clumsy. I have 
therefore used an “in-text” system. The first element of each NSWPD reference indicates the series and volume 
number in which it appears. Thus 1:10 denotes Series 1, Volume 10; 2:10 denotes Series 2 Volume 10 and 3:10 
Series 3 Volume 10 and so on. (Series 1 comprises the sequence of volumes between 1879 and 1900, Series 2 
that between 1900 and 1952 and Series 3, from 1952 to the present. Each reference also contains a date and a 
page number Thus a typical reference appears as NSWPD, 1:3 14/5/1880, p1234, which denotes Series 1 
Volume 3, May 14 1880, page 1234. 
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As far as the MRB is concerned, its "institutional memory" does not go back much 
further than 1987, when it was wholly reconstituted. While its earlier records, dating back 
to 1838, are stored by the State Archives Authority, it proved impossible to obtain 
documentation of more recent times.3 This was also true of the records of the Medical 
Tribunal, actually a court of law which has the task of hearing cases relating to medical 
discipline and imposing sentences on practitioners found guilty of breaking the law as set 
down in Medical Practitioners' Acts. Here again the short institutional memory among the 
staff of the Tribunal (it too, was wholly reconstituted in 1992) gave rise to an insuperable 
problem since officials claimed not to have any idea of where older records could be 
found and there is no trace of them in the State Archives catalogues. I do not believe that 
had these records been accessible to me, they would have had any major effects on the 
conclusions of the thesis since the broad outline of developments discussed is clear 
enough from the research sources which were accessible. However the recent MRB 
documentation and also that of the Medical Tribunal documentation would undoubtedly 
have enriched my research. It is to be hoped that these records will become available if 
and when the request of the MRB for larger premises is granted by the State government.  
 
In contrast, I had enjoyed free access to the archives of the Health Care Complaints 
Ccmmission during the course of a research project in which I was involved in 1993. This 
was at the time when after a prolonged and bitter political battle, the status of the 
                                                 
3 This was because since while the officials of the MRB had no objection to this being used, they would not 
allow it to be taken off their premises. As they are "bursting out of the seams" of their present headquarters, 
they could offer no space for an examination of documents and would not allow these to be studied in their 
offices after hours. This physical problem proved an insurmountable obstacle. While MRB staff offered to 
photocopy any documentation needed, it was impossible to tell without examining the documents in the first 
place, to say what I wanted photocopied - a classic "Catch-22" situation.   
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Complaints Unit, which forms a central focus of research especially for the later chapters 
of this thesis, was being transformed into that of an independent statutory authority.  At 
the time the worth of the project seemingly lay in the fact that the Complaints Unit 
(referred to as the CU from this point on) was the first body of its kind anywhere in the 
world and its transformation into the Health Care Complaints Commission (referred to as 
the HCCC from this point on)  was seen as giving the study further interest.4  At the time, 
as now, there was no major published history of the CU, the only in-depth study of the 
subject being the unpublished Masters' thesis of Donnelly (1990) a former official of the 
CU, which had examined the circumstances of the formation of the CU at the time of its 
establishment in 1984.    
 
Finally it should be said in relation to my original research that in addition to the 
documentation, it was also possible to gather oral accounts from people who were 
involved in the events, both within the CU and also other bodies involved in that 
development, such as the Medical Consumers Association and the Pensioners and 
Superannuants Federation. Among those who were interviewed were the first director of 
the CU, Ms Philippa Smith, as well as her successor, Ms Merrylin Walton, and who 
remained director for the next 15 years. Those interviewed in relation to the conflict over 
the Health Care Complaints Commission Bill in 1993 included Ms Claire Petre of the 
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, who was deeply involved in the political struggle to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Although the results of my initial study were written up, for various reasons no attempt was made to publish 
them until 2002, when they were included a work I was responsible for writing and editing, Medicine Called to 
Account: Health Complaints Mechanisms in Australia. It was in the process of being published by the School 
of Public Health and Medicine at the time this thesis was being completed.     
 
 17
transform the CU into a statutory authority as well as Dr Bernard (universally known as 
“Bernie”) Amos, who was both president of the MRB and and Director-General of the 
NSW Department of Health in the period covered by Chapter 7 in this study. One 
important “player” in the events recounted in the last two chapters whom I tried but failed 
to interview, was Mr Laurie Brereton, who held various cabinet posts in the government 
of NSW, including that of Minister for Health in at the time of the establishment of CU, 
before moving into Federal politics. 
 
Theoretical frameworks 
The empirical data of the thesis has been couched against the postulations of the major 
sociological theorists, Max Weber and Jurgen Habermas and also the much less well 
known American scholar, Robert Alford, who is a political rather than a sociological 
analyst. The way the theories of each has been used, will be discussed separately. 
Weber and bureaucratisation 
The use of the work of Weber was indispensable because so much of this study is 
concerned with the processes of the bureaucratisation of the medical profession in NSW, 
which was happening at exactly the same period that he was making his observations of 
the rapidly spreading processes of bureaucratisation in Europe and the United States and 
formulating the theories which appear in his work Economy and Society (Weber, 1978 
[1922]). Not surprisingly, in the approximately 100 years since Weber's analyses were 
first published, they have been subjected to comment and criticism by numerous authors. 
The critiques of Talcott Parsons (1939), Reinhard Bendix (1947), Alvin Gouldner (1955) 
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and Peter Blau (1956) were well summed up thirty years ago by Martin Albrow (1970), 
one of the greatest contemporary commentators on the phenomenon of bureaucratisation. 
He pointed out that the basic criticisms of Weber arose from the observation that he  
…believed that the growth of bureaucracy was inevitable. Its 'rationality' 
ensured it a place in the general process of rationalization. Clearly this 
belief becomes questionable when, as with the authors just cited, the very 
'rationality' of bureaucracy itself is disputed (Albrow, 1970 pp54-61).  
In his most recent work Albrow (1996) elaborates on this theme, stating that when he first 
wrote on the concept of bureaucracy in 1970, it was still seen as the necessary shape of 
any organisation. However, the "test of time" between that date and his next book on the 
subject, published in 1996,  "was to show its rootedness in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century discourse, and what is now ... a common recognition, is that it was … a passing 
phenomenon" (Albrow, 1996 p117). Albrow none the less affirms that Weber is still seen 
to be the greatest observer of this "passing phenomenon"; despite the numerous and wide-
ranging critiques his work,  "… the classic account of the overall developments of 
…[bureaucratic] institutions remains Max Weber's rationalization process"  (p112).  
 
Australian scholars, Colebatch and Larmour (1993), supply a simple, yet very useful 
definition of bureaucracy when they state: "[A]ny organisation in which all transactions 
[are] governed by the hierarchical application of rules may be called a bureaucracy" 
(1993 p20). The application of such “hierarchical rules”, in other words regulations, is 
designed to create order and predictability and thus to rationalise activity in a particular 
sphere or the activities of a particular group. Reiger succinctly sums up the core element 
of Weberian thinking when she states:  "For Weber, the rational accounting and 
calculation of the capitalist enterprise is the hallmark of modern society" (1985 p25).  
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Martin Albrow, one of the greatest international scholars in the field of bureaucracy states 
that Weber's outstanding contribution to the study of this phenomenon was "his analysis 
of the idea of authority and the way he located the notion of legitimacy at the centre of 
the problems or social order, social control and the state…" (1996 p104). It is these 
questions of authority and legitimacy which comprise the most important aspect of the 
discussion of bureaucracy in this study. Little or no attention is paid to questions relating 
to bureaucratic structure as set out by Weber, since the bureaucracy on which attention is 
focused, the NSW MRB, for most of the period under study, had no full-time bureaucrats. 
It activities were instead controlled by a part-time unpaid or minimally-paid members 
who earned their living from private medical practice.  
 
But while it was unusual in this respect, the MRB none the less was a typical Weberian 
bureaucracy. Despite itself having little formal hierarchy or structure, it had been 
established by government as the legitimate agency for the exercise of the hierarchical 
authority by means of which the activities of the medical profession in NSW were 
regulated. In terms of acts of parliament, the MRB was endowed with the “legal-rational 
authority” (to use Weber’s term) to specify who would be permitted to practice medicine, 
the educational and training they would be required to have, and the disciplinary 
processes by which their standards of practice were to be maintained.  
 
The purpose of imposing these bureaucratic controls was, as noted above, the creation of 
order, stability and predictability in the practice of Medicine. The drive to create that 
situation in NSW constituted a typical example of the forces which, according to Weber, 
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were leading to the enormous expansion of bureaucracy in industrialised and 
industrialising states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In such states, he asserted, 
the increasing complexity of civilisation was  
… a function of the increasing possession of consumption goods, and of 
an increasingly sophisticated technique of fashioning external life - a 
technique which corresponds to the opportunities provided by such 
wealth. This reacts upon the standard of living and makes for an 
increasing subjective indispensability of public, inter-local, and thus 
bureaucratic provision for the most varied wants which previously were 
either unknown or were satisfied locally by the private economy.  Among 
the purely political factors, the increasing need felt by a society grown 
accustomed to stable and absolute peace, for order and protection 
("police") in all fields, exerts an especially persevering influence in the 
direction of bureaucratisation. (1978, [1922] p972). 
The postulation that the advance of bureaucratic organisation is rooted in demands for 
"order and protection" is also put forward by contemporary Australian authors Petersen 
and Lupton (1996) in their treatment of "risk discourse". Drawing on the work of 
Rutherford (1994)  and Beck (1992; 1996), the "risk" they discuss in the late 20th century 
context is that posed by environmental  degradation. While they do not refer to Weber, 
they come to similar conclusions when they state: 
Given the assumed pervasive and insidious nature of health risks, the 
identification of such risks has come to be viewed as beyond the capacity 
of most individuals. Risk identification is increasingly regarded as the 
preserve of those who have access to technology and expert knowledge, 
for example scientists and members of the medical profession (Petersen & 
Lupton, 1996 p98). 
However, as fellow Australian scholars Colebatch & Larmour (1993) might point out, 
technology and expert knowledge by themselves are an inadequate means of controlling 
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risk and need to be enshrined in law and enforced by "rational/legal organisational 
structures", in other words, bureaucratic agencies. Petersen and Lupton (1996) agree, 
asserting: "The environment has become represented by a set of physical resources that 
requires the rationalised strategies of governmentality, including continual surveillance, 
monitoring and regulation on the part of experts" (p90). That "principle" applies not only 
to environmental issues, but to an enormous range of societal activities, especially those 
related to health.  
 
Of course, as post-structuralists, Petersen & Lupton (1996) are critical of the very strong 
perception, which has scarcely waned over the last two centuries, that the type of rational 
organisation embodied in bureaucracy is "natural", arguing along with Albrow (1970, 
1996), that rationality is a time-bound social construct. That certainly does not undermine 
the overall value of Weber's observations and theories. As Colebatch & Larmour (1993) 
explicitly state and Peterson & Lupton (1996) implicitly, Weber's perception of the 
origins of the enormous spread of bureaucratisation in the modern era has stood the test 
of time.  
 
However, there is more to the process of bureaucratisation than general calls for 
government to create "order and protection". Particular note needs also to be taken of 
Weber's postulations about what he calls social or economic closure. In these terms, 
bureaucratisation also results from the demands of specific interest groups which lead to 
the establishment "of a legal order that limits competition through formal monopolies" 
(1978 [1922], p342). Such group demands are often difficult to resist because they come 
as requests for government to impose "order and protection" on a particular field in order 
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to benefit society as a whole and moreover, yielding to them often results in electoral 
advantage to political parties occupying government benches. This "Weberian" 
observation was made by Mr Gary Sturgess, a senior public servant in NSW, who noted 
in a special report he was commissioned to write on "red tape" in government in the 
1990s, that its "excessive accumulation" was the  
       … inevitable result of interest-group politics. The accretion of 
regulatory agencies over the decades has happened, to some extent, 
because of the attempts by politicians to meet the demands of new 
constituencies (Sturgess, 1994 p45).  
When politicians do meet these demands, the outcome is the creation according to Weber, 
of a "legally privileged group (Rechtsgemeinshaft)" in which participants become "legally 
privileged members (Rechtsgenossen)". Governmental legitimation not only gives them 
control over their particular sphere of work, but also enables them to limit and even 
eliminate competition from outsiders and thus help create conditions of scarcity which 
improve their economic status. The moves made by the medical profession before 1900 
to obtain governmental legislation which would ensure social closure through the creation 
the MRB, so closely followed the processes of bureaucratisation described by Weber that 
it almost seems as if his work (published more than two decades later) was being used as 
a blueprint! For these reasons, the work of Weber on bureaucratisation forms the 
analytical fountainhead of particularly the first few chapters of this thesis, although as 
will be noted in the concluding chapter, some important caveats about his theories also 
need to be kept in mind.  
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Habermas and the “lifeworld” 
The theories and terminology of Habermas have also been used as analytical tools not 
only because they are related to and complement the Weber's theories, but because they 
are useful in discussions of the non-scientific medical epistemologies and therapies 
mentioned earlier.  The adherents of these beliefs and practices played a major role 
shaping the way that the bureaucratisation of Medicine occurred in NSW. They were 
vehemently opposed to that development and the conflict between the two epistemologies 
in many ways constitutes a classic example of what Habermas calls the struggle between 
the "lifeworld" and the "system" in his Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas, 
1987b). In the words of Pusey (1987), Habermas "invites us to look at our own modern 
condition as a kind of tug-of-war between the lifeworld and the system" (p72) and in 
doing so Habermas expands on Weber's theories about bureaucratisation. According to 
White (1988) Habermas was concerned with  
[t]he provision of a richer account of what he  saw as the costs of 
modernization or rationalization: the loss of freedom in an increasingly 
bureaucratized society and the loss of meaning or unity in a fully 
disenchanted world. (pp92-3).  
That "disenchanted world" was one in which "the system" was triumphant. Over against 
that, the "lifeworld" is rooted in what Habermas calls "communicative action", that is 
action based on consensual norms, intuitively shared meanings and understandings of the 
world, or as he puts it, "a culturally transmitted and linguistically organised stock of 
interpretive patterns” (Habermas, 1987b p124).   Communication in this context, reflects 
understandings "which define reciprocal expectations about behaviour" (p124). This 
makes possible cultural reproduction (the "continuity of tradition and a coherency of 
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knowledge sufficient of the consensus needs of everyday practice"), social integration 
(which "lends constancy to the identity of groups") and socialisation (which "secures the 
capacity for action for future generations") (Habermas, 1987a pp341-2). 
 
"The system," in contrast, is characterised by purposive-rational action in which  "the 
actor is primarily orientated to attaining an end", or in other words, to the attainment of 
success. (Habermas, 1987b). In communicative action in contrast, participants are not 
primarily oriented to their own individual success; but "pursue their plans on the basis of 
a shared definition of a situation” (Habermas, 1987b p126).  However, when action is 
purposive-rational, it becomes "uncoupled" from communicative experience, and instead 
is co-ordinated through what Habermas calls "steering media", chiefly money and power 
(Habermas, 1987b p154). This in turn leads to his postulation about the "colonisation of 
the lifeworld by the system" (Habermas, 1987a p354).  In this process, "[e]conomy and 
state penetrate, via money and power, into the Lifeworld and destroy communicative 
processes in areas where these remain necessary, namely those of cultural reproduction, 
social integration and socialisation" (Brand, 1965). 
 
Habermas of course, has written little directly applicable to medicine or health care.  
None the less, his theories have been taken up by a number of sociological analysts 
working in the health sphere.   One of these, Scambler (1987), equates "the system" with 
the professional and institutional manifestations of modern scientific medicine, arguing 
that "…system rationalisation in the sphere of health and illness has indeed led to a 
medical colonization of the lifeworld".  He uses as his prime example the 
"medicalisation" of childbirth during the 20th century.  This is epitomised by "the switch 
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from the home to the hospital as the typical location for childbirth (that is, the growth of 
territorial power), and the increasing emphasis on the active management of labour and 
childbirth (that is, the growth of technological power" (p175).  On this analysis, the 
advance of scientific medicine in conjunction with the process of bureaucratisation which 
were necessary to entrench its power, can be equated with "the system", and non-
scientific medical epistemologies with the "lifeworld". This is not to say that Habermas 
idealised the "lifeworld" and held it up as morally superior to "the system".  In the words 
of White, (1988) Habermas raises the question of "whether purposive rationalization is 
only one possible way of developing that broader potential for the rationalization of 
action which is made available with the culture of modernity" (p97). In other words, 
Habermas does not decry rationalisation or modernity as such, although he regrets the 
way in which both have developed as a result of the processes of bureaucratisation.  
 
Habermas is criticised on this point by Albrow (1996) who argues that he fails "… to take 
forward the possibility that the encroachments of the modern state on everyday life 
actually assisted in the empowerment of people, through education of course, but also in 
requiring participation in everyday bureaucracy." He further argues that   
…colonization also involves the expansion of competence on the part of 
individuals without which the modern state could not operate through their 
lives. To this extent the consequences of colonization of the lifeworld are 
the same as territorial colonization: the eventual acquisition of an 
independence, but one which depends on assimilating the colonial culture 
(p177). 
Supporting that point, I would argue that in examining the emergence of those 
movements which challenged the bureaucratic status quo in many fields in the late 20th 
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century, the Habermasian "lifeworld" vs "the system" typology constitutes too broad an 
analytical brush. While it is true, as we shall see, that the challenge to medical autonomy 
in NSW originated in the consumer movement, this study will show that it is unlikely that 
on its own, that movement would have had the power to make any impression on medical 
autonomy, entrenched as it was in and by the bureaucratic State apparatus of the MRB. 
The most effective assault on that kind of bureaucratic power was launched by 
governmental "counter-bureaucracies" which, using the terms of Albrow (1996), placed 
in the hands of the "colonised" subjects of bureaucratisation, instruments which could be 
used to undermine the dominance of the “colonisers”.  
 
The emergence of "counter-bureaucracies" in the second half of the 20th century was a 
result of the introduction of what became known as "administrative law" in public sector 
governance. That development is fully discussed in Chapter 6, but here it can be noted 
that through the establishment of "counter-bureaucratic" instruments such as 
ombudsperson's offices, administrative appeals tribunals and freedom of information 
legislation, the proponents of administrative law aimed to create a much higher degree of 
"open government" and bureaucratic accountability than had existed up to then. Of course 
it could be argued that counter-bureaucratic instruments of the kind mentioned 
represented merely an extension of bureaucratic hegemony or of "the system". However, 
people were very often selected to staff these agencies precisely on the basis of their anti-
systemic values and once installed in "counter-bureaucracies", they used their power to 
challenge and undermine "the system" from within. It will be argued particularly in 
Chapter 7, that the CU/HCCC represented a typical example of this phenomenon.  
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Although he was encouraged by the emergence of what he called "the alternative 
movements", more fully discussed shortly, Habermas seems not to have realised that in 
order to combat "the system", adherents of those movements would themselves enter it. 
But while as noted above, his failure to see that possibility attracted criticism from writers 
such as Albrow (1996), those critiques by no means invalidate his postulations about the 
struggle between "the system" and the "lifeworld".  Although these are very broad 
categories and as suggested, need some qualification, the concept of "lifeworld" in 
particular has proved very useful terminologically. While the scientific epistemology 
taught in universities was commonly described as "allopathic medicine" during the 19th 
century and in the 20th century as "scientific medicine", until the 1960s there was no 
common descriptor for non-scientific epistemologies.  I have therefore chosen to borrow 
Habermasian terminology and refer to these epistemologies as "lifeworld" medicine, and 
not only because the word “lifeworld” constitutes a convenient adjective.  I would also 
argue that the epistemologies which it will denote in this study formed the basis of a 
societal phenomenon with strong class associations. On those grounds the bare technical 
term "non-scientific epistemologies", besides being clumsy, is not an adequate descriptor 
because it fails to convey the social and political connotations of this movement.  
 
The modern term, the "alternative health movement" does help to convey such 
connotations, and might have been used particularly because this movement can be seen 
as the spiritual descendant of 19th century lifeworld medicine. However, the adjective 
"alternative" appears only to have come into widespread usage after the emergence in the 
1960s of the "alternative culture", led by figures such as Dr Timothy Leary with his 
mantra of "tune in, turn on and drop out". Since this particular view of the world 
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embodied a reaction against what was seen to be the excessive rationality and materialism 
of the mid-20th century, the word "alternative" was also attached to those therapeutic 
treatments which did not base themselves on scientific rationality. Still, it would be 
something of a reverse anachronism to apply a late 20th century term to the non-scientific 
medical epistemologies which were powerfully entrenched among the populace of NSW 
a hundred years earlier. Nor, I would argue, would an application of the terms 
"traditional" or "folk" to these epistemologies suffice, because at that time they 
encompassed emergent therapies which attracted a widespread following, particularly 
homeopathy and hydrotherapy which could not be called traditional nor were they rooted 
in folkways.   
 
The use of the term “lifeworld” medicine also means that the terms "quacks" and 
"quackery" can be avoided. As is detailed in Chapter Four, these terms were freely 
employed by the proponents of allopathic medicine, particularly the British Medical 
Association (BMA), in the late 19th century when referring to lifeworld medicine and its 
practitioners. A century later Lewis and MacLeod (1989) and Lloyd (1993) were also 
using the terms, the latter for instance noting that in the second half of the 19th century 
"… quackery was flourishing in New South Wales" (p149). The problem with this 
terminology as Lloyd himself notes, is that it "carries with it the connotations of deceit 
and questionable efficacy" (p142). In less euphemistic  terms, to speak of "quacks" is to 
speak of charlatans.  
 
However, as mentioned above, these "quacks" or charlatans had a broad public following. 
The widespread faith in and preference for traditional medicine is evident from a host of 
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sources (Peterson, 1978); (Pensabene, 1980) (Hicks, 1982) (Allen, 1982) Lewis & 
MacLeod 1988; Willis, 1989; Lloyd, 1993) and that was coupled with an equal 
scepticism about the claims of allopathic medicine, a point acknowledged by Lloyd when 
he asserts that belief in "quacks" remained strong because the treatment offered by 
allopathic practitioners was not seen as any more efficacious than that of the "quacks" for 
most of the 19th century (p142). This was understandable, given that medical training in 
universities could hardly be called scientific in the modern sense of the term, being based 
on "humoral" theories which located the cause of disease as imbalances of "humors" in 
the body and led to the use of practices such as bleeding, blistering, purging, vomiting 
and heavy sweating, to effect cures (Holloway, 1964 p301).  
 
Despite their seeming outlandishness today, such treatments obviously did produce cures 
in some cases; had they proved universally non-efficacious or even fatal, they simply 
would not have been used.  It may be that while some human constitutions were robust 
enough to withstand harsh allopathic treatments and able to revert to a state of full or 
partial health by themselves, none the less the treatment would have been believed to be 
the source of the cure. In other words, the application of even misconceived therapies 
could none the less bring about cures by means of the placebo effect. But if this was true 
of allopathic medicine, it would also have been true of lifeworld medicine.  That means 
there was more to the following of non-scientific medicine than mere mass deception of 
the public by charlatans and that a good deal of non-scientific treatment was found, or at 
least believed by its clientele, to be efficacious, as is the case with alternative medicine 
today.  
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Whatever the explanation, it was because of the flourishing state of lifeworld medicine 
that there was such stubborn resistance to medical bureaucratisation and regulation in the 
NSW parliament before 1900. That resistance in turn was motivated in part by fear that 
regulation would make the practice of lifeworld medicine illegal. As is demonstrated in 
Chapter Four, moves in that direction faced such passionate opposition that governments 
abandoned any attempt to control "quacks" for the first four decades of the 20th century. 
For these reasons, I would argue that the terms "quacks" and "quackery" are not 
appropriate descriptors of what was a mass movement. And it is because that movement 
encompassed so many of the features of cultural reproduction, social integration and 
socialisation used by Habermas to define the "lifeworld" (Habermas, 1987a pp349-50) , 
that I have chosen to use the term in this study.    
 
Habermas's theoretical formulations on the "lifeworld" and "the system" are also useful 
because of his postulation that the "lifeworld" staged a revival in 1960s in the form of 
what he calls  "the alternative movement (which encompasses the urban scene with its 
squatters and alternative projects, as well as the rural communes)” and the women's 
movement among others (Habermas, 1987a p393). He saw hope in this "alternative 
movement" because it was actively challenging the rationalistic underpinnings of 
bureaucratisation imposed on society in the later 19th and early 20th centuries. While he 
does not mention it, he would no doubt agree that the alternative medicine movement 
could also be seen as part of his overall "alternative movement". Moreover, it could even 
be argued that while it was strongly rooted in the assumptions of bureaucratic rationality, 
the counter-bureaucratic impulses of "administrative law" mean that it could also be seen 
as one of the "alternative movements" of the 1960s.  
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It is important to emphasise that the "lifeworld" is not being idealised in this study. In the 
case of medicine, the non-scientific and very often irrational bases of lifeworld therapies 
means that they indeed were and are open to exploitation by charlatans, imposters and 
others who frankly seem to be on the borders of sanity. This was vividly illustrated in the 
evidence given to a parliamentary select committee as far back as 1887, described in 
detail in Chapter Four (pp113-5). But charges of charlatanry or semi-lunacy cannot be 
applied to many and perhaps most of the practitioners or followers of lifeworld medicine 
whose epistemologies not only survived the onslaught of bureaucratic rationality in the 
later 19th early 20th centuries, but staged a remarkable resurgence from the 1960s 
onwards. The endless debates over whether lifeworld medicine is "good" medicine is not 
at issue in this thesis; what is an issue is the "brute fact" of its existence and the wide 
ranging effects that had on the bureaucratisation of medicine and the resultant effects on 
the exercise of medical autonomy and peer review in NSW.   
 
Alford and structural interests 
Both Weber and Habermas can be described as "grand theorists". The same cannot be 
said of the American Robert Alford (1975), whose theories were based on his 
observations in a limited geographical area in the United States (New York) and in a 
limited field, that of health care. But precisely for that very reason, Alford's theories are 
useful for analysing the interplay of social and political forces in localised areas such as 
that under investigation in this present study. The theory put forward in his work, Health 
Care Politics; Ideological and Interest Group Barriers to Reform (1975) has already 
 32
been found to be useful and applicable to the local Australian situations by health care 
analysts such as Steven Duckett (Duckett, 1984). He argued that changes in the 
Australian health care system which were often depicted as being a result of the need to 
contain costs, in fact represented the outcome of struggles and alliances between different 
structural interest groups, while he attributes the emergence of the Community Health 
Program during the Whitlam government's period in office (1972-75) to "a co-incidence 
of interest" between two structural interests (Duckett, 1984 p960). Gardner  (1995) and 
Palmer & Short (2000)  also point to the usefulness of Alford's theories not only in the 
Australian context but also, as demonstrated in the work of Allsop (1995) and Ham 
(1992),  in analyses of  the British health care system.  
 
Alford proposed that the shape of health care systems could be seen as an outcome of 
struggles between three major "structural interest groups". These, he stated 
… are interests which are more than potential interest groups … which are 
merely waiting for the opportunity or the necessity of organising to 
present demands or grievances to the appropriate authorities. Rather, 
structural interests either do not have to be organized in order to have their 
interests served or cannot be organized without great difficulty" (1975, 
p14).   
Structural interests are broad, inchoate groupings, their commonality not being 
immediately visible even to those who are within them. This characteristic differentiates 
them from interest groups as such, and it is because they represent underlying patterns of 
interests that they are called "structural". He further asserted that while there may be 
conflict between various sectors of a particular structural interest, "[n]one of the conflicts 
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of this type challenges the principle of professional monopoly" (1975, p14). This point is 
elaborated on shortly in relation to NSW. 
 
While Alford (1975) postulated the existence of three structural interest groupings, which 
he entitled the "professional monopolists," the "corporate rationalisers" and the 
"community population" (pp9-17), I have added a fourth, the "government interest", for 
reasons given below. Each of the structural interests proposed by Alford will be will be 
examined separately.  
 
The professional monopolists 
The "professional monopolists" constitute what Alford describes as the “dominating 
interest” (1975, p14). The membership of this group is broadly comprised of the medical 
profession but also "bio-medical researchers, general practitioners, surgeons [and] 
dentists" and also those industries with interests in supplying them, such as the 
manufacturers of medical equipment and the pharmaceutical industry. In his words, this 
grouping constitutes a "professional monopoly, in which existing institutions protect and 
reinforce the logic and principle of professional monopoly over the production and 
distribution of health services" (1975, p14). Duckett supplements this by stating: "In 
Australia, the major voice of the professional monopolist interest is the Australian 
Medical Association"  (1984, p959).  
 
The corporate rationalists 
The "corporate rationalist" structural interest is composed of people in bureaucratic 
organisations which according to Alford, include "hospital administrators, medical 
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schools, government health planners, and public health agencies and researchers". In the 
Australian context, to these should be added especially the bureaucracies within 
government health departments. Alford stated that all have "a common relationship to the 
underlying changes in the technology and organization of health care" and that one of the 
chief forces in their "common relationship" is that of "breaking the professional 
monopoly of physicians over the production and distribution of health care" (p15). 
Palmer and Short (2000) see the interests of the corporate rationalisers as lying in the 
promotion of greater efficiency, effectiveness and equity in the provision of the health 
services (p42). Alford describes this group as the “rising interest”, because in historical 
terms, health bureaucracies are a recent phenomenon, and having emerged only in the last 
century or so, their lineage is nothing like as old or as honoured as that of the professional 
monopolists. None the less, as the guardians of the public purse and the allocators of 
resources, they have become increasingly powerful, particularly since the 1960s.  
 
The “community population" structural interest  
Those in the "community population" structural interest are, in Alford’s definition, the 
poorer and politically weak sector of health consumers. He described them as a repressed 
interest "because no social institutions or political mechanisms in the society ensure that 
these interests are served" (1975, p14). However, those who comprise this structural 
interest benefit from and are represented by what he called "equal-health advocates", in 
other words activists who are responsible for initiating actions, very often successfully, to 
improve the health care available to the community population. The activities of equal-
health advocates in New South Wales can be perceived in pressure groups described in 
this thesis, such as the Medical Consumers Association, the Australian Consumer 
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Association and the Public Interest Advocacy Centre. However, some of the most 
effective actions of the equal-health advocates have been achieved from within the public 
sector through counter-bureaucratic agencies such as the Office of the Ombudsperson and 
more particularly through the CU/HCCC. As will appear in Chapter 7, it was equal-health 
advocates who, inspired by the ideology of the "Public Interest Law" movement, used the 
CU to launch the attacks on medical autonomy and the peer review system which forms 
the subject of this thesis.   
 
The government  structural interest  
This is not one of the structural interests originally described by Alford, and my reason 
for creating it is that, as Palmer & Short (2000) point out, the roles of government and 
political parties are almost non-existent in his work (p43).  This is probably reflects the 
fact that he was living and writing in the USA, where the Congressional system of 
government with its constitutionally entrenched separation of powers between the 
executive and legislature, ensures that governments and political parties play a much 
weaker role in the formulation of policy than they do in political systems, including that 
of Australia, based on the "Westminster system". Under that this system, government 
executives  (comprised of the ministers who sit in the cabinet) are not only required by 
law to be part of the legislature, but exercise almost total control of legislatures through 
the application of party discipline - that convention which requires all members of a 
party, on pain of expulsion, to vote as directed by the executive regardless of their own 
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feelings, opinions or even interests.5 As a result of the power placed in the hands of the 
executive by party discipline, governments in Australia,  
                                                 
5 Refusal to obey the executive amounts to political suicide, since expulsion from a party means losing its  
support and resources, which are generally crucial to the individual's ability to retain their seat in future 
elections.  
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unlike those involved in the struggles in the USA analysed by Alford, are major players 
in the formulation of policy.  
 
Governmental executives however, comprise only a small part of the government 
structural interest, which needs some definition because it does not easily fit into Alford's 
characterisations given above.  Firstly, it should be said that the government structural 
interest will not normally include the bureaucracy, even though in popular parlance, the 
executive and the bureaucracy are generally lumped together as “the government”. As 
affirmed by numbers of authoritative writers on public administration, (Corbett, 1992; 
Davis, 1993; Wilenski, 1986), and as will appear at various points in this thesis, 
bureaucrats or corporate rationalists have interests which often clash or at least are not 
congruent, with those of government executives. That point was of course, also illustrated 
with hilarious accuracy in the Yes Minister television series.  
 
Although the executive may be interested in the promotion of efficiency, equity and 
effectiveness in the health system, which Palmer & Short (2000) aver are the chief 
concern to the corporate rationalists (p42), the interests of executives go far beyond that. 
They encompass the fortunes of the political parties of which they form a part, both 
within and outside of legislatures as well the need to retain the favour of those who 
habitually vote for the party without being members of it. It can also be said that since in 
political systems such as Australia, major parties represent very broad sets of capital vs 
labour economic and social interests, when they are in power governing parties may act 
to defend or extend the interests which they claim to represent. In short, although its 
parliamentary manifestation is highly visible, the government structural interest is as 
 38
broad and inchoate as the other three, but there can be no doubt that in the Australian 
context, it has to be treated as equally real and equally important   
 
Retrospective use of structural interests 
Alford evolved his theories on the basis of conditions in health care systems in the second 
half of the 20th century. What will be seen is that I have applied his analysis 
retrospectively to the situation in NSW practically from the beginning of the period under 
review, namely the second half of the 19th century. My justification for doing so is based 
on the fact that the structural interests he defined were present and detectable from the 
outset of the formation of the health system in NSW. The "professional monopolists" for 
example, can be said to have arrived in the persons of the surgeons such as William 
Balmain who were part of the First Fleet which established the colony of NSW in 1788. 
Although until the passing of the Medical Practitioners' Act of 1900 they were neither 
"professionals" in the strict sense of the term nor exercised a monopoly over allopathic 
medical practice, it will be seen both from this thesis and earlier studies such as those of 
Lewis and MacLeod (1988) and Lloyd (1993), that the actions of their leaders in the 
second half of the 19th century were aimed at establishing the dominance of a 
"professional monopolistic" interest. On those grounds, I would argue, it is perfectly valid 
to use Alford's term to describe them as such during this period. In similar vein it can be 
said that the "corporate rationalist" structural interest had emerged in the form of 
embryonic health bureaucracy of the colonial administration in the early 19th century. 
While it was very small to begin with, by the 1890s that bureaucracy had become large 
and mature enough to constitute what was described in annual reports as a Department of 
Health (New South Wales, 1899). By that stage, as will be argued in Chapter Four, the 
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health bureaucracy can certainly be said to have developed as a separate "corporate 
rational" structural interest.  And even though there was never any reference to and no 
consciousness within the "community population" structural group of its interests in 
health care until the mid-20th century, this does not mean to say that those interests were 
non-existent before then. As is demonstrated in Chapter 5, proto-typical equal-health 
advocates were active as early as the 1930s (see pp161-3).  Finally, it can be said that a 
governmental structural interest existed from the moment the NSW legislature was 
transformed from an appointed to an elected legislature in 1856 and politicians in 
government had to act and form policies in ways that would be productive of votes.   
 
Conflict within and alliances between structural interest groupings 
The period examined in the latter part of this thesis was congruent with the time period 
covered by Alford in his Health Care Politics (1975) so here the retrospectivity issue 
falls away. It will be seen that during that period, Alford's assertion that the boundaries 
between the structural interests are fluid and that very often there are conflicts between 
different sectors within the same structural interest, are valid in the case of NSW.  
Conflict of this kind was present in the community population structural interest in NSW 
in 1992/93 over moves to transform the CU into a statutory authority, the HCCC (see 
Chapter 7). That struggle however, did not change the basic commonality of interest 
between the conflicting groups of "equal health advocates" representing the community 
interest. . 
 
The four structural groupings are not necessarily always in conflict. Besides the example 
given by Duckett (1984) above relating to the establishment of Community Health 
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program, it will be seen from the present study that an alliance between the government 
and the community population interest led to the establishment of CU in NSW in 1984. 
This alliance has held firm for almost two decades since then in the face of strong and 
sometimes strident opposition by the professional monopolisers, as represented by the 
Australian Medical Association.  
Conclusion: “dynamic stasis” or structural change? 
Alford’s purpose in suggesting structural interests as an analytical tool was to 
demonstrate that their effect on health systems was the creation of what he called 
“dynamics without change" (1975, p284), which has also been labelled as "dynamic 
stasis”. That oxymoronic term denotes that despite constant interaction between the 
structural interest groupings involving conflict, contest, negotiation, alliance-making and 
alliance–breaking, the strength of each structural interest group ensures that the balance 
of power between them remains stable, or at least changes very slowly. That in turn 
means that the overall shape of the health system does not change despite the victories or 
defeats of the different structural interests in contests across a wide range of issues. In 
other words, in terms of dynamic stasis, the on-going interaction between the structural 
interests is merely a surface phenomenon which does not affect the underlying structural 
characteristics of the system.  
 
One example of the effects of dynamic stasis would be the failure on a national level in 
the USA, of numerous attempts to introduce a universal health insurance schemes, which 
would be to the benefit of the community population structural grouping. The most recent 
of these attempts was made by the then presidential couple, Bill and Hillary Clinton, 
 41
during their first term in office between 1992 and 1996. In that situation, the Clintons 
were representative not only of the government executive, but also of the community 
population interest and as such they were acting as typical albeit very high profile “equal 
health advocates”. In terms of Alford’s theory, the defeat of their efforts can be attributed 
to the interests of the private health insurance industry being congruent with those of the 
professional monopolists . Invoking the support of their allies in the Congress, who 
because of the lack of party discipline could not be controlled by the government 
executive, the professional monopolists were easily able to fend off the Clinton-led 
government executive/community interest attempts to change the health insurance 
system, which remains in place to the present.  
 
Although Alford probably did not envisage his theory being used and applied outside the 
USA, as mentioned above, it has been found a very effective analytical tool in several 
other industrialised countries, including Australia. But if the structural interests approach 
is used, it logically follows that the health systems of these countries are also 
characterised by dynamic stasis.  The materials set out in this thesis should form a good 
“test-bed” of that proposition since the following chapters portray a great deal of conflict 
both between and within these structural interest groupings over the period under review 
which ends in 1994 with the formal establishment of the HCCC. One feature which 
stands out is that while in conformity with Alford’s propositions, the professional 
monopolists were indeed the “dominant interest” for most the 20th century, the loss of 
their exclusive control of the disciplining of the medical profession towards the end of the 
century, constituted a major diminution of their power. If the thesis of this study is 
proven, viz that the challenge to medical autonomy was serious enough to ensure its 
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virtual extinction, it raises the question: does the change in the power balance between 
the structural interests amount to a mere adjustment of the status quo ante, or does it 
constitute real structural change?   These issues are discussed further in the concluding 
chapter.  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL AUTONOMY 
Very broadly, autonomy means that professions and professionals are not subject to 
control by any other body or authority, and also that they are not accountable to any other 
body or authority. Freidson (1970) provided one of the best rationales for peer review 
when he stated that "professional people have the special privilege of freedom control of 
outsiders". That privilege, he argued, is justified by three claims.   
First, the claim is that there is such an unusual degree of skill and 
knowledge involved in professional work that nonprofessionals are not 
equipped to evaluate or regulate it.  Second, it is claimed that professionals 
are responsible - that they may be trusted to work conscientiously without 
supervision.  Third, the claim is that the profession itself may be trusted to 
undertake the proper regulatory action on those occasions when an 
individual does not perform his work competently or ethically.  The 
profession is the sole source of competence to recognize deviant 
performance, and it is also ethical enough to control deviant performance 
and to regulate itself in general.  Its autonomy is justified and tested by its 
self-regulation (p137).  
That autonomy is generally enshrined in and exercised by statutory authorities, which in 
Australia are known Medical Registration Boards.  Such Boards represent the recognition 
by government and society of the right of Medicine to self-regulation, in terms of which 
the medical profession provides its own quality control and self-management  
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 There has been a great deal of theorising about autonomy (Freidson, 1970); (Johnson, 
1972); (Boreham, 1983); (Rueschmeyer, 1983); (Willis, 1989); (Southon, 1998). Perhaps 
not surprisingly the concept is subject to different interpretations. Willis for instance, sees 
medical professional autonomy as consisting in the fact that "Medicine is not subject to 
direction and evaluation by other health occupations." He sharpens that concept by 
arguing: "Not only has medicine gained the right to deny the legitimacy of evaluation by 
others, but it has also gained control over the work of other health occupations.  This … 
denotes a relation of authority over other health occupations" (1989 p88). In this light 
Medicine can be seen to be “supremely autonomous" among those health occupations 
which are regulated and have their own Registration Boards.6     
 
The definition put forward by Willis however, is rather limited in that it defines 
autonomy only insofar as it determines relationships between occupational groups in the 
health care field.  A more comprehensive definition of professional autonomy is that of 
Daniel (1990) who widens the concept and gives autonomy a power dimension. She 
states: 
Autonomy, based on knowledge claims, definitively expresses the power 
of a profession to control its field of work and its own reproduction. 
Professions control the criteria for entry, the lengthy educational training, 
registration, and standards of practice conduct within the profession (p63). 
                                                 
6 As at 1993, there were nine other such boards in New South Wales,  these covering chiropodists, 
chiropractors, dental technicians, dentists, nurses, optical dispensers, optometrists, pharmacists, 
physiotherapists,  
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The power which flows from professional autonomy will be extensively discussed later in 
this thesis. The peer review principle supplements and complements autonomy: while 
autonomy means professionals are not accountable to anyone or any body outside their 
profession, in terms of "peer review" professionals are accountable to their fellow 
professionals. If they fall short of either the ethical or the technical standards laid down 
by the profession for itself, they are judged and disciplined by their peers. This form of 
self-regulation, in terms of which a profession provides its own quality control, 
"represents a significant departure from the formal, hierarchical control by lay individuals 
to which mere occupations are subject" states Wolinsky (1993, p13).  
 
The application of the peer review principle however, raises the dangerous possibility that 
a profession, in Wolinsky's words, will "misuse autonomy and abuse its clientele - both 
the public and other workers in the health care industry" (1993, p13). Such abuse would 
contradict one of the bases of the claim to autonomy made by a profession as set out by 
Freidson viz. that it is "ethical enough to control deviant performance" (1970, p137). It 
should be noted that the whole functionalist view of professions, as supremely set out by 
Durkheim (1957) and Parsons (1939) rested on the assumption that professions not only 
embodied ethical ideals, but that these formed one of the raisons d'etre of 
professionalism. Rosenthal notes that "the strong standards of autonomy” which 
characterise professions "emphasize self-regulation and altruism that submerge self-
interest and emphasize service…" (1995 p3) while Gouldner paints professions "as a 
paradigm of virtuous legitimate authority, performing with technical skills and with 
dedicated concern for society at large" (1955 p19). .  
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But "virtuous and legitimate authority" does not exist simply as an ideal; all professions 
have a controlling body which derives its legitimacy from the state. Such controlling 
bodies are established by legislation and generally operate as statutory authorities. In the 
case of the legal profession, the controlling body is the Law Council, the Law Society 
performs the same function for solicitors and the Medical Registration Boards (MRBs) 
for the medical profession. In the words of Rosenthal, such bodies have in their 
empowering legislation "regulations governing disciplinary procedures and … stated 
codes of professional behaviour and etiquette," and as such constitute "the recognized 
mechanisms of professional self-regulation…” (1995 p4). In turn, their ability to regulate 
themselves, in other words, to operate in terms of peer review, represents the 
materialisation of professional autonomy. 
 
That autonomy is exercised on an institutional level through bodies such as MRBs; but 
institutional autonomy represents only one dimension of medical autonomy. The other 
dimension is that exercised by individual professionals. Southon and Braithwaite (1998) 
for instance, define professional autonomy as consisting in the freedom given to each 
individual professional "to control the management of each task" (p23).  Such autonomy 
is necessitated by the high levels of uncertainty and complexity in the work professionals 
do; people such as engineers, lawyers, academics, accountants academics or doctors 
"continually face new situations which require individual assessment and often the 
application of a sophisticated set of skills". Those with the skills for assessing and 
engaging with these tasks "must … be given the freedom or autonomy to act according to 
the demands presented" (p23). Matheson postulates a further rationale for this kind of 
individual autonomy and the freedom from hierarchical control enjoyed by professionals 
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when he argues that "the imposition of such controls would limit their initiative and 
creativity" (1998p17). This view is complemented by Boreham's argument that 
professionals and medical professionals in particular, deliberately set out to create "an 
aura of indetermination [original emphases] about their activities that denies the 
possibility of rationalization and codification" (1983 p697). Both Johnson (1972) and 
Rueschmeyer (1986), argue that the indeterminacy of the tasks carried out by medical 
practitioners is a reflection of the "competence gap" between professionals and their 
clientele. But in terms of this reasoning, the indeterminacy of medical practice also makes 
it undesirable for professionals to supervise the work of their follow practitioners lest that 
stifle their “initiative and creativity”.  Thus Southon and Braithwaite (1998) see  medical 
autonomy as consisting in the autonomy not only of the profession as a whole, but in the 
autonomy of individual professionals. Medical professionals themselves strongly 
supported this view, and as will be demonstrated shortly, they used the law to entrench 
the autonomy and indeed the virtual untouchability of individual practitioners.   
 
Professional autonomy then, is exercised in two spheres - the institutional and the 
individual. These are interdependent; they are strong only if both are intact; if one is 
undermined, both are weakened. This study will show that while it was the autonomy and 
consequent non-accountability of individual practitioners which became an ever-greater 
cause of complaint in NSW, it was not possible to introduce greater individual 
accountability until the institutional autonomy of the profession, as embodied in the 
State's MRB, was changed. Therefore it is important to investigate the functioning of that 
MRB. 
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Institutional autonomy; the functioning of MRBs 
One of the most important points about MRBs is that they are executors not only of state 
power, but also of professional power. Daniel is both mistaken and correct when she 
asserts, as cited above, that "professions control…" In fact, unless empowered by 
legislation, professions have limited control over their occupational sphere, as is evident 
from the history of the medical profession in Australia before the introduction of 
legislatively-based medical regulation. Thus before 1900 the medical profession in NSW 
had no power even over so basic an issue as who was entitled to call themselves a 
"Doctor of Medicine". As is outlined in Chapter Four, anyone, no matter what their 
background or training or lack thereof, was free to adopt this title and could practice 
without any fear of retribution. This had economic consequences for the profession, 
which faced competition from a large number of practitioners of lifeworld medicine who, 
despite their lack of formal medical education, did not scruple to style themselves as 
doctors. While bodies such as local State branches of the British Medical Association 
were formed to increase the influence of the profession, for most of the 19th century, their 
drive to secure recognition by and regulatory powers from governments, went largely 
unheeded. (Pensabene, 1980).  
 
Yet Daniel's assertion that the profession controls its sphere of work is correct from the 
point of view that once Medicine was granted the legitimating authority it was seeking in 
the form of MRBs, these bodies became the executors not only of delegated state power, 
but also of professional power. That was because, as will be more fully explained shortly, 
in terms of a long-standing tradition and precedent going back to the establishment of the 
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Royal College of Physicians in the 16th century, members of the medical profession 
always staffed regulatory bodies. Moreover, the practitioners who served on the MRBs 
were also invariably members of professional associations, in the case of NSW, the 
British Medical Association (BMA) which was later to become the Australian Medical 
Association (AMA). That body was of course, the major vehicle of Medicine's economic 
and political aspirations as well as of its efforts to give practical expression to 
professional collegiality.  
 
The way in which MRBs embody and execute professional control, is evident in their 
functioning. In terms of their empowering legislation, they exercise two basic functions. 
In the words of Salter (2000 p1), they firstly "provide explicit standards, … certification 
[and] registration" for the medical profession. The "explicit standards" are those which 
set out the qualifications required of anyone who wishes to become a medical 
practitioner. MRBs not only assess and certify the qualifications of aspirant practitioners, 
but also have a major input into determining the content of the education and training 
required of them. The names of those who qualify in terms of the assessment criteria and 
become practitioners, are recorded in a Medical Register; anyone whose name is not on 
that Register may not use the title of "doctor" and is prohibited from practising 
allopathic/scientific medicine, under pain of severe legal penalties.  
 
Secondly, as Salter points out, MRBs "wield … disciplinary procedures to ensure the 
maintenance of high standards of medical practice." Practitioners who fall short of the 
required standards may be referred to a quasi-judicial body, often a Tribunal, which 
operates as a court of law. Such bodies in turn have the power to order that a practitioner 
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found guilty of a misdemeanour be subject either to punitive or remedial measures or in 
extreme cases, have their names struck off the Medical Register.  Through the exercise of 
these disciplinary functions, the MRB becomes the supreme arbiter of the practice of 
allopathic/scientific medicine and that makes the question of the control of the MRB a 
crucial one. Although in terms of law, MRBs are in the final analysis controlled by and 
responsible to government, their autonomy on both an individual and institutional level 
for a great deal of the 20th century meant that governmental control was weak to non-
existent. That in turn meant the informal control exercised by bodies such as the 
BMA/AMA through their overlapping membership with the MRBs, put immense and 
virtually untouchable power in the hands of these associations. Their autonomy also 
meant that the MRBs became the embodiment of the peer review principle, particularly 
with regard to the disciplining of miscreant medical practitioners, a point that will be 
discussed in more detail shortly.  
MRBs as instruments of public administration 
Peer review is a principle or a convention which is observed in practice, even though it is 
seldom or never enshrined in law.  The autonomy of MRBs however, does have a legal 
foundation, in that they constitute what is known in public administration parlance as 
"statutory authorities," or "corporate authorities". Such bodies, while established by 
government to perform governmental functions, are not part of any ministerial 
department and are given freedom, in varying degrees, to operate independently and 
autonomously. The reasons for using these administrative devices will be set out in more 
detail shortly. Here we may note that the number and permutation of statutory authorities 
is vast, so much so that in Australia according to Wettenhall, writing in 1983, nobody 
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was sure just how many there were in existence (1983, p18). Since then, while the 
number of statutory authorities has very probably grown, no attempt has been made either 
to list them or to enumerate them. They are extensively used in the both Commonwealth 
and State spheres; in NSW, their range of functions range from those of the Sydney 
Opera House Trust to that of the Wild Dog Destruction Board which maintains a dingo-
fence on the borders of the State. They form the hidden bulk of what may be described as 
the iceberg of government, in which parliaments and departments constitute the much 
smaller, visible sector.  
 
However, while MRBs are statutory authorities, they together with a small number of 
bodies controlling the professions such as the Bar Council, are exceptional in their degree 
of autonomy in relation to government. For instance, despite the passage of over 30 Acts 
relating to the NSW MRB between 1838 and 1984,7 there was never anything in the 
legislation which required it to account for its actions to a Minister or to parliament and 
thereby to the public. This may be compared to the first legislation regulating other 
health-related occupations. The Act (1897, No. 7) which set up the Pharmacy Board as a 
statutory authority laid down that: 
The Board shall in the month of January in each year prepare and send to 
the Colonial Treasurer a reports of its proceedings during the last 
preceding year, and shall also, at the request of the said Treasurer, made at 
any time, forthwith prepare and send to him a special report of its 
proceedings. A copy of every annual report furnished under this section 
                                                 
7 Despite the lack of any legislative direction, as is detailed in Chapter Five, the MRB began to compile annual 
reports to be laid before the parliament between 1958 and 1972 when it was nominally brought within the 
jurisdiction of Health Commission which had replaced the Department of Health.  After that there was a hiatus 
until until the passing of the 1984 Annual Reports (Statutory Authorities) Act onwards.  
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shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament without delay. (New South 
Wales, 1898 p407)      
The Board reported to the Colonial Treasurer because there was no Minister for Health or 
health ministry at the time. After such a ministry was established in 1913, the Board was 
required to report to the Minister and the reporting requirement was also laid down in 
subsequent Pharmacy Acts passed over the course of the next century.  
 
Direct reporting to government requirements were lacking in the first Dentists' Act passed 
in 1900 (No. 45, 1900), although it was laid down that the Dental Board was keep a 
register of legally qualified dentists and "shall transmit in the month of January in each 
year a certified copy of such register to the Colonial Secretary, who shall cause the same 
thereupon to be 
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published in the Government Gazette" (New South Wales, 1901 p472). While the  
MRB was also required to publish a list of qualified practitioners in the Government 
Gazette every year in terms of the 1838 Medical Practitioners' Act, this did not have to be 
through the agency of the Colonial Secretary. The more restricted autonomy of the 
Dentists' Board compared to the MRB, was reflected in the fact that while all members of 
the MRB had to be qualified doctors, the Dentists' Act laid down that only four of the 
eight members of Dental Board were to be qualified dentists, the other four being 
comprised of two doctors and "two persons not being either medical practitioners or 
dentists", in other words, lay people (New South Wales, 1901 p471).  Dentists therefore 
were not allowed to dominate the Dental Board in the same way that doctors dominated 
the MRB.  
 
The significance of the non-accountability of the MRB is most evident in terms of the 
concept of "responsible government" which came into general use in public 
administration after the introduction of the Northcott/Trevelyan reforms in Britain in the 
in the 1850s. In terms of these reforms, the civil or public service was no longer 
appointed on the basis of patronage, under which the appointee was accountable only to 
their patron and the patron ultimately accountable to the monarch. Under the new system, 
public servants’ appointments were made on the basis of competitive examination and 
promotions were made on merit. Instead of having an "upward" responsibility to the 
monarch, responsible government meant that all parts of government were and are 
considered to be responsible to the people through the agency of parliament (Silberman, 
1993 p356-7).  Such responsibility was enforced through parliamentary scrutiny of 
budgetary submissions and also of annual reports. The MRB had no budget however, 
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since especially in its earlier years, its members, including those who performed 
secretarial duties, acted in an honorary capacity8 while meetings were held in rent-free 
governmental offices. The monies collected from the annual registration fees paid by 
doctors went directly into general revenue. Not having a budget or being required to 
produce annual reports, the MRB’s links with parliament were tenuous to non-existent. 
Thus, even though its powers were derived from parliament, the MRB was tacitly placed 
outside of this system of responsible government.  That situation constituted not just a 
governmental, but also a societal recognition of the principle of peer review; if the 
medical profession was not seen to be accountable to government, that meant it was 
accountable only to itself.  
 
Moreover, in addition to its high degree of autonomy in relation to government, we may 
add Willis’s setting out of the medical profession's autonomy in relation to other health 
care professions; while as noted above, doctors were members of the Dental Board, no 
dentists or member of any other health-related profession ever sat on the MRB. On that 
basis it may be concluded that the institutional autonomy of the NSW MRB and hence of 
the medical profession in NSW, was almost total in NSW for the greater part of the 20th 
century. 
 
But this of course, raises the question of why any MRB should have exercised this level 
of peer review-based autonomy which made it exceptional among statutory authorities. 
                                                 
8 As will appear in Chapter Five, the members of the NSW MRB were not paid for their services until 1955. 
Even after that date there is no evidence of any MRB budgets and that situation did not change until the 
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One answer lies in the history of these bodies which in fact came into existence long 
before the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Medical Practitioners (Amendment) Act of 1987 put the body onto an entirely different footing in terms of 
which it became self-financing (see Chapter 7).   
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statutory authority first began to be employed on a large scale either in Australia or in 
fact, in any part of the world. Perhaps the earliest MRB was established in Ontario as far 
back as 1818 (Goulet, 1997). In this country, the first MRB was set up in 1837 in 
Tasmania, followed by NSW a year later. This was not only before the era of responsible 
government, but also pre-dated the advent of statutory authorities which  emerged only in 
the 1880s when the Victorian government set up the first Board for Railways (Spann, 
1979p115).   
 
The establishment of NSW MRB also took place well before the advent of self-
government, when the Australian colonies were under the direct administration of the 
British Crown.  At that time there were no government departments as such, the whole 
administration being nominally controlled by the governor. However, as the colonies 
developed, there was an increasing need for the administration of areas about which the 
governor and his staff had little knowledge and in which they had no administrative 
expertise. These included land, education, health and Aboriginal affairs. Thus specialised 
boards were established "as a convenient way of getting special jobs done where there 
were interested parties willing to act" according to Spann (p115), these boards being run 
by non-paid appointees who worked on a part-time basis. The MRBs, particularly those 
of Tasmania, NSW and Victoria were typical examples of such bodies.  One significant 
point about them was that, having been created in the pre-responsible government era, 
they were accountable only to the governor for their actions, and precisely because they 
were seen as being specialised and therefore best left to specialists, it is likely that little 
accountability was expected from them.  After the attainment of self-government and the 
implementation of the doctrines of responsible government in the colonies, most of these 
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boards were absorbed into governmental departments (Davis, 1983 pp3-4).  Significantly 
however, the MRBs were excepted from this process and in NSW, for particular reasons 
set out in Chapter Three, continued to exist on an extra-departmental and virtually non-
accountable basis.  
 
The advent of the era of statutory authorities from the 1880s onwards resulted from the 
same reasons which had called the specialised boards into existence in the pre-
responsible government era, viz. the need for the specialised administration of particular 
areas. It had also become clear that the administration of these areas needed to be 
buffered from the hurly-burly of parliamentary politics which strongly affected the 
working of departments under the control of a Minister (Spann, 1979, p118).  
 
 Although pre-dating them, MRBs had been set up in exactly the same way and for the 
same reasons as statutory authorities and therefore fitted easily into the new 
administrative scheme of things. However, they were also significantly different in that 
their autonomous status, to all intents and purposes outside the system of responsible 
government, did not change after the commencement of the era of statutory authorities.  
To understand why the MRBs retained this anomalously autonomous position, it is 
necessary to understand their place in the history of medicine.  
MRBs as part of the history of medicine 
In considering this topic, it is necessary to range more deeply and widely into history than 
I have done so far. The first point to make here is that of course, the advent and operation 
of MRBs is due to much more than simply the administrative needs of government. In 
 57
fact, when one examines statutory authorities as a whole, as was noted in Chapter One, 
this is very often due to the opportunistic advocacy of special interest groups seeking 
control over their sphere of economic activity, the medical profession being an archetypal 
example of such groups.   
 
In the English-speaking world, the MRBs reflect both the societal demand for "order and 
protection" (Weber, 1978 [1922] p972) and the medical profession's demand for social 
closure. This process can be traced to the time when a species of industrial organisation 
by doctors led to the founding of the London College of Physicians in 1518. At that time, 
the College had only six members, all of whom were wealthy (Cooke, 1964-72 pp62-3) 
and whose main motivation was to ensure their exclusive access to attending the Royal 
family (Berlant, 1975 p124). In other words, they comprised a typical Weberian 
rechtsgemeinschaft who were spurred into action by the failure of the first piece of 
medical regulatory legislation passed in 1511 entitled "An Act Concerning the 
Approbation of Physicians and Surgeons". Its preamble fascinatingly encapsulates 
Weber's twin drives, stating: 
Forasmuch as the science and cunning of physic and surgery to perfect 
knowledge whereof, be requisite both great learning and ripe experience is 
daily within the realm exercised by a great multitude of ignorant persons, 
of whom the great part have no manner of insight in the same, nor in any 
kind of learning, some also cannot read letters on the book, so far forth 
than common artificers, as smiths, weavers and women, boldly and 
costomably take upon them great cures of things of great difficulty; in 
which they partly use sorcery and witchcraft, partly apply such medicines 
unto the disease as to be very noxious, and afford great infamy to the 
faculties, and the grievous hurt, damage and destruction of many of the 
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king's liege people most especially of them that cannot discern the 
uncunning from the cunning. Be it therefore, to the surety and comfort of 
all manner of people, by authority of this present Parliament enacted, that 
no persons within the city of London, nor within seven miles of the same, 
take upon him to exercise and occupy as a physician and surgeon, except 
that he first be examined by the bishop of London, the Dean of St. Paul's 
for the time being, calling to him four doctors of physic and surgery, other 
expert persons in the faculty, and for the first examination, such as they 
think convenient, and afterward always four of them that have been so 
approved, upon pain of forfeiture, for every month that they occupy as 
physicians and surgeons, not admitted, nor examined after the tenor of this 
act …  (cited in (Gottfried, 1986 p288). 
In the above we might note the argument for control based on the public interest (to 
eliminate the "grievous hurt and destruction of many of the king's liege people") as well 
as limitation of practice to those possessed of "great learning and ripe experience", who 
would have unquestionably have benefited from the elimination of the "great multitude of 
ignorant persons" from medical practice.  The Act failed because of a lack of any 
machinery to enforce its provisions, and a group of six doctors set out to remedy this 
situation through the establishment of the College of Physicians (Cooke, 1964-72 pp63-
4).  
 
Although it was not a government instrumentality as such, in many ways the College 
prefigured the modern statutory authority in that its aims were the same as those of the 
abortive act of 1511 while its authority was derived from the state.  Initially it was 
granted a Royal Charter reinforced by an Act of Parliament passed in 1523, which 
empowered the College to lay down the educational training required of its members and 
giving it the power to prosecute anyone outside its ranks who set themselves up as a 
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practitioner (Berlant, 1975, p139). In other words, the College was established to exercise 
exactly the same functions as a modern MRB as set out by Salter above.  
 
The College can also be seen as perhaps the earliest attempt to apply social closure to the 
medical field. That concept, was nothing new in other fields; the guilds and craft guilds 
had existed for exactly that purpose for several hundred years. The College of Physicians 
however, represented an entirely new development; unlike the guilds which owed their 
status to the granting of charters by city authorities who exercised close control over 
them, the College was virtually autonomous.  Its strongest obligations seem to have been 
to the Crown according to Pelling, who adds that "its relations even with the universities 
were limited and often negative, and it was not subordinated to the City authorities" 
(1998 p239).9  While prosecutions of non-licensed practitioners did take place, they were 
"far from exhaustive" says Pelling (1998 p239); evidence suggests that only a small 
proportion of those practising without official permission were caught in the prosecutorial 
net even in the limited area to which it applied, namely London and its surrounds. 
Although it was made by "Royal" College by Charles II, during the 17th century its status 
shrank to that of simply a gentlemen's club, the chief aim of its members 
(rechtsgenossen) being to maintain their own exclusive status rather than to assert any 
monopolistic rights over medical practice.   
 
Whatever its weaknesses as a regulatory mechanism, the importance of the College from 
the point of view of this study is that it enshrined the principle of, and contributed 
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powerfully to, the convention of medical autonomy.  Thus when the MRBs began to 
appear in the 19th century, that convention was applied to them without question. When 
the British General Medical Council was established in 1858 after 18 years of action and 
debate in the British 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 This actually proved to be a weakness, since its autonomous status deprived the College of the authority it 
might have had if it was seen to be acting as an agent of city authorities or of the Crown 
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parliament, it was made accountable only to the Privy Council, not the parliament 
(Berlant, 1975, p155).  In this way it was placed outside the evolving system of 
responsible government and since its responsibility to the Privy Council was purely 
formal, it was de facto a totally autonomous body. In NSW the process of establishing the 
first State MRB with regulatory "teeth" was even longer, taking over forty years between 
1859 and 1900. But while as will be shown in the next chapter, multiple Bills were 
brought before the parliament during that period and the membership of the proposed 
MRB was debated at length, that it would enjoy autonomous status seems to have been 
wholly taken for granted.  
 
This is not surprising; the doctrine of medical autonomy was already well entrenched 
even in NSW. As Cummins (1969 p82) points out, boards composed of medical 
practitioners who had decisive powers over the recognition of the qualifications of 
aspirant practitioners, had been in place in the British armed forces from the 18th century 
onwards. Following this precedent, similar boards had been set up by the NSW Colonial 
government on an adhoc basis to test the qualifications of aspirant medical practitioners 
at least from 1801, when John Redfern "was examined by a Board comprising Thomas 
Jamison, John Harris and William Behan as a pre-requisite to entry into the medical 
service" (Cummins 1979, p82). The first Medical Board established in 1838 was merely a 
permanent and more systematised extension of these earlier boards and enjoyed the same 
autonomy, even though its powers were rudimentary.  For reasons which will appear in 
Chapter Four, the structure of this Board was not changed for another century and even 
after the passing of the first "modern" Medical Practitioners' Act in 1938, the Board had 
no reporting obligations to parliament and therefore enjoyed almost complete autonomy. 
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The exercise of medical discipline 
What is of particular concern in this study is the way autonomous medical regulatory 
bodies exercised discipline over the profession. In terms of recent history, a good place to 
begin an investigation of the regulation of the medical profession is by looking at the 
British General Medical Council (referred to as the GMC from this point) since that body 
set the precedents which were followed by MRBs in Australasia and particularly that of 
NSW.  
 
The GMC was established by the British Medical Act of 1858 (21 and 22 Vict. Cap 90), 
which introduced state-sponsored regulation of the medical profession on a national basis 
for the first time. That regulation empowered the GMC, in Daniel’s terms, to “…control 
the criteria for entry, the lengthy educational training, registration, and standards of 
practice and conduct…” (1990, p.63) of the medical profession in Britain. As far as 
standards of practice and conduct are concerned, it is significant that out of the 55 clauses 
which comprised that Act, only one (Clause 29) related to discipline. It laid down the 
following grounds for taking action against erring practitioners.  
If any registered medical practitioner shall be convicted in England or 
Ireland of any felony of misdemeanour, or in Scotland of any crime or 
offence, or shall after inquiry to be judged by the General Council to have 
been guilty of infamous conduct in any professional respect, the General 
Council may, if they see fit, direct the registrar to erase the name of such 
medical practitioner from the register.  
This wording was duplicated in successive NSW Medical Practitioners' Amendment Acts  
passed between 1900 and 1972, when it was superseded by the equally vague term 
“misconduct in professional respect”.  Of particular note is the wording of the 
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disciplinary clause in the Medical Practitioners’ Further Amendment Act of 1900 (No. 
70): 
If it appears to the satisfaction of the New South Wales Medical Board 
that any person registered as a legally qualified medical practitioner 
within the meaning of the Medical Practice Act … has been guilty of 
infamous conduct in any professional respect, it shall be lawful for the 
Board to remove such person's name from the register, and thereupon he 
shall cease to be a legally qualified medical practitioner within the 
meaning of the Act.  
“Felony or misdemeanour” had also been made a ground for deregistration in NSW by an 
Act passed a few weeks before. Thus here, as in Britain, there were two reasons for 
deregistration of erring doctors; but since very few were likely to be struck off the role 
for felony or misdemeanour, the major ground for deregistration was that a doctor had 
been guilty of "infamous conduct in professional respect".  
 
This archaic and obscure wording had in fact been taken directly from the statutes of the 
Royal College of Physicians, founded as we have seen, several centuries before. Berlant 
provides a key to the understanding of this clause when he points out that such conduct 
"did not include mistakes or incompetence short of gross malpractice and gross 
incompetence" (1975, p161). The long-lasting and worldwide influence of the precedents 
set by the Royal College Of Physicians and GMC in this respect, are noted by Maley who 
asserts that the Code of Ethics of the NSW Branch of the Australian Medical Association 
(AMA)  
… is derived from the rulings of the General Medical Council of Great 
Britain on what constitutes "infamous conduct in a professional respect". 
The Code is therefore directly linked with the English tradition of medical 
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ethics and is thus a codification of "professional common law" in 
medicine (1974 p400).  
That the Medical Practice Acts of both Britain and NSW were so closely aligned to 
"professional common law", is indicative of the way in which it was incorporated into 
legislation in the respective jurisdictions. However, as will be made clear in Chapter Four, 
it was not legal draftspeople but members of the local branch of the British Medical 
Association (forerunner of the AMA) who played the major role in having the "infamous 
conduct" wording included in the crucial Medical Practitioners' Further Amendment Act of 
1900. In fact, six years before that Act was passed, it was laid down in the first Articles of 
Association of the BMA in NSW that: 
Any member of the Association …whose name shall have been erased 
from the Medical Register … on account of infamous conduct in any 
professional respect shall ipso facto cease to a member of the Association 
… (1894 p35).  
This wording was obviously taken directly from that of the parent British Medical 
Association since in 1894 there was no law in NSW under which any doctor's name could 
be "erased from the Medical Register".  
 
Not only the wording, but the interpretation of “infamous conduct” noted by Berlant 
(1975) above, was faithfully followed both by the GMC and the MRB in NSW. Here too, 
during the eighty-odd years during which it was incorporated in law, "infamous conduct" 
did not include practice issues. This was an inevitable consequence of the idea of 
individual medical autonomy; if individual practitioners were given freedom to practice 
without reference to any agency outside of themselves other than their peers, those peers 
acting through the regulatory body, also granted individual practitioners freedom from 
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any accountability for the way they practiced. Thus while a gentle reprimand might be 
given in private to a negligent or incompetent doctor by fellow doctors, it was extremely 
unlikely that the GMC or the MRB would take legal action against the doctor on the 
grounds of their negligent or incompetent practice.    
 
The freedom and indeed the right of regulatory bodies such as the GMC to interpret 
“infamous conduct“ in this way was affirmed most famously in the Allinson v the 
General Council of Medical Education and Registration ([1894] 1 QB 750)10 case of 
1894 heard in the British Court of Appeal.  Allinson was a medical practitioner who had 
been deregistered by the GMC for publishing advertisements in which he disparagingly 
compared his own curative record with that of his fellow medical practitioners. His 
appeal against the GMC's action was dismissed by the Court and in his judgement which 
set a long-standing precedent, Lord Justice L.J. Lopes provided the following definition 
of "infamous conduct": 
If a medical man in the pursuit of his profession has done something … 
which will be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his 
professional brethren of good repute and competency, then it is open to 
the General Medical Council, if that be shown, to say that he has been 
guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect. (p763).  
While he referred to the GMC in this judgement, Lopes was in fact affirming that only 
the medical profession could pronounce on what constituted "infamous conduct", which 
in fact meant that the judgements of the profession as expressed through bodies such as 
the GMC and the MRB in NSW, fell outside the jurisdiction of the courts. In other words, 
the Lopes judgement affirmed and entrenched the institutional autonomy of medicine.  
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That this view was closely followed in NSW is apparent for instance in the case, Clune v. 
The Medical Board ([1917] 34), in which a medical practitioner who had been 
deregistered by the MRB for "infamous conduct" appealed to the Supreme Court. In 
dismissing the appeal, Mr Justice Pring observed that while the court was not bound by 
the finding of the MRB, none the less "this court is very loath to disturb the finding of a 
Board of professional men whose knowledge of what may be termed professional 
misconduct must be very much greater than the Court can possess" ([1917] 34 Weekly 
Notes pp127-29). That statement of the pre-eminence of the peer review principle as 
exercised by medical regulatory institutions continued to be supported in law up to as 
recently as 1984, when it was re-stated in another important case, Quidwai v Brown 
([1984] NSWLR 100) heard in the NSW Court of Appeal. 
 
That  the institutional autonomy of medicine also guaranteed the individual autonomy of 
physicians as far as their practice standards were concerned, is clear from the disciplinary 
record of the GMC as set out in a publication commemorating its centenary in 1958 
written by its then registrar, W. Pyke-Lees. He reported that among the 200 doctors who 
had been disciplined and de-registered in the 50-odd years since 1900, "77 have been 
erased for adultery or improper conduct with a patient, 53 for procuring or attempting to 
procure abortion or miscarriage, and 45 for offences connected with drink or drugs" (1958 
p27). Notably missing from that list were anything relating to professional practice 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Legal cases are references separately after the main list of References (see p307)   
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standards, which led Klein, one of the best-known writer/commentators in Britain on 
medical autonomy, to ask 25 years later:  
Does the official machinery of accountability actually ensure that the 
public can rely on getting "satisfactory treatment" from members of the 
medical profession?  The answer is, almost certainly, no.  Once a doctor 
has graduated on to the medical register, the GMC's role is essentially 
negative. … Its role is to drum convicted sinners out of the profession, not 
to ensure continued professional virtue.…. Its machinery is not designed 
to deal with the doctor who is neither psychiatrically ill nor dishonest, 
who does not touch drink or drugs, who does not sleep with his patients or 
break the law... who is a good and sane citizen but a poor doctor (1984 
P162). 
As will be demonstrated particularly in Chapter Five, this was also true of NSW, where 
right up to the 1980s, the "infamous conduct" of most practitioners deregistered by the 
MRB related to improper advertising, financial fraud and addiction to alcohol or drugs.  
 
In 1972 "infamous conduct" was replaced in the NSW Medical Practitioners' Act with the 
words  "misconduct in any professional respect".  This may have been in response to a 
statement made by a learned judge in a Supreme Court case of 1965, Ex parte Meehan; re 
Medical Practitioners' Act ([1965] NSWLR 30). This case resulted from an appeal by a 
practitioner who had been suspended for 12 months by the Medical Tribunal which had 
adjudged him guilty of "infamous conduct" for performing operations in which he 
himself had administered the anaesthetic instead of engaging the services of an 
anaesthetist. The practitioner appealed to the Supreme Court against the judgement. 
While all three judges of that Court agreed with each other that in terms of the precedent 
set by the Lopes judgement in the Allinson case of 1894 and followed in numerous other 
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cases, only medical peers could define and decide on "infamous conduct", Justice J. 
Wallace stated: "…. I cannot leave the case without expressing the view that the phrase 
'infamous conduct' which derives from an English provision enacted over a century ago 
(and I would think, was inspired by a somewhat different legislative intendment) is 
antiquated and attracts legislative review" ([1965] NSWLR 30).11 
 
The suggested "legislative review" took place in 1972 when the Medical Practitioners’ 
Amendment Act of that year was passed. However, the replacement of “infamous 
conduct” with “misconduct in professional respect” in that Act, had been preceded long 
before this in regard to the Dental Practice Act when it was amended in 1934. When the 
original Dental Act was passed in 1900, it included "infamous conduct" as the main 
ground for deregistration, but this was changed to "misconduct" by the 1934 amendments 
which, "without limiting the meaning of the expression 'misconduct in a professional 
respect'," laid down that a dentist would be guilty of such misconduct if he was addicted 
to alcohol or drugs or if, in the words of the Amendment Act, he 
• carries on the practice of dentistry under a name other than his own 
name except whilst he is acting as duly appointed locum tenens of 
another registered dentist; or 
• allows the use of his name in connection with the practice of dentistry 
at premises at which he or his duly appointed locum tenens is not in 
regular attendance for the purposes of practice and supervision during 
the hours in which such premises are open for the practice of 
dentistry; or 
                                                 
11  While it agreed with the Medical Tribunal's finding of "infamous conduct", the Supreme Court overturned 
the penalty of a year's suspension from practice and substituted that of a reprimand to the practitioner.  
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• advertises otherwise than in accordance with the regulations or 
advertises in contravention of the regulations; or 
• for fee, salary or other reward is employed by or associates himself 
with a person who is not a registered dentist in carrying on the 
practice of dentistry.  
Obviously these clauses were designed to protect the economic interests of practising 
dentists and evidenced no concern for the maintenance of practice standards.  That 
situation remained essentially unchanged for the next fifty years, which led Dr J. Jago, 
who taught in the dentistry school at the University of Queensland, to remark in an article 
in New Doctor, (the journal of the Doctors’ Reform Society) in 1980: 
The dental practice acts of the various states and territories, which are the 
ultimate symbols and enforcers of professionalism, lay down no specific 
standards of competent practice, no means of testing them, and no 
provision for deregistering a dentist on the basis of assessed incompetence 
or obsolescence.  
Thus, argued Jago, while the profession had "successfully obtained the right to autonomy 
as the only fit body to assess its performance collectively," it none the less had never 
made any real attempt to do so (Jago, 1980, p21).   
 
The situation in dentistry closely paralleled that in Medicine, but that was of no concern to 
either medical professionals or lawmakers for a long time. For example, in the GMC 
centenary publication, Pyke-Lees praised the Lopes judgement of 1894, stating that it had 
"proved of great value" since the great majority of complaints registered by the GMC 
raised no questions of infamous conduct on the part of the doctor concerned. "Rudeness is 
not infamy; and many minor lapses of judgement or etiquette, although liable to cause 
anger or pain, fall far short of constituting infamous conduct" (p24). Patients who had 
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suffered "anger or pain" would probably have disagreed, but with their position reinforced 
by the Lopes judgement, the "usual answer" of GMC to complainants said Pyke-Lees, was 
that "the Council is not empowered by the Medical Acts to intervene in the matters about 
which they write" (p25). Both he and the medical profession as whole might have taken 
warning from the fact that, as he himself stated,  "to the general public, and to the Press … 
the Council is concerned above all with discipline" (p25) and as Daniel argues,  "discipline, 
or rather the perception of discipline, is the basis of trust in a profession” (Daniel, 1994 
p198).  
 
In any case the disciplinary instrument created first in the British and later in the NSW 
Acts, was a blunt and crude one. It specified only a single sanction for a practitioner 
guilty of “felony or misdemeanor” or “infamous conduct”, and that was de-registration. 
This was an extreme penalty imposing what could amount to an occupational death 
sentence. Being deprived of their means of earning a livelihood could financially ruin 
anyone found guilty of the offences set out in the clause. Not until the passing of the 
Medical Practitioners' Act of 1938, were lesser penalties, including suspension from 
practice and reprimand incorporated into the law for what were adjudged to be less 
serious misdemeanours.  
 
Without these lighter penalties the situation pertaining to the exercise of medical 
discipline before 1938 in NSW was analogous to that of a jurisdiction in which the only 
penalty for any crime was death, which probably has never been the case in any society 
anywhere in the world. Pursuing the extreme penalty analogy, it is evident that whether 
this involves capital punishment or a life sentence, such a penalty is generally applied 
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only to the most blatant and extreme cases and then with great care. The tendency to err 
on the side of caution was likely to be magnified in Medicine, which like most other 
professions is characterised by a strong sense of collegiality. In the words of Johnson: 
"Professionalism creates a high degree of self-consciousness and complete identity"  
(Johnson, 1972 p57) and that in turn creates a situation in which professionals tend to 
close ranks around a colleague whose conduct is being questioned, as was demonstrated 
in Rosenthal's study of the behaviour of doctors in the United Kingdom carried out within 
a decade of this thesis being written. That study showed, she wrote, that the inexact 
nature of medical treatment means that doctors work under "a sense of permanent 
uncertainty" and have an "overwhelming feeling of personal vulnerability". Thus she 
reported, "interviewees express a strong impulse to understand their colleagues' situation 
when an accident occurs and are quick to forgive" (Rosenthal, 1995 p21). 
 
That this is by no means a new phenomenon in Medicine appears from an anecdote 
recounted by a member of the NSW parliament, Mr Alexander Brown (Progressive, 
Newcastle) in the debate over the Medical Practitioners’ Bill of 1900. He told the House 
that  while certain surgeon was performing an operation with several other doctors 
present, it was "manifest to the others that he had made a mull of it." One of the attending 
doctors  
stood out against the others, and did not hesitate to say what he thought of 
the matter.  The other half-dozen however, stuck to their friend at the 
operating table, with the result that they tabooed the man who had not 
hesitated to express his opinion with regard to the matter. … One of the 
medical men to whom I spoke in connection with the matter said: "There 
can be no doubt my friend made a mistake; but that was not the place to 
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declare it; it was our business to stand by him (NSWPD 1:107 1/11/1900 
p4634). 
Hiding the shortcomings of individual practitioners in this way was made easier by the 
fact that because this was a practice issue, the MRB would not have adjudged the 
surgeon’s actions to be "infamous conduct".  
 
Finally, it might be remarked that for over a century after the passing of the British 
Medical Practice Act 1858 (which was the model for later Australian legislation) its 
disciplinary functions were not seen to be a major feature of medical regulatory bodies. 
As noted above, only one clause out of 55 in the 1858 British Medical Practice Act 
related to discipline, while in NSW only two out of the dozen clauses 1900 Medical 
Practitioners' Acts were concerned with discipline. Moreover as will appear in Chapter 7, 
even today MRBs are not equipped with anything but the most elementary machinery to 
investigate disciplinary matters.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the recognition of the peer review principle 
meant that as far as the application of medical discipline in NSW was concerned, the 
interests of medical professionals on both the institutional and individual level, were 
deeply entrenched by the “infamous conduct” wording of the disciplinary clauses of 
Medical Practitioners’ Acts. The peer review principle was embodied in the high, almost 
total degree of institutional autonomy of MRBs which in turn ensured the individual 
autonomy of practitioners, since no other agency outside the MRBs including the courts 
was seen to be competent to judge their professional performance. Since MRBs were not 
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willing to hold individual practitioners accountable for their standards of practice, 
medical professionals appeared to be unaccountable to anyone on this score. It is this 
situation of non-accountability and the way in which it was reversed, which forms a core 
issue in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDICAL AUTONOMY IN NSW 
As noted in the previous chapter medical autonomy is exercised not only on an 
individual, but also on an institutional level. When authorities such as Freidson (1970) 
and Willis (1989) write about "the medical profession" as being autonomous and 
exercising control over other health-related professions, they do so in a general sense; but 
in a more specific sense, as Wolinksy notes, "…autonomy is always granted through 
legal process" (1993, p12). In concrete terms, this means that autonomy is embodied in a 
parliamentary or legislative act which establishes an institution i.e. an MRB or its 
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equivalent. Those institutions also make it possible for the full force and range of 
professional status to be attained. There are of course, a plethora of other conditions for 
professionalisation which have to be fulfilled and these, in the words of Lloyd (1993),  
… involve: generating and sustaining group solidarity; establishing codes 
of professional conduct; standardising initial and continuing education 
training and work practices; restricting access to such educational 
opportunities; maintaining the barrier between powerful expert and 
dependent clients principally by emphasising the indeterminate or 
interpretive quality of professional knowledge;  establishing and 
extending access to a clientele by excluding or subordinating adjacent and 
competing occupational groups (in large part through exclusive alignment 
with major institutional settings within which professional practice 
occurs); jostling with third party providers (for example, in the health 
sector, with organisations such as friendly societies and hospital 
contribution funds) for control over the terms of the expert-client 
encounter; and lobbying government to provide legislative support for the 
group's monopolistic position (p44). 
 
The major part of the theses of Davis (1983) and Lloyd (1993), as well as the work of 
Lewis & MacLeod (1989), is devoted to describing how the professional monopolisers in 
NSW acted to achieve these aims although their success remained very partial until the 
passing of the Medical Practitioners' Acts of 1900. That legislation not only provided the 
foundation for Medicine's dominant position in law, but also provided it with the 
legitimation which enabled it to dominate the discourse of health care in a Foucauldian 
sense during the 20th century. That domination, it should be said, was attained despite its 
almost complete failure to exclude or subordinate "adjacent and competing groups". On 
this latter score, the conclusions of Lewis and MacLeod (1988) are mistaken while Lloyd 
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(1993) also underestimates the power and influence of the lifeworld medicine, as will be 
demonstrated later in this text.  
The 1838 Act and the expansion of government in NSW 
Since legislation occupies such a crucial position in the process of professionalisation, all 
studies pay attention to the Act of 1838 which established the first MRB in NSW. A 
plaque on the headquarters of the current MRB in Sydney proudly records its lineage in 
this regard. However, the Board which existed between 1838 and 1900 was not a 
regulatory body; its function was set out in the title of the legislation under which it was 
established, viz: "An Act to provide for the attendance of Medical Witnesses at Coroners' 
Inquests and Inquiries held by Justices of the Peace" (1 Victoria No. 3)12. In other words, 
its sole purpose was to provide governments with a list of medical practitioners whose 
testimony could be accepted at coronial inquests. That Act therefore might seem to have 
had little direct significance as far as the processes of medical professionalisation and 
autonomy are concerned. Much more significant in that regard was a Medical 
Practitioners' Bill which came before the NSW Colonial Legislature, also in 1838, which 
would have regulated the medical profession as far as the training and qualifications of 
medical practitioners was concerned, although it did not include any disciplinary clauses. 
This Bill however, like all of those which came before the NSW legislature over the next 
60 years, failed to pass and lapsed for reasons which will be more fully discussed shortly. 
Willis chooses to ignore it because it did not affect the division of labour in health (1989, 
p48), but however limited its direct impact on the processes of professionalisation, the 
                                                 
12 The "Victoria" in this title, was Queen Victoria, not the colony of Victoria. All Acts at that time were dated in 
terms of the name of the current monarch.  
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1838 Act is a marker of some very significant trends and developments which deserve 
fuller consideration with regard to the subject of this study. One of those trends was the 
growth of the bureaucratisation of public life, described by Weber when, as noted in 
Chapter One, he pointed to "…the increasing need felt by a society grown accustomed to 
stable and absolute peace, for order and protection ('police') in all fields…" (1978 [1922], 
p.972).  This felt societal need in fact led to one of the most significant but little remarked 
developments in public life during the 19th and 20th centuries. This is reflected in the figures 
quoted by Howard (1995 pp87-8): 
… there has been a massive increase in the relative size of the public 
sector in advanced capitalist nations. From 1890 to 1980, total public 
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expenditure as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) increased 
from 15 per cent to 47 per cent in the United Kingdom, 10 per cent to 45 
per cent in Germany and 5 per cent to 34 per cent in the United States."  
… In Australia public sector employment as a percentage of the total 
workforce increased from 9 per cent in 1900 to 23 percent in 1981 (pp. 
81-2). 
As is evident from the above quotation, no economic figures comparable to those of the USA, 
UK and Germany are available for Australia as a whole. However, Knight who in his 
Masters' Thesis of 1955 traced the growth of the public service in NSW in the late 19th 
century, demonstrated that that the expansion of government bureaucracy in this State was 
probably even faster than that in the economically developed countries mentioned by Howard 
above. Thus, while between 1860 and 1895 the population of NSW grew by 262% (from 
348,546 to 1,262,270), according to Knight (1955): 
In the same length of time, but taking the period 1859 to 1894, we find 
that the number of Civil Servants, (including Railway employees and 
Police) increased from 843 to 32,722 - giving the astounding result of a 
rise of  3,793 per cent! (p38) 
Knight's asserts that this growth was "much faster … than was warranted" because "a 
great deal  … was attributable to the recruitment of large numbers of unqualified and 
generally unsuitable officers, appointed mainly because they were able to command some 
influence on their behalf" (p38). Whether that is so or not, Knight's statistics can be taken 
as confirmation of the observation made by Drucker, quoted below, that at that time 
populations in economically developed countries had “fallen in love with government" 
and saw it as panacea for all kinds of societal ills.  
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Also illustrative of this trend is that the number of ministerial portfolios in NSW doubled 
from six to twelve in the 50 years after the granting of responsible government in 1856. By 
1916 the number of portfolios had risen to 14 and included in these for the first time in that 
year was a health portfolio, known as the Department for Public Health (New South Wales, 
1998 p258). In 1920 this became the Department for Public Health and Motherhood, the last 
word reflecting Australian concern about what was seen as the small size of the population at 
the time and the need to ensure its increase through natural growth. "Motherhood" was 
dropped from this ministry's title in 1925, and the word "Public" ten years later (NSW 1998, 
pp263, 267).  That there was no Health Ministry for 60 years after the coming of responsible 
government indicates that at that stage, health was seen only as a peripheral government 
responsibility and even though as outlined in Chapter Four, this changed in the later 19th 
century; the Australian Commonwealth government established in 1901 did not include a 
Ministry for Health until 1921. 
 
The size and scope of government continued to expand exponentially throughout the 20th 
century. In 1956, 100 years after the introduction of responsible government in NSW, the 
number of portfolios stood at 29 (NSW 1998, p274), while today (2002) they number 39. 
  
This enormous expansion of government indicates a Kuhnian paradigm shift in thinking 
about the functions and scope of government which has taken place during the last 150 
years. The five ministerial portfolios in NSW in 185613 were reflective of the minimalist 
and liberal laissez faire thinking about the functions of government at the time, but as 
                                                 
13  Those of the Colonial Secretary, Colonial Treasurer, Attorney-General, Solicitor-General and Auditor- 
General.  
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Drucker (1969) stated in his influential article, The Sickness of Government, attitudes 
changed radically in the later 19th century. Rather than being a source of societal 
problems and therefore needing to be kept within bounds, government began to be seen 
as the chief source of societal redemption. "For seventy years or so - from the 1890's to 
the 1960's," wrote Drucker:  
[M]ankind, especially in the developed countries, was hypnotized by 
government. We were in love with and saw no limits to its abilities, or to 
its good intentions. … Anything that anyone felt needed doing during this 
period was to be turned over to government - and this, everyone seemed 
to believe, made sure that the job was already done. (p5) 
The phenomenon of governmental expansion has been discussed at some length because 
it was at this time and in this context that the bureaucratisation or regulation of medicine 
in NSW was taking place. The result of that development was that while the medical 
profession encountered great opposition from the adherents of lifeworld medicine as it 
sought " legislative support … for its monopolistic position" in Lloyd's words (p.45) on 
the other hand there was in the later 19th century in NSW   "increasing State interest and 
support for medical activity both private and public, curative and preventative" (1983, 
p.2). That reflected the wholehearted support for the processes of bureaucratisation in 
public life noted by Knight (1955), which meant that both the government and corporate 
rationalist structural interests looked favourably on the drive for medical regulation by 
the professional monopolists. Indeed it will be argued, without the help of the 
representatives of these structural interests, the professional monopolists would have 
found it virtually impossible to obtain the regulatory regime they needed to entrench their 
claims to legal institutional and individual professional autonomy.   
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The “expert co-optation” principle 
One problem governments faced as they sought to respond to demands for regulation and 
bureaucratisation, was that of staffing the newly established bureaucracies, particularly 
statutory authorities. As noted in the previous chapter, these bodies were operating in 
fields in which the existing governmental personnel had little or no knowledge let alone 
expertise. The solution was to apply the principle of “expert co-optation”, in terms of 
which experts from the private sector are recruited to administer new bureaucratic 
agencies. That principle, as noted above, was extensively used in the era preceding that of 
responsible government in  NSW, when administrative boards were established to 
oversee special areas, including that of health. Indeed, in no instance was the "expert co-
optation principle" more likely to be applied than in the case of Medicine, particularly 
because of the historical precedents already cited. As noted above, ever since the 16th 
century governments had accepted that doctors were the best administrators of the state-
related issues of doctoring.  As will be argued more fully, this arrangement contained an 
additional benefit, in that the societal legitimacy which professions such as Medicine had 
won for themselves in turn legitimated the activities of the governments which co-opted 
them. 
 
All of this provides a context for the 1838 Medical Witnesses Act, the instigation of 
which is taken by all who have written about it (Hilder, 1959; Cummins, 1969; Davis, 
1983; Lewis & MacLeod, 1988; Willis, 1989; Lloyd, 1993) as a piece of legislation 
remarkable only for being the first of its kind. However, they make no attempt to see it 
against the background broader societal developments at the time, particularly the 
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changing paradigm of government. This Act represented the incoming tide of 
bureaucratisation based on societal demands for "absolute peace" and "order and 
protection" noted by Weber (1978 [1922]), although the origin of those demands in this 
case lay not so much in NSW as in the United Kingdom, where the first Births, Deaths 
and Marriages Act had been passed by the British Parliament in 1836. That Act, which 
came into force on July 1, 1837, had two main purposes: "first, to facilitate legal proof of 
death, and, secondly, to produce more accurate mortality statistics" (Great Britain, 1972 
p9).  As was the custom of colonial dependencies at the time, this Act was adopted by the 
NSW Legislative Council and incorporated into the law of the colony. In the view of 
Foucault (1975), the statistical concerns of the drafters of the Act would have represented 
a sinister example of the expansion of "surveillance" by the state, another building block 
of the Panopticon. However, the necessity of recording the causes of death, and 
particularly of unexplained death, would certainly have been seen at the time (as it is 
now) as an important contribution to societal stability and support for the rule of law.  
The contest for societal legitimacy 
One of the weaknesses of the British Act recognised from the outset was that "the 
particulars of the cause of death to be recorded in the register were not required to be 
obtained from a medical practitioner but were merely part of the information to be given 
by the informant [the person giving information about the death] or, in inquest cases, by 
the coroner" (Great Britain, 1972 p9). This remained a flaw in the British Act for many 
years and the passing of the Medical  Witnesses Act in NSW in 1838 was probably an 
attempt to remedy that. However, it must soon have become apparent that although the 
Act specified that "legally qualified Medical Practitioners' should be required give 
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evidence at coroners' inquests", it did not define what constituted a "legally qualified 
Medical Practitioner".  
 
While today that definition may seem obvious, this was not so before the rise and dominance 
of scientific medicine. During the whole of the 19th century, lifeworld medicine was not only 
widely used, but as argued earlier, was seen by possibly the majority of the population to be 
just as efficacious, if not more so than the treatments offered by doctors. Thus it would by no 
means have been obvious as to who was best qualified to practice medicine. The wide array 
of traditional practitioners is evident from testimony given to a Select Committee of the 
Legislative Council in 1838, which mentioned  "Midwives, Herbalists, Cuppers, Barbers, 
Electricians, Galvanisers, Dentists, Farriers, Veterinary Surgeons, Village Wisemen and 
Cow Leeches" (New South Wales, 1838 p19). As is argued in Chapter Four, all of these 
would have been accepted and used particularly by the lower socio-economic strata of 
society as bona fide medical practitioners.  
 
None the less, it would no doubt have seemed to the NSW legislators drawn from the 
elite classes who preferred to use allopathic medicine, that there could be no question of 
regarding uneducated traditional healers as qualified medical practitioners; to allow for 
instance, a "village wiseman" or a "cow leech" to give official testimony in the newly 
established coronial courts, would be an affront to the Majesty of the Law. Therefore, 
three months after the passing of the Medical Witnesses Act in June 1838, the Legislative 
Council passed "An Act to define the qualifications of Medical Witnesses at Coroners' 
Inquests and Inquiries held before Justices of the Peace in the Colony of NSW" (2 Victoria 
No. 22).  
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This second Act was of seminal importance, since it set the precedents for the institutional 
autonomy of the medical profession in NSW. This Act established the first MRB, specifying 
that it should be composed of not less than three members, all of whom had to be legally 
qualified medical practitioners. A legally qualified practitioner was defined to be one who    
…is a Doctor or Bachelor of Medicine of some University or a Physician 
or Surgeon licensed or admitted as such by some College of Physicians or 
Surgeons in Great Britain or Ireland or is a Member of the Company of 
Apothecaries of London or who is or has been a Medical Officer duly 
appointed and confirmed of Her Majesty's land or sea service.14  
The MRB had as its basic function the compilation and maintenance of a Medical 
Register, published annually in the Government Gazette, which contained the names of 
practitioners who were adjudged to be "legally qualified". Those who wished to be so 
recognised were obliged under the Act to present evidence of their credentials to the 
MRB, which had the power either to certify or reject them.  
 
While it was probably not obvious at the time and indeed is not so even today, this Act 
can be seen as it were, as a "starter's gun" in a race for societal legitimacy between 
allopathic and lifeworld medicine, the outcome of which would by no means have been 
certain in 1838. However, whatever its shortcomings at the time (as described in Chapter 
One) allopathic medicine started the race with a huge advantage in that it was based on 
university education. As Jackson (1970) states, the university,  
                                                 
14 This last stipulation remained on the NSW Statute Book right up to 1938. 
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…with its emphasis on teaching and research provides both the training 
and the intellectual tradition itself but also, in some measure, incorporates 
the legitimating structure of authority and competence. (1970 p2). 
While particularly the medical knowledge taught in universities, based as noted in the 
previous chapter on humoral theories, was very often misconceived and from today’s 
perspectives, often not very  apposite (heavy emphasis was placed on learning Latin and 
ancient Greek), it was none the less, systematic and testable for qualification purposes. It 
could therefore be regarded as both “scientific” and rational in a Weberian sense. On these 
grounds university medical education provided the foundation for the societal legitimation 
of allopathic medicine, and that in turn indicates how education provided and still 
provides the bedrock of legitimacy for a great range of societal activity performed by an 
equally wide range of groups. Larson also makes a salutary point when she points to "the 
role that educational systems play in different structures of social inequality" (1977 pxvii).  
 
That assertion certainly supports the point made by Davis (1983) that the epistemological 
race for legitimacy between allopathic and traditional medicine in NSW had a strong 
class-based dynamic. He demonstrated that the chief proponents of allopathic medicine 
were "elite practitioners [who] moved in circles which were mutually reinforcing and 
exclusive" and this produced "a medical practitioner whose social, political and economic 
interests lay with the people who employed and paid him, and who shared with them a 
social status and reputation" (pp. 10-11).  
 
Although this trend became much more fully developed in the later 19th century, none the 
less it is clear that it was very much present in 1838 when the MRB was constituted on the 
 85
basis of the “expert co-optation” principle. The first appointed president was Dr J.V. 
Thomson, who was already Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals. The other members 
were Dr J. Dobie, a surgeon with the Royal Navy who was to become a member of the 
legislature, Dr J. Robertson who was later to join the staff of the University of Sydney, as 
did Dr C. Nicholson and who was also a member of the legislature. Finally there was a 
Dr. F. Wallace who had been trained in Edinburgh and after having been in Sydney for six 
years, was obviously close enough to the local medical establishment to be asked to give 
evidence before the Select Committee investigating the Medical Practitioners' Bill in 1838 
(Hilder, 1959 p16).  
 
These practitioners not only provided the NSW government with expertise in the field in 
which they were working, but also imparted their education-based legitimacy to that 
government as its activities expanded into their field. As such the MRB illustrated a 
developing principle - that governments needed specialised occupational groupings such 
as Medicine for the successful conduct of administrative activities in specialised areas. 
This is the other side of the coin to that discussed above when it was pointed out that the 
occupational groups such as Medicine themselves need legislative support from 
governments in order to complete their professionalisation.  This would support Johnson's 
(1982) view that "… the relationship of state to professions presents itself as one of 
constant struggle and seeming hostility, while at the same time constituting an 
interdependent structure". It also constitutes the ground for his critique of Carr Saunders & 
Wilson as well as Durkheim for "viewing state regulation as, in many instances, an 
undesirable incursion into matters best left to the autonomous professions" and for asserting 
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that there was a choice between "intervention leading to loss of autonomy or non-intervention 
allowing autonomy" (Johnson, 1982 pp206-7).   
Autonomy and the functioning of the MRB 
The MRB established in 1838 had no regulatory powers. As such it gave the medical 
profession few obvious advantages and if anything, its activities were irksome for doctors.  
Despite being remunerated for giving evidence before Coroner' s Courts when summoned to 
do so, they very often found themselves out of pocket through having to travel long distances 
and also lost income because of the time that could take (New South Wales, 1887 p18). The 
members of the MRB were unpaid and as outlined in the next chapter, their ability even to 
perform so basic a function as checking the qualifications of those who presented themselves 
for accreditation, was non-existent.  
 
Still, the fact of the Board's existence and its maintenance of the medical register, did hold  
advantages of the profession. That as Hilder (1972, p.35) shows, the numbers requesting 
accreditation rose from 6 in 1839 to 1,906 in 1889, indicates that getting their name on the 
register benefited practitioners in the longer term. Even though the register maintained by the 
MRB was meant to be simply a reference source for magistrates and coroners and was not 
drawn up for any wider public interest, none the less doctors who had their name on the 
register could expect to reap commercial benefits from the fact that their  qualifications had 
received official legitimation.   
 
Finally, it is important to note that since it was entrusted to a body composed entirely of 
medical practitioners, this first exercise in medical credentialling in NSW signalled the 
institution of legislatively-supported peer review. Furthermore, that other than the 
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maintenance of the register, the 1838 Act specified no reporting or accountability 
requirements by the MRB, meant not only that it was free to act autonomously, but that in fact 
it was expected to do so. As such, it set precedents for institutional autonomy which would be 
followed by legislators and MRBs themselves in NSW for the next century-and-a-half.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MEDICAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL STRUGGLES IN nsw 
For reasons that will be outlined in this Chapter, the high degree of institutional medical 
autonomy in NSW established in 1838 lasted well over a century. Institutional autonomy 
was complemented and reinforced by the individual medical autonomy introduced in 
1900 by the Medical Practitioners' Further Amendment Act (No. 70, 1900) in terms of 
which "infamous conduct in professional respect" became the main ground for medical 
discipline. The strongly entrenched nature of professional medical autonomy in NSW for 
such a long period was a result of a major conflict between allopathic and lifeworld 
medicine which also had a major impact on the way the legislative framework for that 
autonomy came into existence.  
 
The paradox is that while the proponents of lifeworld medicine were more successful in 
NSW than in any other Australian jurisdiction in delaying the legislative entrenchment of 
allopathic medicine, the very ferocity with which they resisted that development in the 
final result actually strengthened the position of allopathic medicine and also the 
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autonomy of the medical profession in this State. This Chapter thus deals extensively 
with the conflict between the two epistemologies in NSW and the way this shaped the 
legislative developments which gave rise to the form that medical autonomy took for 
most of the 20th century.  
The weakness of the Medical Witnesses Act 
The 1838 Medical Witnesses Act was the only legislation affecting the medical 
profession in NSW for the next sixty years. Amendments to this Act did not affect its 
substance,15 although it was given "teeth" by the "Medical Practitioners' Registration" 
Act (Victoria 17) of 1855 which laid down a three-year jail term for anyone convicted of 
giving false testimony to the MRB or using forged documents to secure legal registration. 
However that both this and the 1838 Act were inadequate as regulatory instruments is 
evident from the strenuous efforts made to bring in more comprehensive legislation after 
1859. That these proved consistently unsuccessful meant that because of its lack of 
medical regulation, NSW was increasingly isolated in the later 19th century. While the 
model for regulatory legislation was the British Medical Practice Act of 1858, in fact 
embryonic legislation of a similar kind had been passed in Tasmania as far back as 1838 
(Tasmania, 1884` pp1405-1408).16 Medical Acts had also been passed in Victoria in 
1862, (Willis, 1989 pp52-3), New Zealand in 1866 (New Zealand, 1867, pp407-14),17 
South Australia in 1880 (Fraenkel & Wilde, 1994), Queensland in 1867 (Queensland, 
                                                 
15 The 1844 amendment allowed for the establishment of a MRB in Melbourne (Victoria No 7, 23rd August 
1844). In 1855 the  Medical Practitioners' Registration Act added the newly established University of Sydney to 
the list of institutions whose qualifications could be accepted by the MRB.   The purpose of this Act set out in 
its preamble, was simply to "amend the law relating to the qualifications of Medical Witness on Coroners' 
Inquests and other Inquiries" (NSW Statutes, 1879, p1419). 
16 1 Victoria, No 17. 7th November, 1837  
17 30 Victoria No. 30, 10th October 1867 
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1911 pp2108-2122)18 and Western Australia in 1894 (Western Australia, 1984pp1-9).19 
Similar medical regulation was also advancing  apace in the United States, where 
according to Starr, every State had passed the necessary legislation by 1901 (1982 p131). 
 The NSW 1838 Act stood in sharp contrast to what was happening elsewhere in this 
sphere. While it did specify criteria for entry and registration into the medical 
profession20, there was little or no attempt to enforce those criteria even after the passing 
of the 1855 Act with its punitive provisions. Moreover both the 1838 and 1855 Acts 
failed to specify any disciplinary measures to maintain standards of practice and conduct.  
While NSW did finally get a "Medical Practitioners' Act" in 1898, it merely tidied up the 
wording of the 1838 and 1855 Acts and their amendments and did nothing to remedy 
their glaring weaknesses.  Those weaknesses were first and foremost that while the 
legislation provided for the registration of doctors, it did not prohibit the use of that title 
by those whose names did not appear on the Medical Register. That point was forcibly 
made to the Select Committee inquiring into the "Law Respecting the Practice of 
Medicine and Surgery" in 1887 by Dr Henry McLaurin, chancellor of the University of 
Sydney and also a member of the MRB. "Any person" he told the committee, including 
those who had had no medical training whatsoever, could practice medicine in NSW and 
advertise themselves as a doctor of medicine or as the holder of other medical 
qualifications (New South Wales, 1887 p16).  
 
                                                 
18 31 Victoria No. 33, 28th December 1867 
19 58 Victoria No 36, 28th November 1894 
20 Those criteria, as we have seen, were based on educational qualifications or service in the British armed 
forces.  
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Moreover, the powers given by the Act to the MRB were extremely weak, a point 
continually made by members of the MRB and others who were also serving in the NSW 
parliament in the late 19th century. As the chairman of the Board, Sir Arthur Renwick, 
pointed out in 1880, while the Board had power to certify the qualifications of anyone 
presenting themselves for certification as a registered practitioner, 
… the powers of the board were confined to that special purpose, and did 
not admit of a determination whether any gentlemen who presented 
themselves for registration, were really and properly the possessors of the 
documents they showed, or qualified to practice. No other step could be 
taken than to demand an affidavit. Several applicants for registration had 
no doubt forsworn themselves and were now practising in the colony. 
Although different Attorneys General had been consulted on this matter 
… it was found that the power of the law could not be brought to bear on 
such cases (NSWPD 1:1 12/3/1880 pp1530-31). 
Thus it was difficult to say who were duly qualified doctors even when they were 
certified by the MRB. Those who did "forswear" themselves before the Board by 
presenting false credentials were, in terms of the 1855 Act, running the risk of a three 
year jail term. However, confirming Renwick's point about the lack of state support, the 
1887 Select Committee reported that while the Board had from time to time made 
requests  "for assistance in prosecuting cases of fraud", these had without exception, been 
refused by Crown law officers (New South Wales, 1887 p5).  
 
Nor did the Act confer on the Board any powers to control or discipline doctors once they 
had received certification; no legally qualified practitioner could be de-registered or 
barred from practising, however miscreant they had proved themselves (New South 
Wales, 1887 p21). Worse still, the Board had no alternative but to accept the credentials 
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of and certificate a doctor who had been deregistered in another jurisdiction (NSWPD 1: 
93 21/9/1898, p733). 
 
Thus NSW, the most populous of the Australian colonies21, constituted a model of 
chaotic unregulated medical practice in the late 19th century. Not until late 1900 was 
some elementary regulation introduced in the form of the Medical Practitioners' 
Amendment Act  
(No.33, 1900) and the Medical Practitioners' Further Amendment (No. 70, 1900), which 
were passed within weeks of each other. Compared to the legislation of other 
Australasian colonies, these were extremely brief measures. The Medical Practitioners' 
Amendment Act consisted of only five clauses including the one which set out its name. 
The Further Amendment Act, which was rushed through the parliament a few weeks later 
had only six clauses, one of which again contained nothing but its name. When the two 
Acts were consolidated in 1912, the new Act had a mere 12 working clauses.22 This 
contrasts sharply with the model on which they were based, the British Act of 1858, 
which had 55 clauses and also with the 35 clauses of the Victorian Act passed in 1862.  
That the Medical Acts of the other Australian colonies as well New Zealand were 
similarly all very much more extensive than that of NSW is a point which has not been 
remarked on by any of the authors who have dealt with the history of the medical 
professionalisation in NSW and the reasons behind it certainly invite more in-depth 
investigations.  
                                                 
21  According to the census of 1901, the population of NSW was 1,359,133, its nearest competitor being 
Victoria, with 1,201,506 (NSW, 1901, p935).  
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Attempts to introduce medical regulation 
As mentioned above, the 1858 British Medical Practice Act (the world's first 
comprehensive legislation applied on a national basis) provided a model for medical 
regulation. Only one
                                                                                                                                                 
22 This Act has been reproduced in Appendix B rather than the Acts of 1838 and 1855 because in consolidating 
those, it very closely followed their content and format.  
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 year after its passing, Dr Henry Douglass, a member of the Legislative Council (the 
Upper House of the NSW parliament), attempted to have a similar Medical Bill passed. 
This failed, as did further attempts during the 1860s (Lewis & MacLeod, 1988 p77) but in 
1875 a more concerted campaign was launched which could on the surface, provide a 
good illustration of Weber's point that bureaucratisation arises from "the increasing need 
felt by a society grown accustomed to stable and absolute peace, for order and protection 
('police') in all fields…" (Weber, 1978 [1922]).  The strong and prolonged resistance of a 
significant sector of the population to medical regulation in NSW over the next 25 years 
demonstrates that demands for bureaucratisation are not necessarily always universal.  
 
Still, in 1875 the medical profession attempted to show that the society of NSW, desirous 
of "order and protection" in the medical field, did indeed support the introduction of 
regulation and policing by means of the establishment of a bureaucratic apparatus. Thus 
in December of that year, 17 petitions requesting the introduction of a Medical 
Practitioners' Act were laid before the parliament. Containing 2,878 signatures from both 
urban and rural areas across the colony, these petitions were used to launch yet another 
attempt to have such an Act passed (New South Wales, 1876 pp135-157). 
  
Yet while they were presumably willingly signed, whether the petitions represented any 
strong grass-roots popular feeling is questionable. Although they came from widely 
separated parts of the colony, their wording and content bore a close similarity (some 
were identical) and were obviously based on the same basic template. That indicates that 
in all likelihood their compilation had been orchestrated by the medical profession or 
probably more accurately, by the medical elite who will feature extensively in this 
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Chapter. The nature of the petitions can be appreciated by quoting from that received in 
March 1876 from "the inhabitants of Sydney" and which contained 1,360 signatures. It 
claimed that the petitioners 
…have hitherto been deprived of legal protection from injury and 
maltreatment in sickness, in consequence of there not being any Statute to 
restrain the fraud and imposture which is now extensively carried on 
throughout New South Wales by a class of persons professing to be duly 
qualified practitioners in the art and science of medicine and surgery, but 
who are in reality impostors, possessing no recognized qualifications 
whatever.   
That, in consequence of there being at present no such Act of Parliament 
in this Colony, we, your Petitioners, would respectfully pray a Medical 
Bill be brought before Parliament which would assimilate the laws with 
regard to the medical profession to those now in force in the United 
Kingdom (New South Wales, 1876 p281). 
It was a classic statement of the demands for "order and protection" to which, as noted in 
Chapter One, Weber as well as present-day commentators (Colebatch & Larmour, 1993); 
(Albrow, 1996); (Petersen & Lupton, 1996) attribute the emergence of bureaucracy as the 
chief and indeed the only method of managing risk. In this regard, it is interesting that the 
1875 petitions put forward much the same arguments in favour of regulation as those 
contained in the preamble to the Act which established the College of Surgeons in 
England in 1523. This is not surprising seeing, as argued in Chapter One (pp20-23) the 
basic reasons advanced for the regulation in any particular sphere do not vary, whatever 
the place or time.  
 
On the one hand, there is the argument for regulation in terms of the public good. Thus in 
NSW in the 19th century, leaders of the medical profession always argued that they 
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themselves had no personal interests at stake in the regulation of medical practice. In 
introducing a medical bill into the Lower House in 1880, Dr Richard Bowker (who 
served in both the Lower and Upper Houses of parliament) claimed he had no other 
motive "than that of having the honor [sic] of doing good service to the people" (NSWPD 
1:2 16/3/1880 p2158). In 1886 Dr Harmon Tarrant claimed he was acting "solely in the 
public interest", and in this he was supported by Dr John Creed, who said he "no purpose 
but to serve the good of the colony" (NSWPD 1:23 12/10/1886 p5596). Such claims were 
mostly, but not altogether disingenuous; state-licensure does undoubtedly provide "order 
and protection" in the medical field, as experience during the 20th century increasingly 
confirmed.  
 
Their opponents however, saw Medicine's demands for regulation simply as crude 
attempts at economic closure, particularly because in the 19th century Medicine could 
offer little evidence, let alone any guarantees, that its practices were superior to those of 
competing lifeworld medical epistemologies. Pensabene (1980 p16) points out that for 
… all the major diseases confronting late nineteenth century society - 
consumption, diphtheria, typhoid, measles, pneumonia and heart disease - 
the registered doctor had no established cures, nor did he fully understand 
the causes of these diseases (p16).  
Thus it was much more difficult to argue that allopathic medicine did indeed embody the 
public good as far as health care was concerned. Suspicions that economic closure was 
the real, underlying motive of allopathic practitioners were sharpened by their attacks on 
lifeworld medicine such as those in the petitions cited above, which were typical of the 
way Medicine argued its case in favour of regulation.    
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Between 1876 and 1900, there were no fewer than 13 separate attempts to have Medical 
Practitioners' bills passed through the NSW parliament, but all failed because, with two 
exceptions (those of 1886 and 1894-5) they were rejected by the Legislative Assembly, or 
the Lower House of the parliament.23 The significance of that is to be understood in terms 
of the composition of the legislature. When it was established in 1856 after the granting 
of responsible government, the NSW parliament was constituted as a bi-cameral 
legislature in which the function of the Upper House (the Legislative Council), although 
not its composition, was modeled on that of the House of Lords in Britain. The Upper 
House consisted of members nominated by the Governor, who were mostly drawn from 
the elite sectors of the society. The purpose of this nominated chamber was to interpose 
"a safe, revising, deliberative and conservative element between the Lower House and 
Her Majesty's representatives" (New South Wales, 1853 p119). In other words, the Upper 
House was established as a "House of Review". Parker asserts that "the nominee Council 
was conservative in practice, and generally in political complexion and action" (1978 
p197).  
 
The Lower House (the House of Assembly) in contrast was an elected body and therefore 
far more populist in its composition. While in its earlier years, the members of this House 
were mostly drawn from the petit bourgeoisie (Davis, 1983 Ch.4, p.7), after 1889 the 
payment of members made it possible for more working class representatives to enter the 
parliament.24 It is significant in this regard, that the great majority of attempts to pass a 
                                                 
23  A full list of these Bills and the reasons for their failure, appears in Appendix A.  
24 According to Davis (1983): "The largest occupational groups represented from 1856 to 1900 were 
Pastoralists (between 42% and 10%), Traders, Shopkeepers, and Professions and, only from 1891 onwards, 
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Medical Practitioners' Act were not only launched in the Upper House, but were also 
invariably passed through all their stages in that House.  
The free play of expression of the views and in voting patterns was made possible by the 
political situation in the NSW parliament in the 19th century, which was very different to 
that of 20th. Although there were two loose oppositional forces based on free-trade and 
protectionism (Parker, 1978 p.40), there were no political parties as such until the 
emergence of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Formed in 1891, the ALP (which 
became the official opposition in 1904 and the government for the first time 1910 
(Parker, 1978, p.53)), was responsible for introducing party discipline into the NSW 
parliament.25 The lack of party discipline before 1900 meant that individual members 
were free to vote according to their conscience and opinions.  The consequent inability of 
19th century executives to command automatic majorities greatly weakened their 
position, and ensured that fully two thirds of all legislation presented to the parliament 
was rejected (Lloyd, 1993 p.197) Thus the Lower House rejection of the Medical 
Practitioners' Bills would not have been seen an anything unusual at the time, although in 
resisting the onset of regulation and bureaucratisation in medicine, it was the Lower 
House which showing was itself to be “conservative in practice and … in political 
complexion and action”. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Artisans. Between 1856 and 1900 the middle class groups had the largest representation, as the Pastoralists 
were on the decline both in influence and numbers”(Ch 3, p7).  
25 The system of party discipline had been in existence long before this in the British parliament. As far back as 
1867 the famed constitutional lawyer, Walter Bagehot, had observed that without party discipline in the House 
of Commons “there would be 657 amendments to every motion [there being 657 MPs at the time] and none of 
them will be carried, nor the motion either” (Bagehot, 1964, [1867] p158). .  
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Socio-economic status and medical epistemology 
The long resistance to medical regulation by the Lower House affords the firmest pointer 
to  
what has been argued as the class basis for the clash between allopathic and lifeworld 
medicine in NSW. As noted in previous Chapters, while the higher socio-economic 
groups  
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in NSW tended to favour allopathic medicine, the opposition to medical regulation by 
middle-class representatives in the parliament indicated that its support was nothing like 
as strong among this group, and was probably even smaller among the lower socio-
economic groups.  That the medical epistemological divide ran along class lines was 
often unconsciously conceded by members of the Upper House, who were much given to 
lamenting about the way the poor were preyed upon by lifeworld practitioners. For 
example, in introducing the second reading of the Medical Practitioners' Amendment Bill 
in 1900, Mr T.M. Slattery declared that  
[T]hese men have been allowed to practise on the poor classes of the 
community. Of course they do not get their fees from the educated or rich 
classes, but from the poorer classes…. these men have cruelly and 
heartlessly taken away - and no doubt continue to take away - hardly 
earned money from a large number of the poorer classes, not only 
destroying their health, but also robbing them of their money (NSWPD  
1:106 4/11/1900 p3533).  
It might have been pointed out that given the meagre curative record of allopathic 
practitioners at the time, the same might have been said of them, and since their services 
were more expensive than those of lifeworld practitioners, it is not surprising they were 
not well patronised by the poor. 
 
But if the stalemate between the two parliamentary Houses which developed over the 
Medical Practice Bills was a reflection of the divide between higher and lower socio-
economic groups in NSW, it was by no means a neat and definite one. That is reflected in 
the fact that the support for or opposition to the Medical Acts was never total in either 
House. There were always a minority who disagreed with the majority in their particular 
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House. Thus there were some members of the Upper House (for example Thomas Holt 
who had been Colonial Treasurer in 1856 and was appointed as a life member in 1868) 
who consistently expressed strong and sometimes vehement support for the anti-
regulatory stands of lifeworld medicine. Similarly in the Lower House some such as John 
Norton, who was also editor of the sensationalist Truth newspaper, strongly favoured 
Medicine's call for regulation. Another was R.A. Price, who played a leading role in 
securing the passage of medical regulatory legislation in 1900. 
Reasons for resistance to medical regulation 
One of the chief reasons for the resistance of the majority in the Lower House to 
successive Medical Practitioners' Bills was that they were seen as attempts to implement 
"class legislation" (or in Weber's terms, social closure).  More specifically, in the words 
of Mr Francis Abigail (West Sydney), the parliament was being asked to pass a measure 
"giving the greatest possible protection to the medical profession" (NSWPD 1:20 
4/6/1886 p2433). In May 1880, Mr John Lucas (Canterbury), told the House that he had 
"a great objection to class legislation of any description, and he looked upon the Bill as 
the worst form of class legislation he had ever seen introduced into the House. … The 
Bill was a monstrous attempt to protect a few individuals, and the most amusing feature 
in connection with it was that it was advocated by gentlemen who professed to be free 
traders" (NSWPD 1:3 14/5/1880 p2327).  
 
Widespread bribery of members of the Lower House has been also been advanced a 
reason for its resistance to the Medical Practitioners' Bills (Lloyd, 1993 pp263-4); (Lewis 
& MacLeod, 1988 p78) This allegation was based on a speech made in the parliament in 
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1895 by a former Premier Sir George Dibbs, in which he stated that a lifeworld 
practitioner, who he refused to name, had not only offered him a bribe to prevent the 
passage of a Medical Act but boasted that his bribery of other parliamentarians had 
achieved that purpose on several previous occasions (NSWPD 1:76 21/3/1895 pp4700-
01). This was a serious charge, and as members indignantly pointed out, it impugned the 
integrity of everyone who voted against the Bill. They challenged Dibbs to call the 
practitioner to the Bar of the House to answer the allegations. Dibbs never did so. That 
however, did not prevent his story from being repeated by John Norton, who as 
mentioned above, was also was also the owner of the Truth newspaper. His speeches in 
the Parliament tended to reflect its sensationalist content. He named the practitioner in 
question as E.H. Botterell, who he said, had done so well out of his "quackery" that he 
had "added house to house and field to field, drove about with a gorgeous equipage, had a 
beautiful suburban villa and a house on the mountains, station property in the country" 
(NSWPD 1:105 18/9/1900 p2987). These charges were repeated by Dr Creed both in the 
Parliament (NSWPD 1:105 4/10/1900 p3538) and in the Australasian Medical Gazette, 
although there, not being protected by parliamentary privilege, he was careful not to 
mention Botterell's name, referring only to "a well-known man". Nor did he make an 
outright accusation of bribery, stating: 
Of course, I do not venture to connect the expenditure of the money with 
the failure of the numerous other Medical Bills which passed the Council 
but failed in another place to become law, but still it is a subject which 
readers … may like to consider in their leisure moments (March 20, 1900, 
pp113-14).  
That hardly indicates that Creed was sure enough of his facts to challenge Botterell to sue 
him. In the light of the failure of Dibbs or anyone else to instigate action against Botterell 
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for what after all was a blatant attempt to induce impermissible parliamentary behaviour, 
the charge of bribery must remain, in the Scottish legal term, "not proven". Whatever 
bribery may have occurred, it failed to prevent Medical Practitioners' Acts being passed 
by the Lower House in 1886 and 1894-95 as well as in 1900.  
Lifeworld medicine in NSW 
Moreover, it can be argued that no bribery was necessary because the majority of the 
members of the Lower House had no doubts about the rightness of the cause of lifeworld 
medicine over against allopathic medicine. The views of those in the lifeworld medicine 
camp were very often held and stated with great passion. The wide support for lifeworld 
medicine was lamented in an editorial in the Australian Medical Journal, of March 1873 
which stated:  
It should not be forgotten … that the sympathy both of the average public 
and more discreditable still, of the authorities, is on the side of quackery.  
… there is a well-understood feeling in the public mind - and it extends to 
all classes - that medical knowledge, like poetry, is born with the 
professor, and that quacks are natural geniuses, whom to foster is a duty, 
and to prosecute is base vindictiveness  (p89). 
Lloyd (1993 p263) notes that  "Some of the more prominent quacks and irregular healers 
enjoyed a level of patronage and popularity of which many of their qualified counterparts 
would have been envious." Willis (1989 p58) points to the fierceness of the struggle 
between lifeworld and allopathic medicine when he states: "The homeopaths saw 
themselves as pioneers, as founders of a new paradigm of medicine…" and that 
"[t]hrough the 1870s and 1880s the controversy between homeopathy and allopathy raged 
in newspapers and journals".  
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In Victoria, lifeworld practitioners (who included "Chinese and and Indian medical men, 
magnetists, clairvoyants, homeoepaths [sic] herbalists, galvanists, botanists, hydropathists 
and psychopathists") comprised only 4.5% of the medical workforce. None the less in 
urban areas where the bulk practised, "their numbers equalled one-third of the number of 
urban registered practitioners", which represented "a major competitive threat" 
(Pensabene, 1980 p16).  The situation in NSW seems to have been rather different. In 
1886 there were 1,275 legally qualified practitioners in the colony (Hilder, 1959 p.34) 
compared to the figure of 183  "unqualified men" practising in NSW cited in the Upper 
House in the same year by Creed, who served as president of the BMA and editor of the 
Australasian Medical Gazette. Of these, 83 (45%) were located in Sydney and its suburbs 
(NSWPD 1:23 12/10/1886 pp5597).  While this may hardly have seemed to pose a threat 
to allopathic practitioners, Creed thought the number in NSW scandalous because in the 
whole of the other five colonies there were only 74 unqualified practitioners.  
 
The fervour with which he and other proponents of allopathy attacked the 183 
“unqualified men” indicated that they were indeed seen to constitute a major threat. That 
may have been because even if they represented only a small proportion of total medical 
practice, the "unqualified men" attracted a devoted following and exercised an influence 
that was much greater than their numbers might have suggested. While medical doctors 
constituted by far the great majority of practitioners in the colony, this was not the case as 
far as their clientele were concerned. This is suggested by comparing the 2,878 signatures 
on the 1875 petitions cited above with an 1879 petition containing over 2,000 signatures 
of  "landed proprietors in Sydney and suburbs, and in Bathurst, Maitland, Morpeth and 
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other parts of the colony" who opposed the passing of a Medical Bill  (NSWPD  1:1 
15/3/1879). 
The strength of homeopathy and another treatment, hydrotherapy, were evident in debates 
even in the Upper House in 1876. Here Thomas Holt charged that the Medical 
Practitioners Bill of that year would not only disadvantage homeopaths and the 
practitioners of hydrotherapy, but that favouring allopathy would "tend to put a stop to all 
improvements in the healing art, and to foster monopoly". He also expressed the over-
optimistic opinion that  "The allopathic practitioners were, in fact, gradually changing 
their views and coming around to the principles of homeopathy and hydrotherapy" 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 24/2/1876).  
 
The passion of supporters of lifeworld medicine is also evident from what was said by the 
member for Northumberland, Mr Ninian Melville, in the 1880 debate in the Lower House 
on the Medical Practitioners' Bill of that year:  
The object of the Bill was stated to be to save suffering humanity from 
those whom a certain portion of the community were pleased to call 
quacks.  The term ‘quack’ could only be legitimately applied to a person 
who pretended to be able to do a certain thing and proved by his action 
that he was incapable of performing it, and he maintained that if legally 
qualified men had failed to do what they professed to be able to do they 
were in every sense quacks as much as persons who were certified to be 
legally qualified.  It was unfortunate that only in a very few cases could 
the specific result of certain treatment be discovered. If we looked at the 
prescriptions of the legally qualified men, we should find that they 
comprised a variety of drugs of such a nature that if the patients for whom 
they were prescribed knew what they were expected to take they would 
die from sheer fright (NSWPD  1:3 14/5/1880  p2325). 
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Melville also sang the praises of hydrotherapy. It was, he said,  "specially applicable to 
certain diseases, and that hydropathic treatment left behind it none of the bad effects 
which frequently resulted from the doses of the allopathist" (NSWPD 1:3 14/5/1880 
p2325). 
 
While recounting the struggle between allopathic and lifeworld medicine, the more 
serious studies of medical professionalisation i.e. those of Pensabene, (1980) Lewis & 
McCleod (1989) and Lloyd (1993), pay no more attention to lifeworld medicine after the 
passing of the 1900 Acts, as if those endorsements of allopathy by the State brought the 
struggle to a close. This was by no means the case as far as NSW was concerned; as will 
be made clear shortly, the Lower House only agreed to pass the 1900 legislation on the 
express understanding that it would not affect the position of lifeworld practitioners. They 
continued to flourish until well into the 20th century and, it could be argued, were in a 
more flourishing condition than ever at the end of the century, in the form of the 
alternative health movement (Siapush, 1999p.265) Indeed, early in the 21st century the 
AMA, successor to the BMA, officially made its peace with the lifeworld movement, as 
is related in more detail below. 
 
Nothing illustrates the longevity and continuing strength of lifeworld medicine more than 
the reaction of its supporters to the introduction of the Medical Practitioners' Act of 1938, 
the first comprehensive measure of its kind to be passed in NSW. In contrast to the 1900 
Acts and the consolidated Medical Practitioners' Acts of 1912 and of 1915, the 1938 Act 
represented the kind of major legislation which supporters of allopathic medicine had 
tried and consistently failed to have introduced in the last half of the 19th century. It was 
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three years in the making and its seven sections and 53 clauses covered a wide range of 
issues pertaining to the regulation of medicine. Its aims, said the Minister for Health at 
the time, Mr Herbert FitzSimons, could be summed up as the control of the medical 
profession, control of "lay practitioners" and control of the manufacturers of patent 
medicine (NSWPD 2:105 4/8/1938 p823). The "lay practitioners" (i.e. those who did not 
have university degrees) to whom he referred, were the practitioners of lifeworld 
medicine and this was the first time that a NSW government had attempted to act against 
them. However the "control" did not involve their freedom to practice, but simply 
prohibited them from advertising. This would have put them on the same level as doctors 
who had always been prohibited from advertising by their professional ethics and who 
from 1938 in NSW, were also bound in that respect by Section 27 (2)(b) of the Act of that 
year, which gave the MRB power to control advertising.   
 
Both before and during its passage through the parliament, the 1938 Bill generated 
enormous controversy. Not only was the mechanism for controlling medicine queried 
(this will be discussed in more depth in the next Chapter) but even more so was the 
prohibition of advertising by lifeworld practitioners. The attacks on that move, both in 
newspapers and in the parliament, were no less fierce and well-supported than were the 
attacks on allopathic medicine in the last three decades of the 19th century.  The strength 
of the feeling of opponents of the Bill is evident in the way they opposed its introduction 
into the parliament (NSWPD 2:105 14/7/1938 pp407-415) and not surprisingly that 
opposition was fiercely re-iterated during the Bill's second reading.  In this respect, NSW 
seems to have differed sharply from Victoria where, in quoting remarks favourable to 
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allopathic medicine made in its parliament in the 1930s, Pensabene states: "Gone was the 
old hostility shown to the medical practitioner in the previous century" (1980 p48).  
 
In NSW, very little other than the "old hostility" was in evidence in the Lower House in 
1938.  During the first reading debate Mr Christopher Kelly (Labor, Bathurst), told the 
House that ever since the Bill had been mooted, he had 
 received quite a sheaf of letters from people who … generally point out 
the value of the lay practitioner and what wonderful, and in some cases, 
miraculous cures have been performed. One gentleman wrote to me the 
other day and said he had no faith in doctors at all. It may be an open 
question as to whether they are any better than the lay practitioner 
(NSWPD 2:105 14/7/1938 p408).  
To illustrate that, his correspondent recounted an anecdote in which he told of how his 
wife, he himself and the doctor on a ship on which they were travelling, had all 
contracted influenza. The captain gave the writer a bottle of rum as a remedy and having 
drunk the rum, 
I sent for the doctor for my wife. The doctor prescribed a certain 
medicine, the prescription being written in Latin. Then the doctor told me 
he himself had influenza. I asked him what he was taking himself and he 
said he was just drinking water and plenty of it. I drank the rum, my wife 
took the doctor's medicine and the doctor drank water and we all got 
better around the same time. 
More serious evidence of continuing scepticism about the claims of allopathic medicine 
is evident in a statement by Mr James Heffron, (Labor, Botany), who told the House that 
the medical profession had always been extremely conservative and that its members had 
consistently resisted the discoveries of laymen. This theme of the conservatism of 
Medicine over against the "cutting edge" innovatory nature of lifeworld medicine was 
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taken up again and again by speakers in both the first and second reading debates on the 
bill. In the words of Mr James Arkins, (United Australia Party, Dulwich Hill), "As one 
delves into the history of medicine, one finds that generally the discoveries have been 
made by the unorthodox medical man" (NSWPD 2:105 14/7/1938 p414). The names of 
Jenner, Lister, Pasteur and Simpson (the inventor of chloroform) were all mentioned as 
being among those whose discoveries had been initially rejected and scorned by the 
medical profession. 
 
It was not only Medicine in general but the NSW branch of the British Medical 
Association (BMA) which was a particular target of attack since it was seen to be the 
eminence grise behind the Bill. Mr Arthur Tonge (Labor, Canterbury) charged that "this 
was not a doctor's bill, it was a BMA bill" (NSWPD 2:105 17/8/1938 p411). In debates in 
the Upper House, the BMA was described as "the greatest union that Australia possesses" 
by one speaker  (NSWPD 2:106 30/11/1938 p3061). So fierce were the accusations 
against the BMA for being behind the Bill that it felt constrained to deny them in an 
editorial in the Medical Journal of Australia (7/7/1938, p170), which the Minister also 
felt constrained to quote in parliament to support his assertion that "any suggestion … 
that this bill is the product of the British Medical Association is without foundation, and 
untrue" (NSWPD 2:105 4/8/1938 P823).   
 
Had the situation in the Lower House been the same as it was in the later 19th century, no 
doubt this Bill would have been blocked by its opponents by means of filibusters or by 
ensuring that there was no quorum present or simply ignoring it and letting it lapse. By 
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1938 however, government executives had acquired an invincible weapon for controlling 
the legislature, namely party discipline (the operation and effect of which is discussed in 
Chapter One (see p 35). This device had been in use in the British House of Commons 
long before it was introduced into the parliament of NSW after 1900 by the Labor Party, 
the lead of which was soon followed after by their conservative opponents. Party 
discipline also provided governments with an effective weapon for cutting debates short. 
Called “the guillotine”, it could be used at any time by a member of the government 
proposing “that the question now be put” and invoking the disciplined majority to ensure 
that it was agreed to.    
 
One of the most telling illustrations of the effect of the imposition of discipline is the fact 
that Mr James Arkins, the member for Canterbury referred to above, who was one of the 
most bitter critics of the Bill, none the less consistently voted for it in the divisions. The 
reason for that seems to have been that having been elected as a Labor representative in 
1915, he had defected to the National Party twelve years later and in 1938 he was listed 
as a representative of the conservative United Australia Party, which was part of the 
ruling Coaltion (NSW, 1998, p74). No doubt he needed its support to hold his seat in the 
next election and probably was given the freedom to express his opposition to the 
legislation as long as he voted for it.  
 
Thus, even though there was practically no support for either the Bill or the medical 
profession among speakers during the debates in the Lower House, where it was 
criticised even by members of the ruling Coalition government, the guillotine was applied 
and it was passed on party lines in August 1938 (NSWPD 2:105 18/8/1938 p1166). 
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However, in line with the situation of the 19th century when the earlier Medical 
Practitioners' bills were invariably passed by the Upper House, the Bill had a much 
smoother passage through that Chamber, finding plentiful support from the floor. Here 
the second reading debate was completed in one day without a division  (NSWPD 2:106 
30/11/1938 p3076).26  
 
The Bill was assented to in December 1938, but perhaps in reaction to what was said in 
Lower House debates, the Medical Journal of Australia published an editorial in the same 
month which expressed concern about the "Public Esteem of the Medical Profession". It 
attempted to answer the question : "… how are we to account for the fact, which is 
becoming more and more evident, that whilst the individual medical practitioner is 
usually esteemed and respected, the profession collectively is regarded with suspicion 
and distrust?" by stating:  
The most outstanding cause of public antagonism is the collective 
organization of the profession. ... Organization of medical men is essential 
for their own and the public's welfare; but such organization is seriously 
resented because of suspicion that public interests are thereby 
subordinated to professional advantage" (3/12/1938, p954). 
That scenario would certainly have applied in the second half of the 19th century. In that 
era it was not only the weak and embryonic organisational embodiments of 
scientific/allopathic medicine but, as is evident in Melville's 1880 speech quoted above, 
its epistemology also 
                                                 
26 This means that the measure was approved "on the voices" without a vote. Only when one party or another 
other feels strongly enough will it demand that a vote be recorded on the basis of a time-consuming “division” 
in which members leave their seats to record their votes.     
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evoked "suspicion and distrust". During the debates on the 1938 legislation in the Lower 
House, the accusations of conservative obscurantism made by the supporters of lifeworld 
medicine against the practitioners of allopathic/scientific medicine, indicates the 
persistence and power of this strain of thinking.  
 
The defeat of the adherents of lifeworld medicine in the NSW parliament 1938 was a 
precursor to the eclipse of these epistemologies in the State. The ban on advertising by 
lifeworld practitioners imposed by the 1938 Act was certainly one reason for this 
outcome, but another was very probably the outbreak of the Second World War less than 
a year after the passing of the Act. The solid and real progress made by allopathic 
medicine in the first four decades of the 20th century, particularly in surgery (Pensabene, 
1980, pp39-47), could be immediately and highly visibly transferred to battlefields, 
where conditions hardly suited the application of lifeworld therapies like homeopathy, 
hydrotherapy and herbalism. Moreover, the exploitation of the antibiotic discoveries of 
Alexander Fleming by the Australian-born Howard Florey in the 1930s, produced 
seemingly miraculous cures27 especially among troops serving in the Pacific theatre 
during the Second World War. Rapidly transposed into routine medical treatments, they 
helped to raise the reputation of allopathic medicine and its practitioners to 
unprecedented heights. 
 
                                                 
27 As is testified by one of the people interviewed during the course of writing this thesis, Dr Fran Hausfeld. She 
recounts how as a schoolgirl in the early 1940s, she was one of the first beneficiaries of an antibiotic known 
simply as “M&B” which was used to treat her after she contracted pneumonia. Without it she states, she would 
have been dead in a week. Instead, after taking the medication, she was back at school a week after being 
diagnosed with the previously invariably fatal condition.  
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And yet it should be remembered that only 15 years separated the end of the Second 
World War from the 1960s, during which era non-scientific epistemologies staged a 
resurgence in the form of "alternative medicine" or "complementary medicine" as it later 
became known. While not as visible as it was before the 1938 ban on advertising, that 
lifeworld medicine continued in vigorous existence during the 1940s and 1950s is evident 
from the fact that as late as 1956 a Labor government felt constrained to introduce a Bill 
to control lifeworld medicine. The Minister for Health, Mr Bill Sheahan, explained that 
this was because the activities of unqualified medical practitioners were receiving 
widespread newspaper publicity. In introducing the Bill he stated: 
Strangely enough, whenever the activities of these so-called "quacks" 
have been exposed and demands made that their activities be restricted or 
banned, the Health Department has received numerous protests that they 
should not be interfered with. It is felt that a complete prohibition of the 
activities of numerous unregistered persons who claim to be able to treat 
diseases would be difficult to enforce and would result probably in the 
adoption of various subterfuges to defeat it (NSWPD  3:20 12/7/1956 
p922).  
The Bill he was introducing therefore targeted only those unregistered practitioners who 
claimed to be able to treat "prescribed" deadly diseases such as cancer and poliomyelitis.  
In restricting official action against lifeworld practitioners in this way, both the executive 
government and the corporate rationalisers were admitting defeat in such attempts as they 
had made to eliminate lifeworld medicine. Those attempts would be abandoned 
altogether after the rise of "alternative medicine" from the 1960s onwards and even the 
professional monopolisers were in time to accept not only its existence, but also its 
validity. Thus the AMA created headlines in March 2002 when it issued a statement 
which, while it called for greater regulation and testing of non-scientifically-based 
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"complementary" therapies, none the less recognised "that evidence based aspects of 
Complementary Medicine are part of the repertoire of patient care and may have a role in 
mainstream medical practice" (Australian Medical Association, 2002).   
 
The epistemological struggles over medicine will receive little further attention since 
after 1970 the challenges to allopathic/scientific medicine and its organisational 
embodiments which form the subject matter of this study, came not from lifeworld 
medicine but from Alford's third structural interest, the consumer interest represented by 
"equal health advocates", who emerged in the 1970s. None the less, even though driven 
underground for over two decades after 1938, the existence of lifeworld medicine had 
created a continuing sub-textual critique of scientific medicine which provided a seedbed 
for the work of the equal health advocates, even though they were not as critical of the 
scientific medical epistemology. All of this points to the fact that lifeworld medicine 
deserves serious attention in any account of developments in health care over the last two 
centuries. It is certainly the case that the strength of the lifeworld medicine movement 
over the century between the passing of the 1838 and the 1938 Acts, was to have a 
crucially important effect in shaping the way medical regulation was introduced and 
operated in NSW. That in turn also had major effects on the functioning of medical 
autonomy in NSW for most of the 20th century.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EFFECT OF THE LIFEWORLD/ALLOPATHIC MEDICINE 
CONTEST ON MEDICAL AUTONOMY IN NSW 
While the BMA was accused of being the force behind the 1938 Act, there can be no 
doubt that the government executive of the day was the major player in driving that Act 
through the parliament. Here again, the situation stood in sharp contrast to most of the 
19th century, when not only the NSW parliament but also governments were extremely 
reluctant to support medical regulation. As reported by Lewis & MacLeod (1988), when 
deputations of doctors saw the Premier, Sir Henry Parkes, and requested him to advocate 
the introduction of a Medical Practitioners' Act, he told them "that the Government would 
not support sectional interests, however, learned and respectable" (p77). The sharply 
changed governmental attitudes towards medical regulation in the later 19th century were 
due to a number of factors, including the political failure of the parliamentary 
representatives of the professional monopolists, the emergence and rise of the NSW 
health bureaucracy and most of all to what I have described as the “bureaucratic 
imperative”, the call of which was being heard and heeded in NSW to an extent which 
surpassed that of most other jurisdictions in industrialised countries.  
The political failure of the medical elite 
For the best part of four decades after the coming of reponsible government to NSW in 
1856, the professional monopolists or more accurately, an elite coterie of doctors, were 
the driving force behind attempts to introduce medical regulation into NSW. 
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H.G.Douglass, who as noted earlier made the first attempt in the Upper House in 1859, 
was a doctor by profession and as we have seen, it is very likely that doctors orchestrated 
the petitions of 1875, even though the initiator of the Medical Practitioners' Bill of that 
year was a lawyer, Sir Alfred Stephen (who later became the Lieutenant Governor of 
colony). Later Bills were invariably introduced by doctors, these including Dr Richard 
Bowker (both when he was an elected member of the Lower and House and later, as a 
nominated member of the Upper House), Dr Harmon Tarrant, Dr Sir Henry McLaurin, Dr 
John Creed and Dr Sir Arthur Renwick. 
 
The names of two of these, McLaurin and Creed are listed by Davis (1983 Ch 4, p7)28 as 
being among the "medical elite", as is Sir Arthur Renwick, who combined his duties as an 
elected member of the Lower House and later as a nominated member of the Upper 
House, with those of Chancellor of the University of Sydney and as president of the 
MRB. This elite, according to Davis, were set apart from the general run of medical 
practitioners, their status being reflected by their appointments to the MRB, as honoraries 
to major hospitals, to advisory positions to government, and through their connections to 
the University of Sydney, either as members or the Faculty of Medicine or as examiners. 
Davis also notes that "a high proportion of them were … active in Professional [sic] 
politics and a surprisingly large number active in State politics either as elected or 
nominated members of State legislatures" (Ch.4. p4).   
 
                                                 
28 Each of the Chapters in Davis's work has separate page numbers.  
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The political as well as the professional activities of these figures would have been 
boosted by the formation of the local branch of the British Medical Association (BMA) in 
1880, with Renwick as its first chairman. As Weber so accurately observed, interest 
groups will show "a growing tendency to set up some kind of association with rational 
regulations" (1978 [1921], p342). This had been true of Medicine in NSW although 
earlier attempts to found a medical association had failed; these included the Australian 
Medical Association (founded 1858) and the Medical Practitioners' Association, founded 
in 1872. These however, were racked by disputes among the members and were poorly 
organised and financed (Davis,1983, Ch 3, pp 27-32; Lloyd pp238-240) and had 
respectively gone out of existence in 1868 and 1877. The BMA flourished because, says 
Davis, it had success in struggles such as those with the Friendly Societies, which the 
previous medical associations had never been able to achieve (1983, pp32-3). On the 
other hand those struggles tended to absorb all its energies and it took little part in efforts 
to secure the passing of a Medical Practitioners' Act. The minutes of its Council meetings 
make no reference to this issue at all before 1900 while what became its official 
mouthpiece after 1894, the monthly Australasian Medical Gazette (AMG), carried only 
two editorials on the subject over the next six years. The main justification for 
introducing medical regulation advanced in the first of these, entitled "Wanted - a 
Medical Act", was the need to suppress  
the unqualified men or women calling themselves doctors - and 
appropriating to themselves bogus titles - who are allowed to … flaunt 
their filthy advertisements in the press, and imperil the safety of the 
community by suggesting easy escapes from the results of immoral 
practices (Vol. 14, Nov 20 1895, p262).  
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The second editorial was devoted mainly to praising the introduction of the West 
Australian Medical Act in 1896, comparing that favourably to "the mother colony" which 
had not been able "to frame any adequate law for the protection of the public from 
untrained medical practitioners" (Vol. 15, April 20, 1896, pp151-52). 
 
While the members of the medical elite were also all members of the BMA29 apart from 
Renwick and Creed who served single-year presidencies30, the names of the elite do not 
figure among those of the office bearers of the Association. Despite the BMA's lack of 
active participation in the struggle to secure medical regulation, its editorials and constant 
attacks on lifeworld practitioners demonstrated, the AMG and therefore the BMA were 
fully behind the efforts of the medical elite. But on that score the record of the 
professional monopolisers for 20 years after the foundation of the BMA was one of 
failure since they were never able to "establish a legal order that limits competition 
through formal monopolies" in the words of Weber (1978 [1921] p342). As the survival 
and resurgence of lifeworld medicine indicates, the proponents of scientific/allopathic 
medicine, despite all their advantages starting with those conferred by the state in 1838 
and later scientific advances which allowed them to dominate medical discourse later in 
the 20th century, were only very partially successful in establishing the monopolistic legal 
order referred to by Weber.   
 
                                                 
29 As appears in its membership list published in The Australian Medical Gazette of March 20, 1897 (pp105-
58). 
30 Renwick in 1880 and Creed in 1887 and 1892 (Medical Journal of Australia, December 6, 1930, p773). 
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This was not from want of trying and on this score it is again useful to refer to what 
Weber wrote about "Open and Closed Economic Relationships," particularly because, as 
noted in Chapter One, he was writing and analysing developments in Europe and 
America at around the same time which paralleled those in NSW.  He noted that when in 
any field, "the numbers of competitors increases in relation to the profit span, the 
participants become interested in curbing competition." As a result,  "[u]sually one group 
of competitors takes some externally identifiable characteristic of another group of 
(actual or potential) competitors … as a pretext for attempting their exclusion. It does not 
matter which characteristic is chosen in the individual case; whatever suggests itself most 
easily is seized upon" (Weber,  1978 [1922] pp341-2).  As far as the number of 
competitors in the medical field was concerned, Davis (Davis, 1983 Ch 3 p27) shows that  
while in absolute terms, the number of doctors in NSW may have seemed small in the 
second half of the 19th century, in terms of their ratio to the total population, there were 
actually more doctors in NSW per head of population than there were in England.  That  
"crowding in the market place" would very likely have led to their being interested in the 
curbing of competition.   
 
Another factor here which is present in Weber's analysis was the existence of a group of 
competitors with "some externally identifiable characteristic" against whom an interest 
group would want to move. As might be evident from the petition quoted above, 
lifeworld practitioners constituted exactly this kind of group by virtue of their lack of 
formal university training as well as their non-scientific and almost mystical approach to 
healing. There were some among the medical elite who saw one of the chief purposes of a 
Medical Practitioners' Act as being to effect the kind of exclusion of lifeworld 
 119
practitioners from the market as delineated by Weber. In the colloquial terms of the day, 
they constantly called on government to "put down quackery". One of the chief 
spokesmen for that view was Dr Richard Bowker, who in his speeches was much given to 
quoting instances of people being killed by "quacks" which proved he said, how urgently 
they needed to be prevented from practising.  
 
Another proponent of this view was Creed, who as noted above, was also editor of what 
was later to become the BMA's national journal, The Australasian Medical Gazette, in 
which, as Lloyd (1993, p251) points out, "quackery was one of the more frequently 
occurring issues (together with antipathy towards homeopathy)". In 1887 Creed convened 
and chaired a Select Committee appointed by the Upper House "to inquire into the state 
and operation of the laws existing for the regulation of the practice of Medicine and 
Surgery in New South Wales". That title however, only very partially described the aims 
of this Select Committee, which were quite transparent and could be simply described as 
"an exposure of quackery". Besides taking evidence from witnesses such as McLaurin, 
then Chancellor of the University of Sydney, about the uncontrolled state of even 
allopathic medical practice referred to above, the Select Committee also subpoenaed a 
good number of lifeworld practitioners, requiring them to give evidence about their 
epistemologies and administration of their therapies. This was probably designed as a 
shock tactic because it exposed some outlandish practices and practitioners, apparently in 
the hope that this would jolt the government executive into action.  
 
Among those called was the notorious E.H. Botterell, who proved to be a master of 
obfuscation. It turned out that his assumption of the title of "doctor" rested on his having 
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received a diploma from "Edinburgh University" in Chicago, USA. This was one of the 
numerous "diploma mills" which created great difficulties in the attempts of American 
States to introduce medical regulation. Botterell however professed to support a Medical 
Practitioners' Bill because "within the last five years Sydney has been inundated with a 
class of men with no qualifications at all" (NSW 1887(a), pp39-43). Given his own lack 
of real qualifications, that statement constituted little more than one example of his 
effrontery, although it also demonstrated that when it came to eliminating  economic 
competition, he was as pro-regulation as any member of the medical elite. Among others 
examined was a herbalist, Mr Michael Green, whose medical epistemology may be 
judged by the following exchange with the Creed, president of the committee:  
Q. When did you study medicine? 
A. About twenty-five years ago.. 
Q. Under whom? 
A. My own; as it came into my head. 
Q. You never had any teachers? 
A. No; only the Almighty ….The Bible I study is my guide to botany, and 
Almighty God is my physician, my teacher, and my guide in every shape 
and form (NSW 1887(a), p63). 
Some evidence of a homeopathic practitioner, William Moore, was considered so 
obscene that it was deleted from the record of the committee (NSW 1887(a), p52). 
However, in 1886 Creed had referred extensively to Moore in a speech to the Upper 
House. After noting that there were no ladies present (he seems to have ignored the fact 
that "ladies" could and did read NSWPD), Creed quoted from a pamphlet published by 
Moore in which he claimed he could provide a means by which men could protect 
themselves from being "copper-blown" by a woman who, during sexual intercourse, held 
a deep breath "while the semen is passing from the male; wind from the female has been 
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known in many instance to pass under these circumstances, into the male, and to inflate 
him like a bladder."   
 
For the supporters of lifeworld medicine as well as for government politicians, the 
hilarity and shock effect of such anecdotes was probably counteracted by Creed's 
statement that while Moore had a large practice, "I think I must have convinced hon. 
members that he is so grossly ignorant that he should not be allowed to practice at all" 
(NSWPD 1:23 12/10/1886 p5956). But that, his opponents in the lifeworld camp might 
have reasoned, would be a classic case of spoiling the ship for a ha'porth of tar. The 
banning of even one outrageous "quack" could set a precedent for the banning of all 
lifeworld practitioners.  
 
Fears on that score would have been strengthened for supporters of homeopathy by 
Creed's equally vigorous attacks on their beliefs and practice earlier in his speech and 
also because homeopaths figured prominently among the "quacks" summoned by his 
Select Committee in the following year. Although in its report the committee stated: "We 
are not prepared to recommend that any person should be prohibited from practising 
medicine…" (NSW(b), 1887, p6) and Creed himself repeated this in the parliament, there 
appears to have been some ambivalence in his position. While himself giving evidence to 
the Select Committee, he was asked: "Do you think that disease would be more under 
control if there were no unauthorised practitioners who did not understand their 
business," he simply replied "Yes" (NSW, 1887(a), p78). And while his committee may 
not have called for the banning of lifeworld practice, it did recommend that all lifeworld 
practitioners be legislatively forced to add the words "Unregistered by the MRB." to their 
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advertisements31 and also to display them on plates "in some conspicuous place open to 
public view" (NSW, 1887(b), p7). Such public branding of themselves as unqualified, 
even if it was true, was unlikely to be welcomed by lifeworld practitioners and their 
supporters.  
 
The fevered attempts by the proponents of allopathic medicine to impose controls on 
lifeworld medicine were probably counter-productive and actually delayed the 
introduction of full medical regulation. As Weber asserted, when action against an 
identifiable group is taken by another group seeking to defend and extend its own 
interests, this could "provoke a corresponding reaction on the part of those against whom 
[the action] is directed" (1978 [1922] p342). The reaction of the lifeworld camp probably 
explains why Creed's committee failed to make any impression on government. The 
Australasian Medical Gazette lamented in an editorial of February 1898 that while the 
Select Committee had exposed "the danger to the public and the urgent necessity for 
legislation", it was "almost impossible to realize that no action was taken, the then 
Premier, Sir Henry Parkes, quietly ignoring it" (21/2/1898, p80). That was just one 
example of the way in which the medical elite proved incapable of bringing successive 
governments in NSW "on side" in the three decades between 1860 and 1890. The 
continuing hostility of these representatives of Medicine to lifeworld medicine and the 
insistence by some among them on the need for governments to "put down quackery", in 
                                                 
31 Unlike medical practitioners, there was no code of ethics among lifeworld practitioners forbidding the use of 
advertising in printed media, a situation which continued, as has been outlined earlier, until the passing of the 
1938 Medical Practitioners' Act.   
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all likelihood merely succeeded in increasing the intransigence of the Lower House on 
the score of medical regulation. 
The rise of the corporate rationalists  
However, during the 1890s it became clear that that intransigence suited the government 
executive interest group less and less and eventually between 1898 and 1900 the 
objections of the Lower House to medical regulation were overcome. While as noted 
above, the lack of party discipline in the NSW parliament in the 19th century meant that 
the government executive structural interest was weak, the corporate rationalist group in 
the early phases of responsible government, was also weak to non-existent. In 1856 the 
Journal of the Legislative Council carried only two reports relating to health issues, these 
being those of the Medical Adviser to government which was exclusively concerned with 
vaccination activities and that of the Health Officer who likewise was exclusively 
concerned with quarantine issues (pp249-50;663-4). These two officials, along with some 
clerical and field staff, comprised the entire health bureaucracy at that stage.  
 
That situation changed  rapidly, both to cope with and to cater for a population which 
more than quadrupled from 357,978 in 1861 to 1,364,590 in 1900 (New South Wales, 
1902). As Davis notes: "The second half of the century was marked by increasing State 
interest and support for medical activity both private and public, curative and 
preventative" (Ch. 4, p2).  In this regard, NSW followed the precedents set in Britain, 
where from the middle of the 19th century, "[o]fficial services …  included the work of 
public vaccinators, coroners, and medical witnesses. … The private practitioner also 
acted as an agent of the state in the registration of deaths and in the notification of 
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infectious diseases” (Brand, 1965 p149).  Brand quotes a speech made to the British 
Medical Association by a Dr Henry Rumsey who noted in 1870 how government services 
were by then evident in  "medical relief of the destitute, in medical care to inmates of 
asylums and prisons, in medical services to the police, civil service, and labourers in 
public work, in medical care of soldiers and sailors." Furthermore, stated Rumsey, "by 
medical agency again, the State protects the children and youth of the working classes in 
factories, workshops and mines, where the keenly contested race between labour and 
capital requires constant and vigilant supervision" (1965 p9). 
 
Rising public pressure in NSW for more governmental involvement in health meant that 
it was difficult for successive governments "to resist the demands made upon them for 
funds for such charitable purposes as hospitals" (Dickey, 1976 p35). Thus thirty years 
after the attainment of self-government, the Journal of the Legislative Council carried 
reports about a large number of "Charitable Institutions", i.e. government subsidised 
hospitals, including four in Sydney and 68 in country areas as well as eight government 
asylums for the "infirm and destitute". The Inspector of Public Charities noted in that 
year: 
A comprehensive view of the Charities makes it apparent that the 
Government is most generous and constant in its endeavour to supply aid 
to all forms of distress; and that year by year improvements are being 
introduced in the appliances and administration of the institutions it 
supports or subsidises for that purpose (New South Wales, 1887(a) p394). 
Besides the 131 vaccinators reported to be active in that 1887, there were also 96 medical 
officers serving in institutions such as jails, asylums and special schools as well as in 
country towns (NSW, 1887(c), pp 405-423).  By 1900 the number of hospitals had risen 
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to 121 (Lloyd, 1993, p281) and these hospitals "were operating within a web of 
regulation" (Dickey & B, 1977 p49).  
 
Not only was governmental activity expanding in the sphere of curative services. In 1896 
with the passing of a Public Health Act, a "Department of Public Health" was brought 
into being which operated under the under the aegis of a statutory body, the Board of 
Health, founded almost two decades earlier. That Board  had   
… accumulated powers over matters of public health and played an 
important role in the regulation of conditions of life in Sydney and 
throughout the colony… in examining the responsibility of the 
government in the general field of medical and health care, this great 
extension of its work through the Board into such matters as dairies, 
ewers, water, cattle slaughtering, diseased meat must be noted (Dickey, 
1976 p50).  
Although there was no Minister of Public Health until 1913, none the less from 1896 this 
department had a bureaucrat, Dr Ashburton Thompson, as its permanent head (New 
South Wales, 1900 p1). This was in contrast to the previous period when Board of Health 
presidents such as McLaurin and other officials such as Dr Anderson Stuart, Professor of 
Physiology and Anatomy in the Medical School of the University of Sydney, were part-
time incumbents who generally combined their duties on the Board with numerous others 
public offices. The full-time bureaucrats who replaced them were also medical 
practitioners: Ashburton Thompson was a medical practitioner, as was Dr Frank Tidswell 
who headed the other major arm of the Department, the Bureau of Microbiology. That 
indicates that in NSW, as in Britain, "[i]t was clearly apparent that the state and the 
doctor were increasingly linked together in the expanding society" (Brand, 1965 p149).   
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That the bureaucracy responsible for health issues was coordinated by the Premier's 
Department meant that these officials had more direct access to the head of government 
than had there been a Minister for Health. Their reports to parliament printed in the 
Journal of the Legislative Council contained not simply reporting but also a good deal of 
advocacy, 
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indicating that these appointed officials were as active in the making of policy as were 
elected politicians.32  The notion of bureaucrats acting in this way of course, contradicts 
the received wisdom of the Westminster tradition, which is that in proffering advice to 
ministers, public servants are always neutral in a party-political sense and that their 
advice is always objective and impartial.   
 
However, as one of the greatest observers of the Australian public service, Dr Peter 
Wilenski, pointed out:  
[T]he policy advice that officials tender (and that they may go to extremes 
to see adopted) cannot be objective and impartial but is inherently value-
laden. … Many of the most important issues on which senior policy-
makers are required to advise - are all issues in which values play a larger 
part in guiding a public servant to advocate a particular position 
(Wilenski, 1986 p53). 
Wilenski of course, was not the first observer to come to this kind of conclusion. When 
during debates on the 1938 Medical Practice Act, the Health Minister FitzSimons as 
noted earlier, denied that he had been unduly influenced by the BMA in drafting the Bill 
and claimed that he had been wholly guided by senior bureaucrats in this task, the critics 
immediately pointed out that the Director General of the Health Department was a 
member of the BMA (NSWPD 1:105 4/8/1938 p823).  His indignant assertion that of 
course that bureaucrat had acted with proper political impartiality might have evoked 
                                                 
32  As for instance, evident in a statement by Inspector of Public Charities in his 1887 report that "some of the 
evils at present connected with the distribution of State Charities may disappear, consequent on the application 
of regulations more stringent than those any central government has hitherto been inclined to enforce" NSW 
1887 (b). p395). The Inspector obviously believed that the government needed to change its policy in this field, 
and was saying so in no uncertain terms 
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sceptical smiles not only from the Minister's opponents, but also had he ever heard about 
it, from Wilenski himself  
 
In the earlier period before the turn of the century, in the lack of a Health Minister, senior 
bureaucrats were not only advising on the drafting of legislation, they were actually doing 
the drafting themselves. A pioneer of NSW medical history, Cyril Cummins, states that 
after Ashburton Thompson became the first Director-General of the Public Health 
Department and set about organising its administration:  
He was co-author with Berbard [sic] Wise Q.C., of the first Public Health 
Act; sole draftsman of public health legislation to control leprosy; hygiene 
of dairies and noxious trades, [and] innovator of pure food laws on a 
system of uniformity between the States  (New South Wales, 1973 p5).  
Nor did bureaucrats hesitate to enter the policy field. In 1894, Dr Anderson Stuart, 
Medical Advisor to the Government, reported to the Legislative Council: 
The question has arisen during the year as to whether unqualified medical 
practitioners should be appointed to medical officerships of subsidised 
hospitals; and it has been decided that in no case shall a hospital 
subsidised by Government employ either as a paid or an honorary medical 
officer any person who is not a legally qualified medical practitioner 
according to the law of New South Wales (New South Wales, 1897 
p1061).  
A major problem with that policy (which did not become law until 1938) was that before 
1900 in NSW, it was difficult to know who were indeed legally qualified medical 
practitioners. As the Government Medical Officer, Anderson Stuart would have had no 
difficulty in bringing that problem to the attention of politicians in government like 
Creed, Renwick and McLaurin because like them, he was a member of select coterie of 
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doctors who comprised Davis' medical elite (Ch. 3, p14). Although not a parliamentarian 
he was just as effectively "in government" as other members of the elite and as a member 
of bureaucracy was probably just as effective, if not more so, in the making of policy and 
law.   
 
Even after Anderson Stuart was replaced by a full-time official in 1896, the 
doctor/bureaucrats, in other words the corporate rationalists in the Public Health 
Department, would no doubt have constantly pointed out to those in the government 
structural interest group that the lack of medical regulation left NSW in an isolated 
position in Australasia and the economically developed world. It also left Medicine in a 
bureaucratically anomalous position within the colony itself, particularly since ancillary 
health occupations were beginning to be regulated. This applied to pharmacy in 1897 
(Haines, 1997) and dentistry in 1900 (New South Wales, 1901 pp471-5). Moves were 
also under way to regulate nursing, although these did not finally come to fruition until 
1924 (Anonymous, 1990)   
 
Since under the Westminster tradition, one of the important duties of the bureaucracy is 
to advise politicians in government, it can assumed that the governmental drive for 
medical regulation which emerged in the 1890s was due to pressure from the corporate 
rationalists, not least because their leading lights were either members of, or had close 
relationships with, the medical elite.  
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The “bureaucratic imperative” 
That factor is not taken into account by Lewis & MacLeod (1988, p81), who attribute the 
changed climate of opinion which produced the Medical Practitioners Acts of 1898-1900 
to the notion that  
… medicine had gained prestige from greater effectiveness [and] … also 
from the advance of science. The cultural authority of medicine improved 
immeasurably in a society epistemologically and practically dominated by 
science and technology (p.81).  
The continuing strength of lifeworld medicine and scepticism towards 
allopathic/scientific medicine described above in relation to the 1938 Medical 
Practitioners' Act, indicates that these authors overestimate the domination of science and 
technology at the time as does Pensabene (1980). That is probably because they, as well 
as Lloyd (1993), tended to focus, as argued in Chapter One, on the actions of the 
professional monopolists and not to give adequate consideration to those of the 
government executive and the corporate rationalisers. The same is true of Davis (1983), 
who while he notes the "encroachment" (Ch.4, p36) of the state on the medical sphere in 
NSW, none the less in his final Chapter deals exclusively with the way this benefited the 
medical profession, hardly making any reference to, let alone investigating, the actions of 
government.33 
  
                                                 
33 Davis's lack of interest in the actions of government is evident in the fact that he pays minimal attention to the 
legislative regulation of Medicine. He states nothing more than that "doctors got a … modest registration Bill 
passed in 1898" (Ch 5, 24), making no mention of the much more important Amendment Acts of 1900, which 
is more than strange seeing that the topic of his thesis was The Professionalisation of Medicine in N.S.W. 1870-
1900.  
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Over against the view that it was solely the influence of the medical elite and its 
organisational embodiment in the BMA which led to the passing of medical regulatory
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 legislation, as has been argued, of equal, if not more importance were developments 
among the corporate rationalisers. This applied not only to the bureaucracy, but also to 
the government executive interest group. In this regard, political changes in government 
played an important role. It is significant that having been Premier for 12 of the 20 years 
after he first attained the office in 1872, the influential but also anti-allopathic Sir Henry 
Parkes, finally lost power in 1891. He was replaced by the Protectionist Premier Dibbs, 
whose accusations against Botterell mentioned above indicated that he was no friend of 
lifeworld medicine. His successor Reid who was Premier between 1894 and 1899, shared 
Dibbs' views on this issue, even though he was of the Free Trade persuasion.  
 
A changed climate of thinking in the government executive about medical regulation was 
evident from the fact that during the 1894-95 session of parliament, an attempt to pass a 
Medical Practitioners' Bill was launched by members of the government executive, in 
contrast to previous Bills which had invariably been introduced by members of the 
medical elite. In the Upper House the Bill was introduced by the Attorney General and in 
the Lower by no less a figure than the Premier Sir George Reid, who was to become one 
of the main architects of Australian Federation.  Possibly because of this august backing, 
this Bill was passed not only by the Upper but also by the Lower House. It only failed to 
become law because the Upper House refused to accept an amendment (introduced by 
Reid himself) which made the courts rather than the MRB, the final arbiter of an 
individual practitioner's qualifications (NSWPD 1:78 6/6/1895 p6944).  In 1898 the 
introduction of another Medical Practitioners' Bill by Dr Andrew Garran, the government 
representative in the Upper House, once again signalled the Reid ministry's determination 
to have the legislation passed. 
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The outcome of the votes on the Bill of 1894-95 also points to a changing climate of 
opinion among ordinary members of parliament. One reason for that was a perception of 
the increasing urgency of what may be termed "the bureaucratic imperative", in other 
words the need for the "order and protection" created by bureaucratisation. As noted in 
Chapter Two (p73-4), the governmental bureaucratisation which was advancing at a rapid 
pace in NSW  involved not simply the expansion of public service, but also the regulation 
of a wide number of activities and occupations.   It was pointed out in the NSW 
parliament over a good number of years that occupations ranging from conveyancing to 
cab-driving had been subject to regulation and it was ridiculous that so crucial a service 
as that provided by doctors remained unregulated (NSWPD 1:1 12/3/1880 p1525; 1:67 
4/10/1893 p286).  The most eloquent statement of this point was made by Norton, 
referred to above, who declaimed in the Lower House debate on the Medical 
Practitioners' Further Amendment Act in 1900: 
How readily we handed great state interests over to the Railway 
Commissioners. How readily we handed over the whole body of our civil 
servants, depriving them of the right to trial by jury or an appeal to the 
court of the country against the decision of the Public Service Board! We 
handed our settlers over to the land boards and land courts, but here - 
where the health … and the very lives of the people and the children of 
the people … were at stake … some hon. members said that they did not 
think we ought to pass this bill (NSWPD 1:105 18/9/1900 p2987). 
The lack of adequate regulation empowered by a genuine Medical Practitioners' Act, 
meant there was no reliable system for accrediting doctors, or of ensuring that the 
standards of their training were adequate, or of maintaining those standards. The strength 
of health care provision was thus being compromised at the heart of the system and 
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besides being bureaucratically untidy, this situation could also have had deleterious legal 
implications. As was pointed out by Creed's Select Committee of 1887, practitioners who 
were not legally qualified in terms of the law were being called to give expert witness at 
inquests and in medical cases since it was as difficult for the courts as for anyone else, to 
know who was qualified to give evidence and who was not (NSW, 1887(b), P4). Again, 
the only remedy for that situation lay in the introduction of medical regulation. This was 
just one example of the  "bureaucratic imperative" which probably persuaded legislators 
in NSW, who had actively resisted and continued to resist "the cultural authority of 
medicine", to agree to the passing of the Medical Practitioners' Acts of 1898-1900.  
 
While corporate rationalists in all probability, as suggested earlier, argued strongly for 
medical regulation on the grounds of  “the bureaucratic imperative”, in the end they had 
to rely on the skills of the government executive to put the necessary legislation into 
place. In this regard, the professional monopolisers as represented by the medical elite, 
who had initiated and for a long time been the main driving force in moves to effect 
medical regulation, had proved themselves to be the opposite of skilled. For instance, 
when introducing an extensive Medical Practitioners' Bill into the Upper House in August 
1897, Sir Arthur Renwick began by giving an assurance, on the basis of his personal 
contacts, that the BMA "entirely approve of the provisions of the bill". He also argued 
that the findings of Creed's Select Committee ("an exposure of the most extraordinary 
character … of the prevalence of quackery") demonstrated the necessity of the legislation 
(NSWPD 1:89 5/8/1897 p2618). He seems not to have appreciated that both issues were 
likely to be a "red-rag-to-a-bull" to the Lower House, as were Bowker's statements that "a 
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girl was killed and a man was hanged because [a 'quack'] was not prevented from 
practising" (NSWPD 1:89 5/8/1897 pp2619).   
Renwick showed similar non-perspicacity when he stated that his one reservation about 
the Bill was its proposals on the constitution of a new MRB. The twelve current members 
he said, felt slighted by the fact that their services would not be automatically continued 
once the legislation went through. In deference to the sensibilities of these members, 
whose high status had been recognised by the appointment to the MRB in the first place, 
the House devoted most of the committee stage to trying to devise a complicated 
formulae to enable the current  members to continue in membership, but gradually to be 
replaced over time (NSWPD 1:90 7/10/1897 pp3658-3660). The record of these 
deliberations is impressive only in its tedium and of course, in their ultimate futility, 
because the Lower House refused to consider the Bill. However, one effect of these 
discussions may have had was to sound a warning that any attempt to reconstitute the 
MRB would be fraught with controversy. Since the introduction of medical regulation 
had proved to be so highly contentious over so many years, the Reid ministry might have 
concluded that the introduction of yet another controversial item into the process was 
something to be avoided if the legislation was ever to be passed. Thus there were no more 
attempts to change the composition of the MRB, which in fact remained unaltered until 
1938.  
The government strategy 
In 1898 a Medical Practitioners' Act (No. 26) was passed which at first sight, is a baffling 
piece of legislation. As mentioned earlier, it contained nothing new, its title being belied 
by the preamble, which almost exactly duplicated the 1838 Act and only referred to 
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medical witnesses at coronial inquests.   There were no debates on this legislation, which 
was passed through all its stages in one fell swoop in the Lower House in July 1898 along 
with a long list of other “consolidation” Acts received from the Upper House (NSWPD 1: 
92 6/7/1898 p531). This Act seems so inconsequential that it receives no mention from 
Lewis and MacLeod (1989) while Lloyd (1993) simply refers to it in a footnote (p264).  
 
It may be asked: What was the purpose of this legislation? The answer probably is that 
the government was determined to have a Medical Practitioners' Act on its statute books, 
no matter in what form. However, there could also have been some "method in the 
madness" of the government executive. Whatever their other weaknesses, the 1838 and 
1855 Acts had put into place two of Daniel's criteria for professionalisation, viz. those for 
controlling entry to the medical profession and the registration of medical practitioners by 
means of specifying the length of their educational training. Only the laxity and laissez-
faire attitudes of governments towards the enforcement of these instruments for the 
external control of the medical profession had prevented their being effective. A change 
of thinking in government about the necessity for the enforcement of the law would 
certainly have remedied some weakness of the Acts and the passing of the 1898 Act 
signaled that such a change had taken place. While the weight of sixty years of non-
enforcement would have made it difficult immediately to invoke the punitive provisions 
that Act, none the less it contained the groundwork for the regulation of medicine which 
would bring NSW into line with other jurisdictions the world over.  
 
More was needed however, to put the basics of full external control of the medical 
profession in place and thus a Medical Practitioners’ Amendment Bill was introduced 
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into the Upper House later in 1898 by Dr A. Garran as a member of the government 
executive (he was not a medical doctor, but a Doctor of Laws). Even though this Bill 
never got beyond the Upper House, none the less in the debate Garran revealed new 
thinking on the tactics the Reid ministry would employ as they attempted to finesse the 
legislation through the parliament.  These tactics necessitated outmanoeuvring the 
medical elite as well as the supporters of lifeworld medicine.  
 
However desirous they now were to obey the bureaucratic imperative with regard to 
medicine, government executives in the pre-party discipline era found themselves 
between the Scylla of the Lower House and the Charbydis of the political ineptitude of 
the medical elite with their "put-down-quackery" demands. Thus the government 
executive began to develop a strategy for steering between these forces, as was evident in 
the Reid ministry's attempts to pass a medical Bill in 1894-95. Its "whole scope", Reid 
told the Lower House, was simply to prevent unqualified practitioners from using 
medical titles, adding "I would not push it further than that" (NSWPD 1:76 21/3/1895 
p4699). In other words, the Bill was a "barebones" measure which sought to impose only 
minimalist medical regulation and in this respect, contrasted notably with the much more 
comprehensive Medical Acts of the other Australasian colonies and also those of 
pharmacy and dentistry which as noted above, were regulated in 1897 and 1900 
respectively. That approach was vehemently rejected by Bowker in the Upper House. He 
declared that when the Bill was first introduced "to my surprise I found it was so short 
and inadequate that I thought it an absurdity to oppose it," although he said, his non-
opposition did not mean that he acquiesced in the Bill either. His rather novel position 
was based on the belief, held with varying degrees of conviction by all members of the 
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medical elite, that the objective of any Medical Act should be to "put down quackery" 
(NSWPD 1:69 27/9/1894 p805).  
 
However, for the government executive, that demand by the professional monopolisers 
represented an issue best left severely alone since it merely raised the ire and opposition 
of the majority in the Lower House. What was much more important, in terms of “the 
bureaucratic imperative”, was simply to get some basic medical regulation in place. Thus 
echoing Reid's thoughts if not his exact words, Garran stated the "great purpose” of his 
Amendment Bill was simply to prevent the fraudulent use of titles and that "[i]n order for 
it to pass the Government have not encumbered it with anything that is not absolutely 
necessary." In other words, the Bill too, contained nothing that would "put down 
quackery". On that score, he said, while he knew there were some members of both the 
Upper and Lower Houses, “medical men”, who wanted a great deal more to be included 
in the Bill, none the less  "…it is best to pass what we can pass, and leave further matters 
to further experience" (NSWPD 1:93 21/9/1898 p732).  
 
The government's minimalist approach evident in this Bill (its length was probably much 
the same as that of the Bills which were passed in 1900) contrasted sharply with full-
blown legislative instruments introduced in previous years by members of the medical 
elite. The brevity of Garran’s Amendment Bill of 1898 was cause for it to be immediately 
attacked by Renwick, who said that although he sympathised with the government 
executive "in their desire not to meet with obstruction in connection with this particular 
kind of legislation", it none the less was a piecemeal measure and therefore totally 
inadequate. None the less, both he and Creed (who also deplored the brevity of the Bill) 
 139
supported it because, said Creed, while it failed "to do everything that was required, it 
would do a great deal".  
 
Creed even opposed amendments put forward by Renwick on the grounds that "the 
Government have determined that they will have this particular bill and nothing more" 
(NSWPD 1:93 21/9/1898 p734). As his speech indicated, not only had the initiative for 
the passing of medical regulatory legislation moved firmly into the hands of the 
government executive,  but the medical elite was divided about the best strategy for 
introducing medical regulation.  Bowker did not share the pragmatic approach of Creed 
and Renwick and as usual argued that a "proper" medical bill was needed "because there 
are a number of unqualified practitioners who are continually causing deaths in this 
country" (p736). That point was strongly supported by another member of the Upper 
House, Mr  Henry  Dangar, who called "for a stop to be put to the nefarious practices of 
men who have been allowed to carry on their atrocious business without any interference 
on the part of the Government". Instead of calling it a bill to regulate the practice of 
medicine, he said, its failure to suppress lifeworld medicine meant that "it ought to be 
called a bill for the encouragement of quacks"  (p737).   
 
Although this 1898 Amendment Bill was passed by the Upper House in a division by 17 
votes to 9, it was again ignored by the Lower House. This probably convinced the 
government executive that it was useless attempting to launch the legislation from the 
Upper House. Moreover, if its introduction even by a non-medical member of 
government had failed to make it acceptable, to have a Bill introduced by a member of 
the medical elite was to give it the "kiss of death". It might therefore have been reasoned 
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by those in the government executive that further attempts to put a Medical Practitioners' 
Act in place would need to be launched from the Lower House, which as the "near miss" 
of 1895 had demonstrated, was not  impossible. However, it would take some careful 
strategising to effect that, and the time taken in working out and implementing the 
strategy  might account for the fact that, in contrast to the previous decade in which 
attempts to have Medical Practitioners’ Bills passed had occurred virtually on an annual 
basis, nothing further happened for another two years.  
 
However, the Protectionist Lyne ministry which had come to power only a week before 
the 1898 bill was introduced, proved as determined as the Reid ministry to get a genuine, 
albeit minimalist Medical Practitioners' Act on to the statute book. One reason for that 
was no doubt that while the government executive had changed, the corporate rationalists 
in the bureaucracy had not. Eventually, an elementary form of medical regulation was 
achieved in December,1900.  
The Medical Practice Amendment Acts 
As already noted, the way in which the two Amendment Acts of 1900 were passed was to 
have a crucial effect on the way medical autonomy was entrenched and institutionalised 
in NSW. Before considering that, it is first of all necessary to outline and discuss the 
content of the two Acts in some detail. Clause 1 of the first, the Medical Practitioners' 
Amendment Act (No 33, 1900)., made it an offence for anyone who was not a legally 
qualified practitioner in terms of the Act of 1898 to assume "the name or title of a 
physician, doctor of medicine, licentiate in medicine and surgery, bachelor or medicine, 
or surgeon, or any name, title, addition or description implying that he is legally 
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qualified". The penalty was severe: a fine of £50 and £5 for each day during which the 
offence was committed or alternatively a jail term of 12 months.  While the 
criminalisation of fraudulent titles dated back to the Act of 1855 and thus was nothing 
new, the eagerness of the government executive to have this legislation in place signalled 
that the law would be strictly enforced in the future. In other words, the practice of 
allopathic medicine, with the equally eager concurrence of the professional monopolists, 
had been subjected to state-supported "external control".  
 
The first Medical Practioners' Amendment Act of 1900 also for the first time, introduced 
a system of medical professional discipline through the medium of its second major 
clause. As we have seen, that there were no disciplinary provisions in the 1838, the 1855 
or the 1898 Acts meant that it was not possible to remove anyone's name from the 
medical register. The Amendment Act in contrast, provided for the deregistration by the 
MRB of firstly anyone who, even though previously legally qualified, turned out not to 
have the requisite educational qualifications and secondly, of any practitioner who had 
been convicted (my emphasis) of "felony or misdemeanour".  The inclusion of the word 
"convicted" in this sentence gave the state complete control of medical discipline. Since 
the MRB was given no powers to deregister unconvicted practitioners its power of 
internal discipline over the profession remained practically non-existent. That in turn 
denied the notion of peer review since the legislation made the courts primarily 
responsible for acting against miscreant practitioners rather than the profession itself.  
 
While this might have suited the government executive and the corporate rationalisers, it 
would have been a glaring weakness from the point of view of the professional 
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monopolisers. That weakness was remedied by the second Amendment Act, the full title 
of which was the Medical Practitioners' Further Amendment Act (No 70, 1900). 
Crucially, the first clause of this measure specified  "infamous conduct in any 
professional respect" as the ground for deregistration. The importance of that may be 
appreciated from the discussion on this topic in Chapter Two (see pp 59-63).  Since there 
was no reference to the judicial process, the enforcement of the "infamous conduct" 
clause became the responsibility of the MRB, which as we have seen, constituted the 
legislative embodiment of the power of the medical profession. If the first Act had given 
the MRB full external control of the medical profession, this second Act complemented 
and consolidated that by ensuring the establishment of full "internal control" by the MRB 
of the profession. The second Act therefore constituted the legal institution of peer review 
in NSW.   
 
The passage of the two Amendment Acts of 1900, together with the 1898 Act, meant that 
all the conditions for the full regulation of allopathic medical practice in NSW and the 
attainment of full professional status by Medicine in NSW had been attained. With the 
backing of the state, the MRB had been given full control of  "the criteria for entry, the 
lengthy educational training, registration, and standards of practice and conduct within 
the profession" (Daniel, 1994) However, this had been accomplished in an extremely 
messy legislative fashion. The "criteria for entry" were specified by Clause 3 of the 1898 
Act and Clauses 1 and 3 of the first Amendment Act of 1900, those for "the lengthy 
educational training" by Clause 1 of the 1898 Act and Clause 1 of the Further 
Amendment Act of 1900 while the control of the "standards of practice and conduct" was 
specified in the clauses relating to professional discipline in the two Amendment Acts of 
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1900.34 That piecemeal situation remained in place until 1912, when the three Acts were 
consolidated into a single Medical Practitioners' Act (Act 29, 1912). 
 
But it was the very messiness of the process which also produced a high degree of 
medical autonomy, something which calls for a closer examination of the passing of the 
two Amendment Acts. Neither Lewis & MacLeod (1989) nor Lloyd (1993) deal 
adequately with this issue. The former note simply that in 1900 "an Act passed 
surprisingly quickly" and was strengthened by a second piece of legislation, which 
implies the two acts represented a logical legislative progression.   Lloyd (1993) echoes 
this view in his statement that "Given the level of previous opposition," the passage of the 
first Act "occurred with little fuss" (p264) while the second Act consolidated the gains 
made by the profession. Moreover, it seems that in the view of these authors, the two 
Acts embodied the complete triumph of allopathic over lifeworld medicine. Lewis & 
MacCleod state for instance that the passing of the 1900 Acts meant that: "At last, the 
profession had secured legal support in its attempt to suppress unorthodox practice" 
(1993,p78). As demonstrated by the speeches of Reid in 1895, of Garran in 1898 and also 
that of Price in 1900 recorded below, the Acts of that year strictly avoided any attempt to 
"suppress unorthodox practice" or  to "put down quackery".  
                                                 
34 The untidiness of the legislative situation confused even Lloyd (1993) who states that the MRB's power to 
regulate the behaviour of registered practitioners remained limited after 1900. Despite having been given "the 
power … to deregister doctors for serious breaches of professional conduct" he states, it was not until the 
passing of the Medical Practitioners' Acts of 1912 and 1915 that the Board had the power "to remove from the 
register the name of any doctor 'convicted of felony or misdemeanour' …" (p267). Lloyd seems to assume that 
the second Amendment Act passed in November had over-ridden the first, but this was not the case, as was 
pointed out in the Lower House during the committee stage of the Bill (NSWPD 1:106 27/11/1900 p5831).  
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The differing origins of the Medical Practitioners Acts.  
It has earlier been suggested that government executive had realised that if proper 
medical regulation was to be put in place, there was no alternative but to take the Lower 
House bull by the horns and to push the legislation through there. As suggested above, 
that was not such a hopeless proceeding as might have appeared. The debates in 1886 and 
1894 which resulted in the Bills being passed, had revealed there were a good number 
who supported medical regulation in the Lower House both because their views on 
lifeworld medicine were not very different from those of the medical elite in the Upper 
House and also because they understood the urgency of the "bureaucratic imperative." An 
extreme example of such members would have been that of Norton and while the 
colourful vehemence of his views would have made them suspect, they were shared by 
Mr Richard Price (Independent, Gloucester), who introduced the first Amendment Act in 
September 1900. The shrewd political manoeuvring described below ensured its passage 
through the Lower House. Upper House acceptance followed shortly afterwards, and 
once the Act was assented to in October, the basic criteria for the regulation and full 
professionalisation of medicine had been put in place.  
 
This raises the question of why there was a second Amendment Act. As suggested above, 
this Act did not represent a mere logical progression from the first Act, since while that 
had been fashioned and sponsored by the government executive, the second was the work 
of the professional monopolisers.  That they were determined to have an Act of their own 
can be deduced from what was said during the debates and also from the fact that in its 
original form, this Act contained the "infamous conduct" clause as well as the that 
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providing for a longer training period for doctors,35 both very much to advantage of the 
profession. In Willis' view, the lengthening of the training requirements can be seen as 
"part of the attempt to improve the status of doctors in early Australian society by 
professionalisation" (1989, 54), which had in fact had been accomplished in Victoria in 
1862. In this regard, Willis cites a statement by Freidson which is worth repeating 
because it is so apposite to the theme of this study: 
[T]he content and length of training of an occupation including abstract 
knowledge or theory, is frequently a product of a deliberate action of 
those who are trying to show that their occupation is a profession and 
should therefore be given autonomy (1970, pp77-80). 
On the basis of evidence cited below, it seems the reason for the introduction of the 
second Bill was that it has been prepared, quite separately from the first government 
executive-sponsored Bill, by members of the medical elite. They appear to have come to 
the same conclusions as the government about the best way of securing the passage of an 
Act and had also found a Lower House champion in the person Mr Richard Meagher 
(Independent, The Tweed). His credibility in the Lower House was indicated by the fact 
that while he was originally elected as an independent in 1895, in 1907 he won his seat as 
a Labor candidate (NSW, 1998, p157).   
 
That his was a rival Bill to the government's is evident from the fact that while it was read 
for the first time on June 19, it was "upstaged" by Price's Bill which, although introduced 
two weeks later, went through all its stages in both the Lower and Upper Houses and 
                                                 
35 In its original form, this Bill did not include the provisions for establishing a separate register for unqualified 
practitioners, which was included in the final Act. This was introduced against the strong opposition of the 
medical elite. See p 147. 
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passed into law two-and-a-half weeks before Meagher's Bill received its second reading. 
Further evidence that the two Bills came from different sources is indicated by the fact 
that initially each bore exactly the same title, something which confused even the 
compilers of the contents list of NSWPD!36  
The passage of the Acts 
Further contrasts between the two Acts are provided by the way they were passed. As far 
the first or what may be termed the government executive Act is concerned, political 
wisdom might have dictated that it should not be introduced "cold" into the Lower House. 
Therefore members like Price might have prepared the way by arguing the case for the 
Bill to their colleagues in informal arenas before it was introduced.  The flavour of such 
arguments can be seen from points advanced by Price when he moved the second 
reading.  He assured the House that the Bill would  "… take away none of the rights 
possessed at the present by persons who may be practising … ". He contrasted this 
approach to that of the medical elite in the Upper House, stating that "the main objection 
to the bill introduced in another place by Dr Bowker and also to previous medical bills … 
was that they attempted to interfere with persons who were practising …" (NSWPD 
1:105 18/9/1900 p2978). Those "other persons" were of course, lifeworld practitioners. 
Although Price was as hostile to them as the medical elite, in terms of the government's 
minimalist strategy, he had distanced himself from any attempt to "put down quackery".  
 
                                                 
36 According to that list, Price was responsible for the second reading of Meagher's Bill, which was nothing like 
the case.  
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Price would also have ensured a more favourable hearing from Lower House members by 
arguing that the bill was confined to a "broad principle which is … recognised among 
trade unions. They insist that a man shall not use a term signifying that he possesses a 
certain qualification that he does not possess" (NSWPD 1:105 18/9/1900 p2978). That 
point disarmed opposition to the prohibition contained in the first clause of this Act 
which prevented the assumption of medical titles by practitioners who did not have 
academic training.37 This seems to have been readily accepted in the House; however, in 
conceding that only allopathically trained practitioners could use the title of "doctor", the 
proponents of lifeworld medicine were allowing their opponents to take a giant stride 
towards the domination of the discourse of medical practice which they established 
during the 20th century.   
 
It might also be remarked that Price's "trade-union" argument was unlikely to have been 
used in the Upper House by the medical elite. Moreover he would not have appeared as 
disingenuous as they when he argued: "The bill is not in the interests of the medical 
profession, nor in the interests of any special class" …[but] of the public who are 
victimised by quacks" (NSWPD 1:105 18/9/1900 pp2978-80). While in the ensuing 
debate one member Mr William Hughes38 (Labor, Sydney-Lang) [sic] deplored the 
failure of the Bill to "put down quackery", Price found support from others on the 
grounds of the bureaucratic imperative. Among these was Mr John Neild (Independent, 
                                                 
37 This point had been disputed in 1894 by the Labor member for Waratah, A. Griffith, who argued that anyone 
practising as medicine should be able to prefix the title of "doctor" to their names, so long as those not legally 
qualified added the words "not registered".  (NSWPD  1:78 14/5/1895 p6103). 
38 This was the famous (or infamous, depending on various points of view) Billy Hughes, later to be Prime 
Minister of Australia.  
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Paddington). who pointed out that auctioneers, tobacconists and omnibus drivers all had 
to be licenced and that "[i]n the interests of the men, women, and children of the 
community, no man should be allowed to tamper with their lives and limbs unless his 
competency is guaranteed by some form of state supervision" (NSWPD 1:105, 
18/9/1900, p2985).  
 
The lack of opposition to the Bill as a whole during the comparatively short debate was 
reflected in the way that its second reading and committee stages were passed without a 
division. In technical terms, the Bill had indeed been accepted with "little fuss", but that 
may also have been due to a deal having been made by government with the members of 
the Lower House, who in return for an assurance that the position of lifeworld medicine 
would not be touched, agreed to pass the Bill. It had an even quicker passage through the 
Upper House but as argued above, the disciplinary provisions of this Act notably failed to 
accomplish the complete professionalisation of Medicine in NSW, something which had 
to wait for the passage of the second Act.  
 
This second Act, the Medical Practitioners' Further Amendment Act, was of crucial 
importance because it contained the "infamous conduct" clause, which in terms of the 
Allinson judgement of 1894 (see Chapter Two p62) gave Medicine complete control over 
medical discipline. However, to judge by the very short speech Meagher made in 
introducing the second reading on October 30, he was either half-hearted about this Bill 
or simply did not understand it. He appears to have been aggrieved by the passage of the 
first Amendment Act, stating that while Price had "introduced a medical bill" (ignoring 
the fact that it had already passed into law), the medical profession was dissatisfied with 
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it since it was "only a titles bill". His reference to the medical profession was a clear 
pointer to the source of this Bill.   
 
More evidence that Meagher's Bill had been prepared quite separately from that of the 
government executive, is that its first two clauses were identical to those in the first 
Amendment Act. Had there been any communication between the drafters of the two 
measures, they would not have allowed this duplication to occur. That apart, Meagher 
charged that what the medical profession found most unsatisfactory about the government 
Bill was that it did not do "what is very important shall be done. It does not prevent 
quacks and alleged medical men from advertising in the newspapers" (NSWPD  1:105 
18/9/1900 p2978). Had his Bill sought to prohibit such advertising, it would have 
provoked an even bigger storm than it did in 1938; in fact it merely contained a provision 
that practitioners who placed advertisements in newspapers, should include their names 
and home addresses. This had also been specified in the 1894 Bill and was aimed at 
unqualified practitioners who were being allowed to use the premises of doctors to offer 
treatment to an unsuspecting public. None the less, Meagher's statement quite possibly 
reflected the true feelings of the medical elite about the advertising of lifeworld medicine. 
That "Freudian slip" of 1900 of course became a reality in 1938.  
 
Other than this Meagher said nothing more about the content of his Bill. It seems 
extraordinary that he failed to mention the "infamous conduct" clause or the provision for 
extending the training period for doctors. That may have been either because he did not 
want to draw attention to these clauses, or because both he and the other members present 
simply did not grasp their significance. The Bill was introduced after 10 pm., which may 
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account for the fact that it evoked no debate, the second reading as well as the committee 
stage being approved without a division. The whole process, according to NSWPD, took 
eleven minutes, the record filling less than one page (NSWPD 1:105 18/9/1900 p4524).  
 
There could have been more than simply the moderate lateness of the hour to account for 
the lack of opposition to the Bill. If, as suggested above, there had been a deal between 
the government and supporters of lifeworld medicine in the Lower House, there was little 
or no suggestion that the government was reneging on it. Apart from its mild advertising 
provision, the Bill left the position of lifeworld medical practitioners untouched. The 
terminology of "infamous conduct" clause may well have seemed incomprehensible 
mumbo-jumbo to members of the Lower House, who were obviously also unaware of the 
sophisticated arguments such as those of Willis and Freidson cited above, about the 
significance of the extension of the training period for medical practitioners.  
The institution of individual medical autonomy 
The swift passage of the Bill through the Lower House was not duplicated in the Upper 
House. Here it was introduced only two days later by Creed, the unusually short time 
after its passage through the Lower House being indicative of a sense of urgency among 
its sponsors in the Upper House.  That the Bill had not emanated from the government 
executive is clear from the fact that the representative of the government in the Upper 
House, Sir Francis  Suttor, immediately protested that since its first clauses duplicated 
those of the earlier Bill, the House was being asked to pass the same legislation twice 
(NSWPD 1:106 1/11/1900 p4635). Creed admitted this did pose a problem and was due 
to an "oversight" on his part, but argued that despite its overlap with the previous 
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Amendment Act, it was essential to pass the second reading. His urgency on that score 
was echoed by Dr William Cullen39  who declared:. 
I think we ought to take what the gods send us, and be thankful. We have 
been trying to legislate in this direction for a very long time, and now, 
when we find two bills passed through the Assembly in one week each 
giving us an instalment of what has long been desired by the people, I 
think we should accept them (NSWPD 1:106, 1/11/1900 p 4636). 
The House heeded his plea and passed the second reading without a division.40 However, 
during the committee stage, the "infamous conduct" clause was queried by Dr John Nash 
who had been appointed to the Upper House less than six months beforehand (NSW 
1998, p39) and who, although a medical practitioner, obviously did not feel himself to be 
a member of the medical elite. Nash said "he would like to be informed of the meaning of 
the words 'infamous conduct'. This was a subject that had given rise to a great deal of 
trouble, and had been before the English courts on many occasions during the last ten 
years."41 His worry, however, was not that of critics of the term in the late 20th century, 
who saw it as providing a convenient shield against accountability by individual doctors, 
but that "the use of the words had been found to be fraught with grievous consequences to 
medical men who had been registered in England". In other words, Nash's fear about the 
vagueness of this clause was that it could be used as a weapon in the endless squabbles 
within the medical profession. On this point he was supported by Mr Alexander Brown 
(Progressive, Newcastle), who as detailed in Chapter Two (see p68), had cited the case of 
the surgeon whose incompetence had been covered up by his fellow surgeons. Brown's 
                                                 
39 He was a Doctor of Laws, not a medical doctor (NSW 1998, p32). 
40 The difficulty posed by the duplication of clauses in the second Bill was dealt with by deleting them at the 
committee stage 
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point however, was not that the infamous conduct clause would protect incompetent 
practitioners, but rather that it could be used to silence the "whistleblower" in this and 
other cases.   
 
In other words, Nash and Brown opposed the clause not because of the way it might 
affect the rights of patients, but because of the way it could affect the interests of doctors. 
In response to their fears, McLaurin claimed that the MRB was composed of men of 
"high standing, respectability, and honesty of purpose" and could be trusted to administer 
the clause fairly. Moreover he said, anyone deregistered on these grounds had the right, in 
terms of the Bill, to appeal to the Supreme Court. Both he and Creed asserted that the 
clause had been in operation in Britain since 1858 and had raised no problems, which of 
course ignored the Allinson case, although they also had reason not to draw the attention 
of the non-medical members of the House to that case.  
 
Nash asked Creed to reconsider the clause, especially because the low attendance in the 
House posed the danger that the debate would be halted and the Bill possibly lapse 
because of a lack of a quorum. The medical elite would have none of that and it was 
when Nash reiterated that "it ought to be stated what was meant by infamous conduct", 
Creed replied: "It is impossible to define it!" (NSWPD Vol 106, 1/11/1900, p 4637) In 
that statement is to be found the basis for the non-accountable practice of Medicine for 
most of the 20th century. As will appear later in this thesis, Creed was not expressing an 
individual opinion here. He was expressing the view of Medicine as a whole, and that 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Nash was guilty of  hyperbole here, because the only case which had occurred in "the last ten years" was that 
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view was supported both by governments and by the legal system. Today the logic which 
produced such thinking seems incomprehensible, because it was allowing Medicine the 
sole prerogative of defining a term which medical practioners themselves claimed to be 
non-definable or to be definable only in their terms. Those terms, as pointed out by 
Berlant (1975) and Klein (1984) among others, did not include issues relating to practice. 
But this ultimate claim to medical peer review contained the seeds of its own destruction 
because it was based on the assumption that those in the community population would 
forever tolerate what was the blatant over-riding and ignoring of their interests. 
 
But obviously any such thoughts would not have been near to anyone’s minds that day in 
the Upper House. What was clear was that the medical elite were in a hurry to get the Bill 
passed. In appealing to Nash to drop his opposition to the clause, Creed argued "there 
was an evident need for a provision which would enable a man to be struck off the roll 
without it being proved that he had actually committed a crime" (NSWPD 1:106 
1/11/1900 p4638). Later in the debate McLaurin expanded on this argument, claiming 
that while habitual drunkenness or sexual assault of a female patient could constitute 
"infamous conduct," the law could not touch anyone for these offences. The profession 
should therefore be empowered to take action against someone whose conduct was "so 
gross, glaring, and shameless, that it could fairly and properly be described as infamous" 
(NSWPD  1:1061/11/1900 p4640). This was a reasonable enough point, but there can be 
no doubt that seeing Nash knew about the Allinson case, that Creed and McLaurin were 
                                                                                                                                                 
of  Allinson.  
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also very familiar with it and with the implications of the Lopes judgement with regard to 
the autonomy of the medical profession.  
 
Although Nash said that in his view no satisfactory definition of "infamous conduct" had 
been forthcoming, under sustained pressure he withdrew his opposition to the clause  
(NSWPD 1:106 1/11/1900 p4642). The pressure by the medical elite on Nash, as well as 
the haste in which the Bill was brought into the Upper House, indicates the eagerness of 
its sponsors to rubber stamp the Bill as quickly as possible. Any changes would mean the 
measure would have to be re-submitted to the Lower House and as Cullen had implied, 
there was no guarantee that its amendable mood would continue.  
 
However, hopes for a quick passage of the Bill were again dashed by Nash, who 
introduced a new clause (it became Clause 3 of the final Act) which stipulated that a 
practitioner not possessed of the qualifications laid down in the previous Act but who 
none the less had passed through "a due course of study at a recognised school of 
medicine and surgery" and had "practised in a reputable manner" for 15 years, could have 
his name placed on a separate register by the MRB. This move to legitimate non-qualified 
practitioners was fiercely opposed by the medical elite, but was passed on the casting 
vote of the Speaker (NSWPD 1:106 27/11/1900 p5840). In the Lower House it was 
opposed with equal vehemence by Norton (he said it would "encourage the most 
diabolical quacks") and also by  Price, who had introduced the first government 
executive-sponsored Bill. None the less, the clause was not only accepted without a 
division, but the period of "reputable service” was reduced from 15 to 5 years (NSWPD 
1:106, 27/11/1900 p5843). That indicated that despite the belated acceptance of the 
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necessity for medical regulation, there was still a great reservoir of sympathy in the 
Lower House, for practitioners who fell outside its boundaries (and these would have 
included lifeworld practitioners).  
 
The change meant that the Bill had to be re-submitted to the Upper House, where again it 
was considered only one day after it was passed by the Lower House. Despite protests by 
McLaurin about the reduction in the period of "reputable service", Creed's plea that 
Lower House amendments be accepted without change was heeded; he might have had in 
mind the way the 1895 Bill had been stymied "at the winning post" by the Upper House's 
refusal to accept Lower House amendments (NSWPD 1:106 28/11/1900 p5854). Thus the 
Bill, the title of which on the basis of the expert legal advice of Cullen, had been 
amended to "The Medical Practitioners' Further Amendment Act" (NSWPD 1:106 
1/12/1900 p4643) was at last ready to pass into law, being assented to in December, 
1900. 
 
The passage of the Act represented a double victory for the professional monopolisers. 
Not only had they successfully staked a claim to share  "internal control" of the medical 
profession itself with the state and reasserted the legality of peer review, but the 
entrenchment of individual practitioner autonomy had been enshrined in the law by the 
adoption of the "infamous conduct" clause. The significance of that can be appreciated by 
a comparison with the situation in Victoria, where a fairly complete regulatory regime 
had been installed by its parliament as long ago as 1862. However, the Victorian 
legislation had never included an infamous conduct clause and as Lewis & MacLeod 
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(1989, p78) point out, it was not until 1933 that a similar clause was included in the 
Victorian Medical Practitioners' Act.  
 
In this regard, what is strongly evident from the NSW debate about "infamous conduct" is 
that the question of the actual practice standards of individual doctors was not a 
disciplinary issue even for Nash. Patients' rights were simply not a part of medical 
discourse at the time. Instead McLaurin put forward the notion that "infamous conduct" 
related mainly to addiction to alcohol or drugs and sexual misconduct, particularly extra-
marital sex. In the light of what Creed had earlier said about the "indefinability" of 
"infamous conduct", he might have deprecated Mclaurin's attempts to give the term even 
limited definitions such as these. As pointed out in Chapter Two, it was precisely the non-
definability of "infamous conduct" that made it infinitely valuable to Medicine. As 
affirmed by Mr Justice Lopes in 1894, the non-definability of "infamous conduct" in 
either everyday speech or in legal terminology meant the interpretation of the term was 
left solely the medical profession. That gave the profession as embodied in the MRB, the 
power to exclude matters relating to medical practice from consideration under its 
disciplinary procedures. Thus was the individual autonomy of practitioners entrenched in 
NSW for the almost 90 years, with results that will be discussed in the next Chapter.   
The entrenchment of institutional autonomy 
As was argued in Chapter Two, the first line of defence for individual medical 
professional autonomy is always that constituted by the institutional autonomy of their 
controlling body, in this case, the NSW MRB. As we have seen, the 1838 Act had 
established it as a strongly autonomous body and the passing of the 1900 Acts not only 
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left that autonomy intact, but probably strengthened it. Had earlier attempts to pass a 
Medical Practitioners' Act succeeded, the autonomy of the MRB might not have been 
anything like as complete. Most of the abortive Bills between 1876 and 1897 were 
comprehensive measures which envisaged reconstituting the MRB in such a way that the 
majority of its members would be drawn from outside the ranks of practising doctors.  
 
In this, the proposals followed the precedent set by the 1858 British Medical Act, which 
had established "The General Council of Education and Registration of the United 
Kingdom," better known simply as the General Medical Council (GMC).   That body had 
24 members, nine representing the Royal Colleges and other medical licensing bodies 
which had emerged in the course of time in the United Kingdom, another ten representing 
the universities which trained doctors, and six members nominated by the Privy Council, 
the body to which the GMC was responsible (Pyke-Lees, 1958 p3)  Since there were no 
licensing bodies in NSW, the composition of the proposed MRBs was necessarily 
different here, although the model of having a mix of representation was followed.  Thus 
in many of the abortive Bills and also in the recommendations of Creed's Select 
Committee (NSW, 1887, p6) it was proposed that besides members of the medical 
profession, the Board should include representatives from the University of Sydney 
(because of its medical school) as well as government nominees.  
 
Ideas about the size and the balance of representation of these elements differed over 
time, but what is notable is that in every one of these Bills, the numbers which it was 
proposed would be nominated or elected by the medical profession were in the minority, 
while in some Bills, notably those of in 1876 and 1884, were eliminated altogether. There 
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were obviously strong feelings even in the Upper House about allowing the medical 
profession to control the proposed MRB. Holt for instance, expressed agreement with 
what had been "justly said", that the establishment of the MRB would result in "the 
appointment of a body of men to regulate their own affairs, and for the protection of 
themselves and not of the public" (Sydney Morning Herald, 3/3/1876). One hundred 
years later, feelings in the consumer structural interest group about the MRB almost 
exactly mirrored those of Holt in 1876. In that year another member of the Upper House, 
Mr Bourne Russell, averred that unless the Board contained a strong lay element, "it 
would very soon dwindle into a close borough that would be very oppressive.… no body 
of medical men ought to be trusted with the powers proposed to be given by this Bill" 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 24/10/1876).  
 
As will be seen from the table below, the extreme position which altogether eliminated 
the appointment of medical practitioners to the MRB, was not maintained in the later 
proposals.  
 
Some examples of the proposed membership of the MRB in various Medical 
Practitioners' Bills can been seen from the Table.               
 
TABLE 1.  Proposals for the composition of the MRB contained in the 
abortive Medical Practitioners Acts for the years specified.  
 
  University  
of Sydney 
appointees 
Government 
appointees 
Medical 
profession 
appointees 
Source 
1876 3 6 0 (SMH 24/2/1876).   
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1884 3 6 0 (NSWPD 1:1 1/2/1880 p1597). 
1886 3 3 3 (NSWPD  1:20 4/6/1886 
p2432). 
1893 2 4 4 (NSWPD  1:67 11/10/1893 
p284) 
 
It is also possible that even with the addition of nominees from outside the medical 
profession, it probably would still have been dominant since appointees from University 
of Sydney would undoubtedly have been drawn from the medical faculty. It is also 
possible that government appointees would simply have been more medical practitioners.  
 
However, the attempts to make the composition less dominated by the medical profession 
came to nothing. The minimalist, little-or-no-change strategy adopted to get the Acts 
through the Lower House dictated that any issues which might generate controversy and 
opposition, were to be avoided. The composition of the MRB was one such issue, and 
therefore it was left unaltered. Since the MRB had originally been appointed before the 
era of responsible government and that over the next century it was regarded as simply a 
continuation of that body, it is not surprising that, as noted in Chapter Two, no Medical 
Practitioners' Act or Amendment Act passed between 1838 and 1987 laid down any 
reporting provisions for the MRB. Nor did they specify any mechanisms through which 
the MRB could be made directly responsible for its actions either to a minister or to the 
parliament.  
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In short both before and after 1900, the MRB enjoyed almost complete institutional 
autonomy in terms of which as remarked in the previous Chapter, although empowered 
by government, in a de jure sense it was not responsible to government.  Thus the 
minimalist strategy enforced on government by the power of lifeworld medicine, in the 
final result had actually increased the power of its allopathic rival by entrenching the 
autonomy and non-accountability of the MRB.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that what emerged from the messy production of 
medical regulation and the consequential full professionalisation of Medicine in NSW, 
was a very high degree of both institutional and individual medical autonomy. That 
degree of autonomy was due to accident as much as design, one of the chief "accidents" 
being the persistence of lifeworld medicine and the political power of its adherents.  Their 
power was evident in many ways in the society, but from the point of view of this study, 
most evident in the resistance of the Lower House of the parliament to the introduction of 
medical regulation.  
 
The power of lifeworld medicine proved too great for the professional monopolisers as 
embodied in the medical elite in the Upper House and the BMA to overcome in the 
parliament. It was thus left to the government executive to finesse the necessary 
legislation through. However, this could only be achieved by keeping that legislation as 
minimalist as possible in order to back assurances given both in the open forums of the 
parliament and very probably in private arenas, that it would contain nothing to suppress 
lifeworld medicine. The success of this strategy allowed the professional monopolisers to 
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"piggy-back" their own desired legislation, contained in the Further Amendment Act of 
1900, through the parliament. Yet here again their fear of the power of lifeworld 
medicine in the Lower House gave them a good excuse to suppress the Upper House 
debate on the "infamous conduct" clause which so deeply entrenched individual medical 
autonomy,  
 
Thus we return to the point made earlier: in the final result the attempts of lifeworld 
medicine to block the advance of allopathic medicine actually contributed to its power. 
That indicates that of course, the attempt by the proponents of lifeworld medicine to 
contain the onward march of bureaucratisation constituted a "mission impossible". They 
were at a double disadvantage because as far back as 1838, it had become clear that their 
lack of a scientific epistemological foundation deprived the many and varied strains of 
lifeworld medicine of any hope of recognition or legitimation by the state and they 
therefore had no hope of joining the onward march of bureaucratisation. 
 
In contrast, as far as allopathic medicine was concerned, the increasing dominance of 
societies by rationalistic/scientific epistemologies made the advent of bureaucratisation 
seem welcome because it held out the promise of "order and protection" in Weber's 
terms. Thus "the system" in Habermasian terms, not only colonises, but is often willingly 
invited in by inhabitants of the lifeworld. However, as stated in Chapter One (p18) in the 
words of Albrow (1996 p177), "assimilating the colonial culture" can lead the colonised 
to the eventual acquisition if not total independence, then at least to a position of power 
equal to that of the colonisers. It is suggested that the attainment of that position was 
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accomplished in NSW by the consumer structural interest group in NSW in the late 20th 
century.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE DOMINANCE OF MEDICAL PEER REVIEW IN NSW  
1900-1972 
 
The long time-period under review in this chapter marked the apogee of medical 
autonomy in NSW. 1900 and 1972 are the dates of the Medical Practitioners' Acts and 
Amendment Acts which provided the framework for the exercise of that autonomy over 
the first seven decades of the 20th century. That legislation in turn ensured that peer 
review remained the supreme and exclusive instrument for the enforcement of medical 
accountability during the period under review.  While there are indications that medical 
autonomy had begun to be questioned in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its force was not 
checked in any significant way even as late as 1972, which forms the cut-off point of this 
chapter.  
 
The investigation of the nature of medical autonomy between the dates specified is 
concerned with firstly the constitution of the MRB and its relationship to government, 
since those are indicators of the degree of institutional autonomy enjoyed by the medical 
profession. Secondly, the chapter investigates the way in which medical discipline was 
applied, since that had a vital bearing on the individual autonomy of practitioners and 
more to the point of this thesis, the operation of peer review. It should be said that the 
evolution of both institutional and individual autonomy was a slow one; for long periods, 
what was not happening was just as significant as what was happening. As will be seen 
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from the content, what was not happening in the period under review, was any change to 
the principle of peer review.   
Medical autonomy and discipline, 1900-1938 
It was pointed out in the previous chapter that the initial medical regulatory Acts, viz. 
those of 1898-1900 were of an extremely elementary nature. As has been stated, when 
these were consolidated and amended slightly in 1912, they shared the "barebones" 
nature of the original Acts. Both these Acts and that of 1912 specified nothing more than 
that the MRB should consist of not less than three medical practitioners nominated by 
government (there was no specification of the maximum number).  The duties of the 
MRB were simply to maintain a register of the names of those who it had adjudged on the 
basis of their education and training, to be legally qualified medical practitioners, and to 
remove from the register any found to have been guilty of "felony or misdemeanour" or 
of "infamous conduct in any professional respect". The 1912 Act specified no reporting 
requirements for the MRB and thus the high degree of autonomy and its essentially 
unaccountable nature dating back to 1838, remained intact.  
 
The records of the MRB indicate that there was no application of any disciplinary action 
against practitioners between 1900 and the passing of the 1912 Act. Although it seems 
unlikely that there were no cases calling for discipline, especially since the number of 
legally qualified practitioners had risen by 33% during that period42, the lack of action 
may have been because the Acts of 1898-1900 simply stated the grounds for acting 
                                                 
42 The exact number of legally qualified practitioners according to Hilder (1959) was 1,225 in 1897 and 1,825 
in 1912. He states that the figures for 1898-1904 are unavailable (p34).  
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against a practitioner without specifying who could register complaints or how they 
would be dealt with once they were made. The assumption was probably that the MRB 
would initiate and deal with disciplinary cases in the course of its ordinary business. 
Although the problems of acting on that basis are not recorded anywhere, it is easy to see 
what they might be. Simply to strike a doctor's name from the register without hearing the 
accused would have left the MRB open to a charge of acting without due process. On the 
other hand, if accused doctors were allowed to defend themselves in an ordinary meeting, 
that raised the question of whether they had the right to legal representation. If so, the 
MRB itself would be entitled to have  a legal representative. This in turn would raise 
questions about the procedures to be used in hearing the case since the MRB did not 
constitute a court of law.  
 
To deal with these issues, a clause was included in the 1912 Act stipulating that for 
disciplinary hearings the MRB would transform itself into an open court in which the 
normal rules of evidence would apply, including the cross examination of witnesses and 
the right of legal representation by the accused. That system had already been in use for 
disciplinary proceedings in the dental profession in terms of the Dentists Act of 1900 
(New South Wales, 1901 p472). Although the open court principle represented an 
advance on the 1900 Medical Practitioners' Act, its application to the MRB meant that its 
members, who were unlikely to have had any legal training, were expected to act as both 
judge and jury in cases brought before them. This situation probably seemed of no great  
consequence since the MRB dealt only with medical matters in which its members could 
be expected to be expert, a view which seems to have been accepted in the Clune vs the 
MRB of New South Wales ([1917] 34) case cited in Chapter 2 (see p62).  
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While the minutes of the MRB demonstrate that after 1912 disciplinary actions did begin 
to be taken, leading in most cases to the deregistration of practitioners, these were few 
and far between. The first happened only in 1915 and between that date and 1938 only 12 
such actions are recorded, an average of one action every two years. During this period 
there was only deregistration on the grounds of  "felony or misdemeanour", this being 
that of a doctor  convicted of a crime in a court of law and sentenced to a year-long jail 
term (Medical Registration Board NSW (1838-1972),  Vol 4, 1924, p325). All other 
deregistrations were as a result of practitioners being found guilty of "infamous conduct", 
although most cases were concerned with financial fraud, not practice issues. The 
emphasis on fraud is evident from an item of 1916 in the minutes of the MRB, which 
record that one of its members, Dr R.H. Todd "drew attention to disciplinary cases before 
the [British] General Medical Council, particularly the case of Dr William Herbert 
Fawcett summarised as the charge of having improperly used undue influence in the 
making of a will. Dr Todd said he mentioned the case as it appeared to him similar to one 
that occurred in this State"  (Medical Board, 1916, Vol 4, p91).  
 
Other cases over the years involved the deregistration of practitioners who had 
deliberately given wrong diagnoses apparently in the hope of financial gain from the 
misdiagnosed patients.  For instance in 1932 a practitioner was charged with having 
wrongly diagnosed three men with gonorrhoea and advising them they required "special 
private treatment" which only he could give them, "by means of which representation [he 
attempted] to obtain … various large sums of money" (Medical Registration Board NSW 
(1838-1972),  Vol 6, pp352-3).  A second charge was that this practitioner had published 
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and was selling a book called Sex and Disease and was also selling a preparation called 
"San-o-Sex". The misdiagnosis charge was dismissed on the grounds that the practitioner 
had been misled by the three men: in its judgement the MRB told the practitioner that  
[T]he evidence clearly indicates that in each of three cases there was a 
deliberate attempt to deceive you by wilful misstatement of symptoms and 
of the medical history, and in all the cases the misstatements were so 
misleading that the Board considers that they might have influenced your 
judgement, and led you to give a diagnosis which the Board cannot, in the 
face of the evidence, believe was correct (Medical Registration Board 
NSW (1838-1972),  p352-3).  
It might be remarked that it is difficult to see why the practitioner would have relied on 
statements rather than on physical examinations to make his diagnosis, although of 
course, the three complainants might have been attempting to entrap him (which in turn 
would indicate that he had already developed a reputation for exploiting victims of 
sexually transmitted disease). While the practice issue involving misdiagnosis was 
rejected by the MRB, the second charge involving improper financial gain was found to 
constitute "infamous conduct". On this score, the deregistration sentence was suspended 
for six months on condition that the practitioner desisted from his commercial activities, 
which he promised to do. It is perhaps a significant pointer to the thinking of the MRB 
members at that time that they seemed to consider financial impropriety a more heinous 
offence than a practice issue. 
 
While the 1912 Act made provision for the enforcement of discipline, it made no 
provision for policing the behaviour and actions of the members of the profession. In 
terms of the notion of peer review, the assumption was probably that the profession itself 
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and the MRB in particular would be responsible for this function. If they failed to 
perform it, there was no official "complaints pathway" by means of which aggrieved 
patients could register their grievances.  
 
However, an unofficial pathway does appear to have been developed over time.  When 
Mrs Kathleen Flynn of Sofala in 1934 approached the MRB with a complaint about what 
a local practitioner had said "concerning the nature of her illness," she was informed that 
 …the MRB is a judicial body, and can only conduct inquiries when 
sitting as a Court: the usual procedure followed to initiate an inquiry is for 
the complainant to acquaint the Director-General of Public Health with 
the substance of the complaint. The Director-General then has a 
preliminary investigation made by his officers, and if he considers that the 
matter is one that should be enquired into, he takes the necessary steps to 
have it brought before the Board (Medical Registration Board NSW 
(1838-1972),  Vol 6, p51).  
Since it was not specified by law, this would have been a purely ad hoc arrangement. In 
the same ad hoc fashion, some aggrieved patients had earlier established an alternative 
complaints pathway by directly approaching the office of the Crown Solicitor. This is 
evident from a response by the Crown Solicitor to a complaint made by Mrs Augusta 
Smith against a doctor in 1930. She was told that if she signed a form of complaint ("a 
draft of which is submitted herewith"), the MRB could serve a summons on the 
practitioner concerned (Medical Registration Board NSW (1838-1972),  Vol 6, pp284-5).  
This would certainly have short-circuited the process set out by the MRB when it told 
Mrs Flynn that it could only launch investigations when it was sitting as a court (the 
Catch-22 being that it would not sit as a court until it had the results of an investigation in 
front of it). The use of the office of the Director-General of Public Health to conduct 
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initial investigations might have been introduced to deflect direct complainants' 
approaches to the Crown Solicitor.  
This early system for dealing with patient complaints by requiring that they first be 
screened by the office of the Director-General for Public Health before being passed on 
to the MRB, set a precedent in that it required complainants to prove their case before 
two different bodies. That double hurdle, which was written into the Medical 
Practitioners' Acts after 1938, remained in place in different forms right up until 1987. 
The second hurdle, that comprised by the MRB sitting as a court, was the more 
formidable one, because here complainants were faced with having to prove their case 
under court-room conditions in which expert legal knowledge and probably the 
employment of legal counsel was required if the complainant was to have any chance of 
success. Evidence for this appears in the later history of the case brought by Mrs Smith in 
1930 referred to above, who had taken her complaint directly to the Crown Solicitor. In a 
letter to the firm of solicitors engaged by the doctor in question to defend him, the Crown 
Solicitor stated that the MRB would hear Mrs Smith's evidence and that of any witnesses 
she chose to present, and would also hear evidence in answer to the charge "whether the 
parties are represented by Solicitor or Counsel or not" (Medical Registration Board NSW 
(1838-1972),  Vol 6, pp284-5).  Having already engaged a firm of solicitors, the doctor 
was obviously going to be legally represented at the hearing. The Crown Solicitor 
informed Mrs Smith that if she wanted to be similarly represented, "she must make her 
own arrangements … and must bear any expense in connection therewith".  That nothing 
more about this case appeared in the MRB records indicates that Mrs Smith did not 
pursue the matter, even though the Crown Solicitor had told her that in his opinion, if her 
charges against the practitioner were proved, they "might be found as justification for 
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removing his name from the roll of Medical Practitioners" (Medical Registration Board 
NSW (1838-1972),  Vol 4, pp284-5). Very probably Mrs Smith simply did not have the 
financial means to use the services of a solicitor.  
More evidence of the difficulties faced by complainants appears in the MRB minutes for 
1936, which record a charge brought by Miss Sylvia Welsh, a nurse, against Dr Percival 
Homer, who she alleged, "performed an illegal operation on the late Eileen Verna Clint 
Smith, and did criminally neglect her, the result of which caused her death" (Medical 
Registration Board NSW (1838-1972),   pp133-4). This complaint was made directly to 
the MRB, which sent her the complaints form drawn up by the Crown Solicitor "with a 
suggestion that she should consult her solicitor". The case was brought before the MRB 
sitting as a court on June 22, 1936. What followed is best related in the minutes of the 
proceedings.  
The President read the Complaint, and after waiting for ten minutes for 
Miss Welsh or for any one to appear on her behalf, was about to dismiss 
the complaint, when she presented herself and requested an adjournment 
on the ground that she had no legal consultation on the matter. Also that 
there had been interference by public officials (not named). The President 
pointed out to Miss Welsh that notice had been served on her on 18th May 
of the date fixed for the hearing, which should have afforded her sufficient 
time for legal consultation; and that official interference - of which there 
was no evidence - was a matter into which inquiry could not be made by 
the MRB: He asked Miss Welsh to proceed with the charge. 
Miss Welsh said she must insist on an adjournment. Mr Bradley [the 
barrister appearing on behalf of the accused doctor] opposed an 
adjournment. The President after consultation with other members of the 
Board informed Miss Welsh that the request for an adjournment could not 
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be granted and that if she would not proceed with the charge, the Board 
had no alternative but to dismiss the case. 
Miss Welsh said she must consider for a while as she must communicate 
by telephone with a certain official (stated later by Miss Welsh to be the 
Minister for Health). 
The President informed Miss Welsh that the Board wished to give what 
assistance it could within reason; but it appeared to members that no good 
purpose could be served by adjourning the Court. He must ask her quite 
definitely to proceed at once with the charge; or the case would be 
dismissed. 
Miss Welsh stated that she had relied on the Minister to provide legal 
assistance. There was a definite official leakage and she must know why. 
Everything had been done to suppress the matter (Medical Registration 
Board NSW (1838-1972),  Vol 7, pp133-4).  
The MRB ignored Welsh's pleas for an adjournment and dismissed the case. It is difficult 
to disagree with her view that there had been, in modern terms, a "cover-up". Despite her 
strong feelings about the case (as a nurse she had no doubt been an eye-witness of the 
events leading to Smith's death), she obviously did not have the means to employ the 
services of solicitor. Thus this proto-typical “equal health advocate” found herself 
powerless against the alliance which existed at that time between the government, 
corporate rationalist and professional monopolists interest groups.  
 
The chief representative of the government was the Minister for Health, Mr Herbert 
FitzSimons, who as related in the previous chapter, was responsible for piloting the 1938 
Medical Practitioners' Act through the parliament. Welsh's hopes for help from him were 
misplaced; his thinking on the meaning of "infamous conduct" is evident from a case 
cited in parliament by Mr John Hawkins (Labor, Newcastle), during the committee stage 
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of the 1938 Medical Practitioners' Bill (NSWPD 2:153 18/8/1938 pp1143-4). Hawkins 
related how, through negligence and failure to act quickly, a doctor at the Buladelah 
hospital directly contributed to the death of an injured 19-year old youth from a forestry 
camp in the district. When the man's workmates, who had carried him three miles over 
bush tracks on an improvised stretcher, brought him to the hospital, the doctor on duty 
adopted a truculent attitude and wanted to know how the costs of treatment would be 
covered. The workmates said they would pay whatever was necessary, but when they said 
that the youth urgently needed to be taken to Newcastle hospital, the doctor had asked 
who would pay for the 'phone call. He did nothing more than examine the youth and 
diagnose blood poisoning, leaving him in a bed outside on a verandah for the rest of the 
night and next day without treatment. When his workmates visiting him the following 
evening and found him semi-comatose, they protested to the doctor, who ordered them 
out of the hospital. He also said that in future there would be no treatment to patients who 
did not pay for it in advance. Although the youth was eventually taken by ambulance to 
Newcastle hospital, he died there.  
 
So outraged were the workmates by the doctor's actions that they took the case to 
Hawkins as their local MP and he in turn raised it with the Minister. While obviously the 
MP and the workmates thought the doctor had been guilty of "infamous conduct", the 
Minister claimed that under the 1912 legislation, he had had no power to act against the 
doctor.  That judgement of course, was based on the interpretation of  "infamous 
conduct" which confined its purview to moral turpitude and obviously in the Minister's 
view that did not encompass the allegations of negligence made against the doctor.  The 
best the Minister could think of was to refer the case to the BMA, but since the doctor 
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was not a member of that organisation, it had no grounds for taking action .  No doubt the 
doctor in question would have had his own version of the events but he was never called 
to account for his behaviour.  
 
The case was indicative of how little ideas about peer review and "infamous conduct" had 
changed since 1900 in official and medical circles. The record of the MRB over the first 
four decades of the 20th century further indicates that the interpretation of "infamous 
conduct" was not even particularly focused on issues of "sex-and-booze" which 
characterised those of the late 19th century, but rather on unfair financial gain by 
individual practitioners. The lack of any disciplinary cases at all between 1900 and 1915 
and the small number of such cases between that date and 1938 also indicates that 
exercise of medical discipline was not seen to be of high priority by the MRB even after 
the passing of the 1912 Act. However, the development of the non-official complaints 
pathways by aggrieved patients described above, and cases such as those presented by 
Nurse Welsh and the Buledelah loggers, also indicate that there was a slow but steadily 
rising demand for greater medical accountability among patients.   
The effects of the 1938 Act on institutional autonomy 
One point which stands out with regard to the constitution of the MRB, is how slowly it 
changed. As noted above, not until 1912 was there any attempt to alter the chaotic nature 
of the legislation of 1898/1900.  Although updated Medical Practitioners' Acts were 
considered in the 25 years after 1912, it was not until 1938 that a new, much more 
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comprehensive Act was passed.43  The need for that Act would have been made ever 
more pressing by the continuing expansion of the population of the State from 1,777,534 
in 1912 to 2,735,695 in 1938 (35%), while according to Hilder (1959), the rise in the 
numbers of registered medical practitioners from 3,213 in 1912 to 6,035 (53%) in 1938, 
was even faster (p34).  
 
During this period regulation of other health occupations was also expanding; besides 
pharmacy and dentistry regulated in 1897 (Haines, 1997) and 1900 (New South Wales, 
1901 pp471-5) respectively, nursing was regulated in 1924 (Anonymous, 1990 1990, 
p23) and optometry in 1930 (New South Wales, 1938 pp643-53), while physiotherapy 
was moving towards being regulated, something which eventuated in 1945. The more 
comprehensive nature of the Acts which established the regulatory bodies for these health 
occupations, stood in sharp contrast to minimalist nature of the 1912 Medical 
Practitioners' Act.  
 
That Act would also have seemed increasingly inappropriate in the light of the rapid 
expansion of governmental activity in the health field. As noted in the previous chapter, 
health became a full portfolio with its own Minister in 1913. Annual reports of the 
Department of Health indicate a steady expansion of the bureaucracy and the activities in 
which it was involved. Whereas in 1913, the number of staff running the various sections 
of the Department for Public Health amounted to a little over 100 (New South Wales, 
1915 pp12-14) by 1938 that number had grown to close on 1,400 working in 25 sub-
                                                 
43 An Amendment Act was passed in 1915. However, this did nothing more than prohibit the registration of any 
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divisions (New South Wales, 1940b pviii). While the number of hospitals grew from 342 
in 1913 to 549 in 1938, efforts in the field of public health (i.e. that sector concerned with 
the control and elimination of disease) were becoming a central concern.  
 
In the face of this expansion of activity and interest in the health field as the 20th century 
progressed, the failure of governments to change the elementary nature of the 1912 Act 
meant that in many ways, the history of the pre-1898/1900 period as far as medical 
regulation was concerned, was repeating itself, even though unlike in the earlier period, 
there was an Act in place. However, the struggles to pass the 1900 legislation had left a 
long institutional memory which seems to have discouraged any attempts to pass another 
Act. This can be deduced from an anecdote told by Mr Herbert FitzSimons (Coalition, 
Lane Cove). In the later stages of his long parliamentary career, he moved to the Upper 
House where during debate on the Medical Practitioners' Act of 1963, he stated:  
I well recall that in 1936 I first discussed proposals for the new Medical 
practitioners Act with the Crown Solicitor, Mr Clarke, and the 
Parliamentary Draftsman, Mr. McCrae. I remember Mr. Clarke looking  
at me quizzically in my office in the Department of Health and saying: 
"Are you really serious about attempting a new Medical Practitioners 
Act?" I said, "Yes, Cabinet has directed it." He said: “I shall just tell you 
this. In the department somewhere there are probably the remains of 
twenty six previous drafts of Medical Practitioners Acts, some of which 
were taken only to the rough draft stage, some of which were printed and 
some of which were actually introduced, but as far as I know none ever 
succeeded in getting approval" (NSWPD, 3:46, 3/4/1963, p4063). 
                                                                                                                                                 
doctors of German or Austrian registration.  
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However sceptical the "Sir Humphrey" of his day was about the possibility of passing a 
new Act, it is evident both from what he said about the 26 drafts of putative Acts and also 
from FitzSimons' report about the directive from Cabinet, that there had been a growing 
realisation during the 1930s of the necessity for passing of such an Act.  
 
FitzSimons had been appointed Minister for Health in the conservative Coalition 
government which, having first come to power in 1932, had been re-elected in 1935. 
Although, as he recalled in his 1963 speech, moves to introduce a new Medical 
Practitioners' Act began the following year, these were not implemented until after 
another Coalition election victory in February, 1938. That cleared the way for FitzSimons 
to introduce the Act in July 1938, and as we have seen in Chapter Four, the effects of 
party discipline ensured that it had passed into law by the end of the year. 
  
The 1938 Act was the most extensive and sophisticated medical regulatory legislation 
adopted in NSW to that date and brought this State into line with legislation in other 
Australian States and overseas jurisdictions. It might also be remarked in passing that this 
Act enormously strengthened the position of the medical profession. Not only did it 
extend and tighten the provisions relating to the admission of candidates to the 
profession, but it also laid down that only registered practitioners would in future be 
permitted to hold appointments, honorary or non-honorary, as medical officers in public 
hospitals and medical officers of health, to sign death certificates or to sign any legal 
certificates. Although these stipulations had been applied since 1894 (see Chapter 4, 
p120) in terms of policy, this was the first time they had been given legal force. That 
constituted a major reinforcement of allopathic medicine's dominance of medical 
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discourse since it decisively confirmed the exclusive recognition of the legitimacy of 
allopathic medicine by government.  
 
In line with the general recasting of medical regulation, the Act also made extensive 
changes to the constitution of the MRB. For instance, rather than merely specifying as 
had the previous Acts, that it should consist of not less than three members, the 1938 Act 
set the number at nine. One of these was to be appointed by the Senate of the University 
of Sydney, another to represent the interests of physicians outside of Sydney, while the 
remainder was appointed by the government. However, the fundamental composition of 
the MRB was left essentially unaltered in that the Act specified that all members had to 
be medical practitioners. In other words, there was no attempt to bring in "lay" or non-
medical representation as had been suggested in the 1870s and in fact there was no such 
representation until 1963. 
 
Still, the total domination of the MRB by medical practitioners was only half the story. It 
was pointed out during debates in the Upper House that all government appointees to the 
MRB were also likely to be members of the BMA (NSWPD, 2:157, 6/12/1938, p3281). 
In the Lower House, the leader of the Industrial Labor Party, Mr James. Heffron, (who 
later became State Premier), raised an interesting point when he asked: "Would the 
Premier allow any board that was established to deal with the mining industry to be 
comprised of three members of the Miners' Federation, and give them authority to 
determine wages and conditions to govern the industry?"  (NSWPD, 2:155, 14/7/1938). 
The flaw in that argument was of course, that the miners were just one of the stakeholders 
in the mining industry and thus hardly deserved to be given exclusive control of it. This 
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highlights the fact that in 1938 the medical profession was seen to be the only stakeholder 
worthy of any recognition in Medicine's controlling body. Government-nominated 
members to the MRB were appointed as representatives of the medical profession, not of 
the State. In fact, as will be outlined shortly, government came under pressure to allow 
the BMA to have direct representation on the Board, a demand that was at least partly 
successful.  
 
The continuance of the institutional autonomy of Medicine was assured by the fact that, 
as in previous legislation, the 1938 Act laid down no reporting requirements for the 
MRB.  Moreover, while for administrative purposes, it was included in the purview of the 
Department for Public Health, which provided it with office accommodation and 
administrative services, there were no official lines of communication with the 
Department. When Mr Charles Kelly (Labor, Bathurst) charged in the debate on the Act 
that "The board will be altogether distinct from the Department of Public Health" and that 
the Minister was therefore "creating something that will be outside his jurisdiction," the 
Minister did not deny the accusation. Nor did he make any response to Kelly's statement 
that he was giving "to an outside body power unequalled in the history of responsible 
government in New South Wales" (NSWPD, 2:155, 10/8/1938, p327). But in fact this 
had always been the case; at that stage it was not seen to be part of the operations of the 
Department for Health, as is indicated by the fact that there was never any reference to 
the MRB in the annual reports of the Department either before or after 1913, when a 
separate ministerial health portfolio was established.   
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Even had they agreed with Kelly, the government at this point were in a weak position 
over against the professional monopolisers, who found powerful support in the Upper 
House of the parliament.   Although it had ceased to be a purely nominated body in 
1934,44 the Upper House continued to differ sharply from the Lower House on questions 
of medical regulation. Thus, while as we saw in Chapter Four, the BMA was the subject 
of harsh criticism in the Lower House during the debates on the 1938 Act, the opposite 
was true of the Upper House, where members not only heaped adulation on the BMA, but 
also demanded that it be given direct representation on the MRB. When even the 
conservative Minister piloting the Bill baulked at the recognition of what he called 
"sectional interests", he none the less was forced to compromise and to accept an 
amendment which gave the BMA the power to appoint the Board member representing 
the interests of doctors outside Sydney (NSWPD, 2:157, 6/12/1938, pp3279-84). 
 
The financial arrangements of the Board would have bolstered its independence. While it 
produced revenues from the registration fees of doctors45 which went directly into 
consolidated revenue, its operations involved practically no financial outlays for 
government. Particularly in its earlier years, it met once a month in offices provided by 
the government (NSWPD,3:7 11/11/1953 p1866) so there were no accommodation 
expenses and moreover until 1955 its members acted in an honorary capacity.46 If it is 
                                                 
44 Although it had become "elective", it was elected only by the members of parliament. It became a popularly 
elected chamber only in 1978 (NSW Parliamentary Archives, 1991, p.30).   
45 As from 1950 these fees had to be paid annually and not simply when the doctor first applied for registration 
(NSWPD, 5/10/1950, p563). 
46 Also until 1938, secretarial services were provided by a member of the MRB. One reflection of the "amateur" 
status of secretaries is that its minutes were handwritten until 1932, a good half-century after the invention of 
the typewriter and its widespread employment in office work.   
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true that "he who pays the piper calls the tune", then it is also true that non-paid pipers 
have much more freedom to play their own tunes and to act autonomously.  
 
Even though members of the MRB had been officially requesting government since 1946 
that they be paid for their services (New South Wales, 1938 Vol 8 unp), what they 
received once their request had been granted in 1955 would hardly have formed a major 
portion of their income. Initially these payments amounted only to £6 per monthly 
meeting for the first hour and £2 for every subsequent hour. In 1967 their fees the 
corresponding payments were $25 and $20 respectively (New South Wales, 1938 
8/9/1967 unp).  Not only did government therefore largely lack any grounds for 
demanding "value-for-money" from the MRB, but the fact that those who served on it 
were seen as leaders in the profession and the community would have inhibited any 
inclination to call the MRB to account for its actions or inaction with regard to the 
enforcement of discipline of or anything else, for that matter.   
The effects of the 1938 Act on medical discipline 
The 1938 Act brought about extensive changes in the MRB's disciplinary machinery. In 
place of the open court system set up in 1912, the new Act established an official Medical 
Tribunal for the hearing of disciplinary cases, consisting of the members of the MRB but 
with a judge of the District Court as its president, which ensured that its deliberations 
were conducted under competent legal supervision.  Emphasising the distinction between 
this Tribunal and the MRB itself was a provision that its members would be paid, which 
meant that for the first time in 100 years, members were given some remuneration for 
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their work, although somewhat anomalously, as mentioned earlier, they were not paid for 
their work on the MRB until 1955.  
 
The Act also widened the scope of the grounds on which the discipline of medical 
practitioners could be based. While the main grounds of "felony or misdemeanour" and 
"infamous conduct in any professional respect" remained intact, addiction to alcohol or 
drugs was incorporated as a new legal ground for deregistration. Moreover, there was 
some sophistication of the penalties which could be imposed, in that besides 
deregistration, it was now possible for the Medical Tribunal either to suspend an erring 
practitioner from practice for a set period of time, or simply to issue them with a 
reprimand.  This seems to have arisen out of a case in which the MRB had found itself 
impaled on the old "death-or-nothing" provision when a doctor was found guilty in a 
court of law of causing injury while driving a car under the influence of alcohol. He was 
then hailed before the MRB which found him guilty of "infamous conduct" and struck his 
name from the register. It did so with reluctance however, stating: "Had we power to 
suspend him we would have suspended him. Finding him guilty of professional 
misconduct. we could punish him only in the way provided by the Act…" (NSWPD, 
2:157 6/12/1938  p.3283).  
 
Another major innovation of the 1938 Act was that for the first time it created an official 
pathway for the registration of complaints against practitioners by members of the public. 
Now however, instead of the Department for Public Health constituting the complaints-
screening body, this function was put in the hands of the Board of Health, the statutory 
body which had originally been called into existence in 1881 to contain a smallpox 
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epidemic and which ever since was responsible for general oversight of health care in the 
State. Reflecting the fact that the containment of the 1881 epidemic was seen to be a 
community-wide concern, this nine-member Board had been set up with a majority of 
"lay" members, the remainder being medical practitioners. Placing the preliminary 
screening of health care complaints in the hands of this lay-dominated body might have 
seemed to represent a small diminution of the control of disciplinary processes by the 
professional monopolisers. However, it is unlikely that this was a conscious attack on 
their power or autonomy.  As is evident from the Minutes of the MRB(New South Wales, 
1938 Vol 7, pp51-2) the Minister had been consulting with it long before the 1938 
legislation was introduced, and while this admittedly was not about the new disciplinary 
machinery, there can be no doubt that the members of the MRB, and therefore the BMA, 
would have been well aware of what was proposed. They registered no objections, nor 
did the supporters of the BMA in the Upper House.  
 
There may well have been second thoughts on this issue once the new system was put 
into place. In April 1941 it was reported by the secretary of the MRB "that the Crown 
Solicitor's Office and the Board of Health were ready to proceed with the charges 
pending against 8 medical practitioners" (New South Wales, 1938 Vol 7, p287).  This 
was just a little over two years after the 1938 Act had been passed and the number of 
eight cases reported here can be compared to the 12 cases instituted by the MRB itself 
between 1912 and 1938. That seven of the eight cases related to practitioners being 
addicted to drugs or alcohol  is indicative of the effects of the 1938 Act, which as noted, 
had included such addiction as a ground for deregistration. On the other hand, that there 
were only eight more such cases between 1940 and 1963 (four of them in one year, 
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1961), is one pointer to the somewhat erratic record of the Board of Health in dealing 
with complaints  (Board of Health, 1897-1973). 
 
Indeed, the choice of the Board of Health as the channel for complaints seems somewhat 
odd. This Board, which only met once a month and therefore had a very part-time 
membership, had always been concerned with public health matters such as the licensing 
of food outlets and the control of infectious disease rather than curative medical practice.  
And unlike the Medical Tribunal, it did not have a member of the judiciary to guide its 
deliberations. When a complaint was laid, the Board used its own officials to investigate 
and report.  Either because of or in spite of the predominantly "amateur" nature of the 
Board of Health, it referred an average of close on three disciplinary cases a year to the 
Medical Tribunal compared to the average of one case every two years in the 1912-1938 
period. Altogether between 1938 and 1963 the Board considered 106 cases (32 of them 
were rejected and therefore not passed on to the Medical Tribunal) and in line with the 
53% increase in the number of registered medical practitioners, there was a 
corresponding rise in the number of cases. Thus while during the period from 1938 to 
1951 the Board considered 26 cases, in the period 1952-1963 the number of cases totalled 
81 (which means that during this period, it was considering an average of close on seven 
cases a year). The following is a breakdown of the grounds on which the Board referred 
cases to the Medical Tribunal:   
Infamous conduct   26 
Misdemeanour  20 
Drugs/alcohol   24 
TOTAL                         70 
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The minutes of the Board of Health detailing these cases only rarely stated the reasons for 
the charges laid against practitioners or the origins of the complaints. It is notable 
however, that practically all the cases in which the name of the complainant was given, 
were dismissed by the Board since they were adjudged not to contain sufficient prima 
facie evidence against the practitioner. This would seem to mean that the majority non-
medical representation on the Board did not necessarily make it more sympathetic to 
individual complainants.  
 
That in turn indicates that opportunities provided to aggrieved patients to register their 
complaints under the new system introduced in 1938, were extremely limited. As in the 
era between 1912 and 1938, in terms of the new Act they also had to prove their case 
twice, first before the Board of Health, and then before the Medical Tribunal, which was 
of course, merely the MRB with another name. Thus while the 1938 Act did make some 
slight obeisance to the interests of health consumers, it remained heavily weighted in 
favour of those of the medical profession.  
 
However, in the view of the BMA (which changed its name to the Australian Medical 
Association in 1962) the weighting was not heavy enough. Although there were no open 
challenges to peer review after 1938, none the less it appears from a letter in the 
correspondence columns of the Medical Journal of Australia (MJA the official journal of 
the BMA) that there was unease in the ranks of the BMA about the role of the Board of 
Health.  In a letter of August 14, 1954, Dr Douglas Anderson, who gave his address as 
Macquarie Street, Sydney, argued that a weakness of the system of complaints 
investigation established by the Medical Practitioners' Act lay in "… the curious 
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circumstance that it is possible for medical practitioners to be in a minority on the Board 
of Health".  He argued that whereas "it is in the public interest that medical discipline and 
the preservation of the profession's good name should be the responsibility of the 
profession itself" (MJA Vol 2, No. 7, p272)47 this peer review principle was not being 
observed in the current system.  He repeated his points in another letter to the MJA.In 
1960, in which he again asserted that because the majority of the members of the Board 
of Health "may not be medical practitioners", it was "a very unsuitable body" for the 
processing of complaints. He charged that the Board had made "serious errors of 
judgement in the past in referring to the Tribunal matters whichought to have gone no 
further" and asserted that the time had come for the disciplinary provisions of the Act to 
be amended (March 19, 1960, p.478).   
 
The thinking of the NSW branch of the BMA/AMA on this issue was set out in a position 
statement which appeared in the MJA in June 1960. This repeated Anderson's point that 
the Board of Health was not the body to which complaints should be made; instead it 
stated, the 
 screening of complaints should be referred in the first place to MRB and that their final 
adjudication placed in the hands of a Disciplinary Tribunal consisting of a member of the 
legal profession and two medical practitioners, one appointed by the Minister, the other 
by the NSW branch of the BMA. (June 4, 1960, p902). Such a system would have totally 
excluded any "lay" participation in the disciplinary process apart from that of the member 
                                                 
47 Anderson also made the interesting observation that "the law distinguishes between the wrongdoings of 
doctors and their unskilful or negligent acts, which are dealt with by the ordinary legal processes". While there 
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of the legal profession, who could be expected to defer to the opinions of the medical 
representatives on the interpretation of "infamous conduct". Whatever the Minister for 
Health thought of this proposal, he was to be impelled to act on medical discipline within 
the next 18 months not by the professional monopolists, but by what was to become an 
unfailing champion of the community population structural interest group, the media. The 
catalyst was the Windsor Hospital incident of December 1961 (see p178), which brought 
the era introduced by the 1938 Act to an abrupt close.    
 
In summing up developments with regard to peer review during the era between 1938 and 
1963, the most significant feature seems to have been the effect of placing the screening 
of complaints in the hands of the part-time Board of Health with its majority of non-
medical members. From the figures given on on p192-3, it can be seen that even though 
the Board did not prove to be particularly sympathetic to individual complainants, none 
the less the number of disciplinary cases it sent to the Medical Tribunal increased at a 
rapid rate, especially towards the end of the period.  The resentment this aroused in the 
ranks of the AMA indicates that the 1938 system which used the Board of Health as the 
first stage of the complaints pathway, represented what the AMA anyway, regarded as a 
rising challenge to peer review.  
 
It might also be remarked that even the increased volume of cases sent to Medical 
Tribunal probably did not represent anything like the full number of health complaints 
being made at the time. As will appear from the next section, members of the public were 
                                                                                                                                                 
is no evidence that that view was widespread, Anderson's opinion could indicate why the medical profession at 
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actively seeking alternative complaints pathways to those laid down in the 1938 Act, 
particularly through use of media.  
Media becomes a player 
The part media played in bringing about change in the Medical Practitioners' Act of 1963 
represented a new development in the health care field which deserves particular noting 
because it was to have major effects on questions of medical discipline.  Mass media's 
interest in health issues was spurred not only by its unending quest for news, but by 
government and in particular by the Department for Public Health. As the 20th century 
progressed, as Baum points out in The New Public Health, (Baum, 1998 pp20-28) 
governments increasingly abandoned the old lassez-faire attitudes to public health which 
left it to individuals and individual households to maintain hygiene and healthy 
environments.  Instead, the Department for Public Health began actively to propagandise 
the population about health issues and to promote what in modern parlance would be 
called "healthy lifestyles". The first indication of that new drive was a statement in the 
annual report of the Director-General for Public Health in 1915 that "steps will be taken 
at an early date with a view to arranging for the delivery of courses of lectures on health 
matters at centres in the metropolitan and suburban country schools of art" (New South 
Wales, 1915 p13). 
Over the next two decades these propaganda efforts expanded enormously, the 
Department for Public Health moving from mere lectures in "country schools of art" to 
increasing use of mass media including both newspapers and "the wireless" which 
created its own far-flung audiences from the 1920s onwards.  The Report of the Director-
                                                                                                                                                 
the time interpreted "disgraceful conduct in any professional respect" as not including practice issues.  
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General of Public Health for 1938 shows that by that time a full-time Publicity Officer 
had been employed and his report filled several pages. Among other things, he stated that 
in terms of a long-term plan drawn up some years before, provision had been made "for 
the issue of attractive posters, show cards, and booklets; the use of health motion 
pictures; press propaganda, photographs and stereos, broadcasting of health talks, lectures 
and addresses, effective window displays and exhibits, promotion of Health Weeks and 
exploitation of other avenues"(New South Wales, 1940a p67). 
 
Public consciousness of the importance of health care issues was also boosted by the 
professional monopolists, as represented by the AMA, entering the media arena. 
Although the AMA did so much later than the corporate rationalisers, after its NSW 
branch established a Public Relations Committee (PRC) in 1956, it began to play a major 
role in public health education and promotion. Of course it was not doing this in a wholly 
disinterested way, its aims also embracing the protection and enhancement of the image 
of the AMA. In pursuit of that brief, the PRC began to place material in both print and 
electronic media and in the following year, it engaged the services of a firm of public 
relations consultants, J. Walter Thompson, at a cost of £2,000 a year, possibly the 
equivalent of $200,000 in 2002 (Australian Medical Association, 1956-62 25/6/1957, 
Minute 41b p17).  In 1958 it was reported that the PRC had been responsible for sending 
material to over 150 newspapers in both urban and rural areas, had sponsored a 48-page 
supplement to Women's Weekly and had provided a series of talks, such as "Keeping 
Your Family Healthy", to radio stations (Australian Medical Association, 1956-62 
Minute 197, Appendix). The new medium of television had not been used to any great 
extent, but this was to change in the 1960s.   
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Just how active the PRC became in that decade can be appreciated from an item in its 
minutes of 1962, which stated:  
It was noted that the Secretariat was considerably occupied in answering 
the day to day members' queries, holding Press Conferences and issuing 
press statements, writing letters to answer to correspondence [sic] of all 
variety, providing articles and radio material to guide the public on 
community health matters, assisting radio and television interviewers to 
obtain the Association's views, assisting individual journalists and feature 
writers to obtain medical data and checking afterwards prior to 
publication (Australian Medical Association, 1956-62 8/4/1965, Minute 
481, p7).   
 
The AMA was of course, simply duplicating the drive to use media for health promotion 
purposes started by the corporate rationalists, but that drive probably produced 
unintended consequences for both structural interests. Since so much of the effort to 
make the population more health conscious emanated from authoritative sources, it would 
have naturally followed that in the eyes of the populace, those authorities in both the 
public and private sector were as responsible for the maintenance of health standards as 
was the individual citizen. Very probably this was one factor which spurred the 
mobilisation of the community population/equal health advocate structural interest in the 
second half of the 20th century.  
Cases such as that of the Buledelah hospital and that raised by Nurse Welsh cited above, 
indicate that the populace began increasingly to expect government to be responsible not 
only for public health on the macro-level, but also to intervene on the micro-level when 
the provision of health care by individual medical practitioners and health institutions 
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was sub-standard. While governments were initially unresponsive to these demands, the 
situation began to change in the 1950s and 1960s after mass media had been alerted to the 
potential of health care as a source of news and sensation by the favourable public 
response to the governmental and AMA health promotion campaigns. The powerful 
impact of media interest in health care issues, especially those containing a hint of 
scandal, was demonstrated by the role played by media in the events which occurred at 
the Windsor Hospital in December 1961.  
The Windsor Hospital incident 
Those events were set in train by a visiting medical officer or VMO (i.e. a doctor 
appointed to work in the hospital an honorary capacity), Dr J.F. Boag, who was seeing 
private patients in his surgery at the time he was supposed to be on duty at the Windsor 
District Hospital. When a six-year old boy with an arm fractured in two places by a fall 
from a horse was brought into the hospital for treatment, Boag directed that the boy be 
brought to his surgery. When that was done, he demanded a fee of £10. Had the treatment 
been undertaken at the hospital, it would have been gratis.  
 
That story was unnoticed by media, but it was considered serious enough for the Windsor 
Hospital Board to ask Boag to attend an inquiry on December 18, 1961. When he refused, 
claiming he had not been given enough notice, he was suspended from his VMO position. 
In reaction, all the other nine VMO doctors withdrew their services from the hospital. 
The outcome of that action was summed up in a large headline in the Sydney Morning 
Herald on December 26: "No doctor available. Man dies". The newsworthiness of the 
story was enhanced by the fact that the man who died had been injured in a water skiing 
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accident. He was taken by his friends by car to the Windsor Hospital where, with no 
doctors on duty, they were directed to the surgery of one of the "striking" VMOs, but 
could get no response when they knocked on the door (it was a Sunday). They then tried 
to take the injured man to Parramatta hospital, but he died in their car on the way there.    
 
The story caused a great public outcry and that the "striking" doctors realised just how 
serious it was is indicated by the fact that after being contacted by the Hospitals 
Commission (the body which had oversight of all hospitals in the State), the VMOs 
agreed they would treat emergency cases at the hospital. The following day the Sydney 
Morning Herald again carried a major article under the headline "Doctor Dispute: 
Sheahan Sees Need for Ethics Review" (Sheahan being the Minister for Health at the 
time). It also ran an editorial entitled "The Duty of Doctors" in which it attacked the 
"striking" VMOs for their "false sense of loyalty to a colleague".  The editorial stated: 
Such an extreme decision by a group of doctors virtually to boycott their 
own hospital is rare, if not unprecedented, in the annals of the medical 
profession. But the fact that it could occur at all, points to a lowering of 
former professional standards. Many complaints received by the 
Department of Health… show that there is a more extensive withholding 
of services and relaxation of diligence than this extreme case  would 
suggest. 
Newspapers for days on end ran major stories on the incident and the subsequent four-
day long inquiry by the Hospital Board in January, 1962. On January 11, the main front-
page headline of the Sydney Morning Herald read: "Board Dismisses Doctor: New Angry 
Clashes at Inquiry". Boag's dismissal was described as a "Hitler regime tactic" by Boag's 
counsel, Clive Evatt QC.  Confrontations of this kind made excellent news material for 
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media, something which increased pressure on the both the government and corporate 
rationalists, as well as on the professional monopolists. Government executives in 
particular had much more to lose from consumer discontent than did the professional 
monopolists and this factor began to drive a steadily widening wedge between the two 
structural interests which would widen into a chasm when the equal health advocates, 
with the enthusiastic support of media, emerged as a political force 
The 1963 Medical Practitioners' Act 
The enormous publicity and press coverage left the Labor administration of the time with 
no political alternative but to take swift action. The Minister for Health, Mr Bill Sheahan, 
thus set about a major revision of the legislation which, when it was incorporated in the 
Medical Practitioners' Amendment Act of 1963, was the most important of the long series 
of amendments to the 1938 Act which had been legislated during the 1940s and 1950s.48  
 
In constructing the new Amendment Act the Minister proceeded carefully. His first move 
was to call the "ethics conference" alluded to by the Sydney Morning Herald headline 
quoted above, on January 23, 1962. It was attended by representatives from his Health 
Department, the MRB and the Australian Medical Association49 (AMA) and also a 
lecturer in medical ethics from the University of Sydney. The conference appears to have 
been a stormy one; Sheehan later told the parliament that there had been a "frank" 
discussion and "differences of opinion" (NSWPD, 3:46 2/4/1963 p4007), a typical 
political euphemism for "a blazing row". Although he did not specify the main points of 
                                                 
48 Those amendments were concerned with the qualifications of doctors and therefore are not of direct concern 
to the present thesis.  
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difference, the medical representatives were probably reacting against his argument that 
the definition of "infamous conduct" should be extended to include refusal by a doctor to 
see patients in an emergency.  
 
Despite the objections, just such a clause was incorporated into the 1963 Act. This was 
the first time that there had been any specification or definition of "infamous conduct" in 
NSW legislation. While that represented a diminution of the peer review principle in that 
it infringed on the profession's sole right to define "infamous conduct", a year later in 
parliament Sheahan claimed that it had been agreed to by all parties, including the 
representatives of the AMA (NSWPD, 3:45, 27/3/63, p3807). This indicates that despite 
the initial resistance, as the Sydney Morning Herald remarked in an editorial:  "…it is a 
fair inference that [the AMA] felt no enthusiasm for the recent behaviour of the nine 
Windsor honoraries" (26/1/1962). In its editorial on the same day, the Daily Telegraph 
expressed the view: 
The proposals for State legislation to force doctors to obey their own code 
of ethics seems moderate, sensible and just. The legislation should ensure 
that members of the public in genuine need will never be denied medical 
care; it should safeguard hospitals - and consequently the public - from 
actions like the recent walkout of honorary staff of Hawkesbury District 
Hospital. (26/1/1962) 
What is clear from these editorials is that the newspapers in question constituted a 
powerful ally for the Minister on this issue. However, as already suggested, although the 
1963 Act was designed to rein in the medical profession, in the final analysis it had 
exactly the opposite effect. 
                                                                                                                                                 
49 It had changed its name from the "British Medical Association" in 1962. 
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Medicine resumes control of health complaints processes 
The AMA had been very concerned about the proposed changes to the Act on its national 
level as well as on the NSW branch level. This is evident from an editorial on the subject 
in the MJA, which ordinarily paid little attention to issues within individual State 
jurisdictions.  This editorial noted that in the Governor's speech at the opening of the 
1962 NSW parliamentary session, it had been indicated that an alteration was to be made 
to the provisions of the Medical Practitioners' Act  "relating to the investigation of 
complaints against doctors for unprofessional conduct, such as 'failure to attend in an 
emergency…'" (2:2, 25/9/1962, p513). That the Windsor Hospital incident was neither 
the first nor the only incident of its kind was confirmed by the editorial when it reported 
that at the January conference mentioned above, the Minister had expressed concern 
about "the number of complaints being made against the Department of Health in regard 
to the failure on the part of members of the profession to answer what were said to be 
emergency calls".  
 
The MJA did not mention the confrontations at the conference and reported that the 
Minister had later had a meeting with AMA deputation at which several matters were 
discussed, "one of which was a submission that the Association itself be given statutory 
power to investigate complaints made to it against doctors". Obviously in line with its 
1960s statement given above, the AMA was trying to seize control of the health 
complaints process. The Minister's resistance to this idea may have been the reason for 
his refusal to meet another deputation from the AMA, which was regrettable, said the 
MJA, since "they might have been able to help him to steer a safe course between the 
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Scylla of the ineffectual and the Charbydis of the intolerable". The meaning of that 
resounding phrase was not set out in the editorial and it concluded with the hope that the 
Minister would change his mind   
 
Although the Minister did not do so, he was doubtless wary of alienating the AMA too 
far, since at this point in time it had become enormously powerful. In her examination of 
the rise and decline of the AMA, McKay remarks that the political influence of the 
BMA/AMA on the Federal government was probably at its peak in the period of 
Coalition dominance between 1949 and 1972 (McKay, 1995). In NSW the power and 
influence of the BMA had peaked much earlier according to Lloyd (1993), who asserts 
that in this State: 
[D]octors had become adept at negotiating with government, and in using 
the political system in general well before the beginning of World War II. 
Even following the establishment of the BMA Federal Council [in 1933], 
and despite that body's independence from state branch directives, power 
remained with the state councils … The state branches, particularly in 
New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, where the level of political 
debate had always been much greater than in the smaller states, continued 
to take the leading role in dealing with medico-political issues (Lloyd, 
1993 p349). 
However, although as suggested by the records of the Public Relations Committee, the 
AMA was not as powerful as it seemed, its political skills described by Lloyd may well 
have been sharpened by the fact that for 45 of the 62 years between 1910 and 1972, it had 
to contend with hostile Labor administrations in NSW. That Labor was much less 
favourably disposed to the BMA/AMA than its conservative Coalition opponents was 
evident among other things, in the critiques of that body made by its members during 
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Lower House debates on the 1938 Medical Practitioners' Act in contrast to its much 
smoother passage through the Coalition-dominated Upper House (see Chapter Four 
p105).  
 
However, reflecting a complete change in the climate of thinking, among politicians 
anyway, since 1938, was that Labor's hostility to Medicine in general and the AMA in 
particular, had all but disappeared. In debates on the 1963 Amendment Bill, references to 
both were made in the most fulsome and complimentary terms. When introducing the 
Bill, Sheahan found it unexceptionable that "the doctors who will be members of the 
board constituted by this bill are, for all practical purposes, members of the Australian 
Medical Association" (NSWPD 3:46 2/4/1963). And in contrast to 1938, when the 
responsible Upper House Minister in the conservative Coalition government had been 
reluctant to grant any direct representation to the AMA on the MRB, in 1963 Sheahan as  
Labor Minister for Health, for reasons given below, allowed the AMA three 
representatives.  
 
Moreover, while he had refused to capitulate to AMA demands that it be given complete 
control of the complaints investigation process, it had little reason to be displeased with 
what was specified in the Act. For one thing, in establishing a new pathway for the 
registration of complaints, the Act abolished the role of the Board of Health as the 
screening agency and replaced it with a three-person "Investigating Committee", one of 
whom had to be an AMA representative. The other members were a stipendiary 
magistrate, who headed the Committee, and the Director-General of Public Health or his 
nominee. The structure of this Committee could only strengthen medical dominance. Lay 
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influence been almost completely eliminated from the complaints screening process since 
the magistrate was likely to defer to the opinions of the two medically orientated 
members (the Director-General was usually a medical practitioner) when it came to 
judging matters of medical ethics and practice.  
 
Like the previous system, if a complainant convinced this Committee that their case had a 
prima facie validity, it would be passed on to the Medical Tribunal. There however, the 
case had to be argued ab initio, while complainants themselves had to bear the cost of any 
legal representation. The Act also stipulated that the hearings of the Investigating 
Committee were to be held in camera and that anyone registering a complaint with this 
Committee had to put down a deposit of £5 (the equivalent of at least $50 in 2002) and 
support their complaint with a statutory declaration. If the Investigating Committee 
decided that a complaint was "vexatious or frivolous" or contained false information, the 
complainant would not only lose their deposit, but could also be fined £100 for making 
false statements under oath (NSWPD, 3:99 7/9/1972 p791). These stipulations (which 
were absent from the 1938 Act) resulted from amendments passed in the Upper House, 
and meant that obstacles in the way of complainants had been made much higher than 
they had ever been before.    
The MRB reconstituted 
The 1963 Act brought about a wholesale reconstitution of the MRB. The expansion of its 
membership from 9 to 13 reflected developments in Medicine since 1938, one of these 
having been the emergence of the specialist colleges, or "Royal Colleges" as they were 
known. Thus, the new Act made provision, for the first time, for representation of the 
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Royal Colleges of Physicians, Surgeons and General Practitioners.50 This however, 
prompted protests from the supporters of the AMA in parliament that while it was a much 
larger organisation than any of the Royal Colleges, the AMA has been given only one 
representative in the original draft Bill. It was because of this protest that the 
representation of the AMA, as noted above, was raised to three. Another significant 
innovation was the inclusion of two members from outside the ranks of practising 
doctors, these being a barrister or solicitor nominated by the Minister and also the Under-
Secretary of the Department for Health (or his nominee). The Minister noted that the 
latter appointment would provide a "nexus between the profession and the Department". 
The Minister's reference to the "profession" rather than to the MRB seems to reflect a 
view that the MRB was a professional rather than a governmental body; in any case, this 
was the first time since 1838 that there had been a "nexus" of any kind between 
governmental administration and the MRB.  
 
These changes however, represented no inroad into the autonomy or power of the 
profession as expressed in the MRB. The nominated barrister was the only member from 
outside the medical profession, while the Minister himself, who up to then had nominated 
all members other than those representing the University of Sydney and the AMA, was 
given the right to nominate only one representative. The Council of the University of 
New South Wales which by then had developed a medical faculty, was also given the 
right to nominate one representative, but it was specified that this person too had to be a 
                                                 
50 Both the Federal and the NSW branches of the Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons were given 
representation. The recognition of the Colleges through their representation on the MRB reflected not only their 
advent since the passing of the 1912 legislation, but also their rising power.  
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medical practitioner. Since the Departmental representative was also likely to be a 
qualified medical practitioner, it is clear that the dominance of the MRB by the profession 
was strengthened by the 1963 Act.  That dominance was reinforced by changes to the 
disciplinary and complaints pathways.  
The closure of complaints pathways 
When he introduced the 1963 Bill into the parliament, the Minister advanced several 
reasons for bringing in the new system, one of which was that, in his opinion, dealing 
with complaints should not be the function of a statutory body such as the Board of 
Health.  Another more likely explanation was that the Minister had found himself under 
growing pressure from consumers who found the old system less than satisfactory and 
who, as argued above, were increasingly looking to government to intervene and correct 
substandard health care delivery. In speaking to the second reading debate, the Minister 
stated:  
I have received letters of complaint against medical practitioners and I 
have been forced to make my own investigations and findings on the 
facts, although I do not think that that is part of my duties. One such 
complaint was first made to the medical association, which took no action, 
and then the person concerned went to the newspapers. I had to make my 
own investigations into that matter, and the resultant finding was in favour 
of the doctor, notwithstanding what had been published in the newspapers 
(NSWPD 3:45 27/3/1963 p3807).  
Sheahan's report of how newspapers were being used as a non-official but highly 
effective complaints pathway is indicative of an emergent alliance between media and 
consumers which as remarked above, worked to the disadvantage the professional 
rationalists over against the government executive and corporate rationalisers.  
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While the Minister stated that the government had no desire to "build up a Maginot Line 
or an East Berlin wall between the public and the medical profession" (NSWPD, 3:45 
26/3/1963,p3719), the management of complaints as laid down in the 1963 Act was 
hedged about with such careful conditions and so dominated by the medical profession 
that, as the table below indicates, this is exactly what happened.  Compiled on the basis of 
figures given in the annual reports of the MRB between 1963 and 1972, Table 2 below 
indicates that the flow of complaints passed on to the Medical Tribunal by the 
Investigating Committee, underwent a drastic fall as compared to the 1938-1963 period.  
TABLE 2.  Medical disciplinary cases dealt with by the Medical Tribunal,  
1962-72 
 
Year Number of 
cases 
   Penalties Imposed  
  Reprimand Suspension Deregistration Not guilty 
1962-65 3 0 2 0 1 
1966 0 0 0 0 0 
1967 0 2 2 0 0 
1968 4 0 0 2 2 
1969 1 0 0 1 0 
1970 3 (one case 
adjourned) 
0 0 0 2 
1971 2 1 1 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 13 2 3 3 5 
                                                              (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1963-72) 
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The figures indicate an average of only a little over one disciplinary case a year, less than 
half that in the previous period. Another figure of some significance is that while the 
number of registered doctors rose from 6,658 (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1967 
p5)  to 9,878 in 1972 (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1967 p9), i.e. by 32%, there is 
very little year-on-year variation in the number of actions over the period under review. 
That the number of disciplinary cases was extremely low can be appreciated by 
contrasting it to statistics produced by the Complaints Unit of the Department for Health 
established in 1984. This was a little over a decade later, and it is unlikely that conditions 
would have altered dramatically over that time period.  In 1984-85, its first year of 
operation, the Complaints Unit received no fewer than 500 written complaints and 200 
telephone inquiries (Department for Health NSW, 1984 p3). Once the Medical 
Practitioners' Act of 1987 enabled the Complaints Unit to investigate and refer cases 
directly to the Medical Tribunal, in the following year alone, 1988, it sent no fewer than 
15 cases to that body as well as another 12 cases to the newly established Professional 
Standards Committee. These figures can be compared to the 13 cases sent to the Medical 
Tribunal for the whole of the period between 1963 and 1972 (Department for Health 
NSW, 1990). 
The sophistication of medical discipline 
Other than extending the definition of "infamous conduct" to include failure to render 
emergency treatment, the disciplinary provisions of the 1963 Act were the same as those 
of 1938. Thus, as far as penalties for "infamous conduct" were concerned, besides 
deregistration, the 1963 Act also made provision for reprimanding and suspending 
practitioners who were adjudged to have erred in less serious ways. An analysis of the 
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penalties imposed by the Medical Tribunal for "infamous conduct" between 1963 and 
1972 (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1963-72) shows the following:    
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3:  Penalties imposed by the NSW Medical Tribunal for “infamous 
conduct in professional respect”, 1963-72 
 
1962 Unprofessional conduct (nature not specified) Suspension for six months 
 Unprofessional conduct (nature not specified) Suspension for twelve months 
1967 Charging exorbitant fees Reprimand 
 Unprofessional conduct (criminal charge) Deregistration 
 Unprofessional conduct (addiction to drugs) Deregistration 
1968 Criminal conviction (including drug addiction) Deregistration 
1971 “Complaint proved” (no details given) Reprimand 
 “Complaint proved” (no details given) Suspension for three months 
                                                                  (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1963-72). 
What will be seen from the above is that none of the cases in which the nature of the 
"infamous conduct" was specified concerned issues of medical practice. This clearly 
demonstrates that the individual autonomy and non-accountability of doctors as far as 
their practice was concerned, was virtually unquestioned in both the MRB and in 
governmental circles in the period under review. That the interpretation of "infamous 
conduct" had not changed since 1900 is evident for instance, in the debate on the 1963 
Bill, Health Minister Sheahan stated:  "Nobody can attempt to define infamous conduct. 
To try to do so would be like Mr Speaker, trying to define improper conduct in this 
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House" (NSWPD, 3:45 27/3/1963 p.3807). It was a not a good analogy; the Standing 
Orders of parliament define improper conduct very closely (e.g. loud and persistent 
interjections) and there are a range of prescribed penalties for such conduct - loud and 
persistent interjectors may be suspended or ejected from the House. But possibly because 
they so completely agreed with the Minister on the score of the non-definability of 
"infamous conduct", neither the Speaker nor anyone one else contradicted him on this 
point.    
 
The minutes of the MRB show that its members were at this time, actually thinking of 
extending their control over the medical profession by widening the scope of "infamous 
conduct". In June 1964 the MRB discussed "the implications of the … decision to 
recommend that the powers of the Investigation Committee be extended to cover moral 
turpitude or misconduct of a non-professional kind…" Its ambitions on that score 
however, were checked by its barrister-member, G.H. Kerr who 
… stated that had he been present at the discussion of this matter … he 
would have urged the Board to be very circumspect about altering the 
longstanding position that infamous conduct, to imperil registration, must 
be "in a professional respect". He said that the policing of general conduct 
would be a very big change and should be introduced only if the Board 
felt there was strong case for it (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1963-
72 Minute 5).  
Exactly what was being proposed and what the members of the Board considered to be 
"moral turpitude or misconduct of a non-professional kind" is not evident from the often 
frustratingly cryptic minutes of the MRB. But obviously the barrister Kerr thought the 
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changes constituted a "bridge too far" and the Board seems to have heeded his advice, 
because nothing more was heard of this matter. . 
 
One significant development as far as the institutional autonomy of the MRB is 
concerned which should be mentioned here, is that between 1958 and 1972, printed 
annual reports were included in the Parliamentary Papers, which were comprised of the 
documents tabled in the parliament during each of its sessions (Medical Registration 
Board NSW, 1963-72). This was the first time since 1838 that such reports had been 
made and indicated that in this respect, the necessity for public accountability was being 
realised either by the MRB itself or more likely, by the corporate rationalisers and 
governmental executives in the parliament. That development should be seen against the 
background of and be coupled with what is dealt with in the next chapter, i.e. the advent 
of the consumer movement in Australia, and also of the much less well-known, but none 
the less vital development of administrative law, which was transforming ideas of the 
accountability of all sectors of government. However, in 1972 the Health Department was 
transformed into a statutory authority, the Health Commission and since the MRB was 
considered to fall under the jurisdiction of that entity, its annual reports ceased to be 
published over the next 12 years and there was no mention of its activities in the annual 
reports of the Commission itself. This situation continued even after the Commission was 
re-converted into a Department in 1982.  
The beginning of the end of medical dominance 
The total dominance of the professional monopolisers in NSW was relatively short-lived 
and did not last much longer than a decade.  For the sake of chronological convenience, I 
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have marked the end of this era by the passing of the next Medical Practitioners' 
Amendment Act, that of 1972. That legislation changed very little, merely adding the 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists to the bodies represented on the MRB, as 
well as a representative of the NSW Universities Board, while withdrawing the 
representation of federal bodies of Royal Colleges. None of these tinkerings with the 
membership of the MRB made any difference to its dominance by the professional 
monopolists. Nor, as noted in Chapter 2 (pp59-60), did the discarding of the "infamous 
conduct" terminology in favour of "misconduct in professional respect” make any 
difference to the exercise of unchallenged peer review in the medical profession. 
 
None the less, despite Medicine's dominance, there was a growing groundswell of protest 
about its non-accountability among health consumers during this period. One indication 
of that was the way in which as we have seen, the establishment of the Investigating 
Committee in 1963 came about as stated earlier, as a result of the Minister for Health 
wanting to avoid having to deal with an increasing stream of consumer complaints which 
were coming directly to him. 
 
However, the Investigations Committee established in 1963 proved to be anything but an 
ideal complaints pathway. It had no investigatory powers and worked on a part-time 
basis. As its chairman noted with regard to a particular case  “The members of the 
Committee apart from myself, have busy professional practices and its most difficult of 
course, for them look to the possibility of having a full week away from their ordinary 
duties.” In a Green Paper produced by the Department of Health in 1985 and to which 
extensive reference will be made in the next chapter, it was noted: 
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In practice, the [Investigating] Committee does not actively investigate 
complaints. The Committee writes to the medical practitioner, forwards 
details of the complaint and provides an opportunity for the medical 
practitioner to respond. The Committee then conducts a hearing at which 
it reviews the material placed before it. … The cost and responsibility of 
preparing in support of the complaint however, rests entirely with the 
complainant (Department for Health NSW, 1985 p21). 
The Green Paper further noted that “this approach to investigation has been widely 
criticised on the grounds that generally, an individual has neither the financial resources 
nor the medical knowledge required to assemble and present the necessary evidence” 
(p21). 
 
Under these circumstances, there was very little scope for complainants to pursue their 
cases successfully. There may have been some realisation of growing consumer 
discontent in government circles. Thus it is perhaps significant that in the 1972 
Amendment Act, the stipulations that complainants put down a £5 deposit and make a 
statutory declaration to support their complaint, was abolished. The "Maginot line" 
constituted by these provisions and also by the way the Investigating Committee 
operated, had proved unhealthily impenetrable.  
 
It is interesting that while these provisions were incorporated into the Act at the 
insistence of the Liberal/National Party Coalition when it in was opposition in 1963, they 
were dismantled by that same Coalition when it was in government in 1972. This point 
was seized on by Mr Kevin Stewart (Labor, Canterbury) later to be Minister for Health, 
when he spoke in the Lower House debate on the 1972 Bill. The 1963 insistence of 
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Coalition members on the £5 deposit and the statutory declaration was, he charged, 
merely a result of their  
jumping on the band  waggon [sic] and making as loud a noise in as 
hysterical manner as they could in order to alarm medical practitioners of 
New South Wales about the big bad wolf that was going to devour them - 
the Labor Government… (NSWPD, 3:99 17/9/1972  p793) 
While his typical parliamentary polemic need not be taken too seriously, Stewart was 
right in pointing to a notable Coalition policy somersault on this issue. It can be 
speculated that the change did not originate from within the government executive, but 
resulted from reports by the corporate rationalisers to the Minister about the volume of 
consumer complaints. The Coalition government Minister, like the Labor Minister 
Sheahan before him, would also have been the recipient of a constant stream of such 
complaints, particularly because the official channel through the Investigating 
Committee, had proved to be so unresponsive.   
Conclusion  
While the way in which the original Medical Practitioners' Acts were passed between 
1898 and 1900 indicated the weakness rather than the power of the professional 
monopolisers, they gave this interest group a platform on which it could consolidate its 
strength over the next four decades. In the process, the professional monopolists showed 
themselves to be highly resistant to calls from the members of the nascent community 
population structural interest group for greater medical accountability. The position of the 
professional monopolists was immensely strengthened by the support for the medical 
peer review principle given by the courts, both in Britain and in NSW, starting with the 
Allinson case of 1894. Through the failure of the professional monopolists to recognise 
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the low-grade threat to peer review posed by the "complaints management" system 
instituted by the 1938 Medical Practitioners' Act, their grip on medical disciplinary 
procedures was weakened over the next 25 years. However, this position was reversed by 
the victories of the AMA over the government structural interest enshrined in the 1963 
Medical Practitioners' Act. 
 
In assessing the developments which led to the passage of that Act, it is obvious that the 
losers in the contest over control of the MRB and the complaints management processes 
were the government executive and the community population structural interest groups. 
Even though they were supported by media in their drive to curb the power of the 
professional monopolists, in 1963 the government interest, as represented by Sheahan, 
found itself isolated in the parliament.  While the position of the corporate rationalists in 
the central Health Department bureaucracy on this issue is not very evident, they 
certainly would have supported the moves by the Windsor Hospital Board against Boag 
and the nine VMOs who withdrew their services. To have done otherwise would have 
undermined the whole system of medical practice in public hospitals. However, as had 
been proved by events between 1898 and 1900, the corporate rationalists are dependent 
on the power and skill of the government executive to get measures they favour through 
the parliament. Because the government executive lacked power seriously to challenge 
the support for the AMA, the corporate rationalists were helpless to achieve whatever 
reforms they might have had hoped for.  
 
Since the community population structural interest group was still so unformed and 
inchoate, it is not surprising that it was also a big loser in this contest. However, one new 
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factor was the role played by media which, since they are dependent on consumers to 
purchase their products, invariably favour consumers in any clash with professional 
monopolists or government structural interests. Those among the latter who aspire to 
power, are of course, also dependent on consumers for votes and thus, as it became clear 
later in the 1960s that the AMA had failed in its attempts to secure unconditional media 
support for Medicine, government executives as noted above, abandoned the alliance they 
had perforce to enter with the professional monopolisers in 1963. Thus, while the 1963 
Act undoubtedly constituted the "high water mark" for the influence of the professional 
monopolisers as represented by the AMA, their position was not as strong as it appeared 
and in fact was crumbling rapidly.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CHALLENGES TO MEDICAL AUTONOMY AND PEER REVIEW  
1972-93 
 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that medical autonomy and the peer review 
principle was at its apogee during the 1960s and the 1970s. The legislative embodiment 
of supreme professional power evident in the Medical Practitioners' Acts and their 
amendments from 1960 onwards, remained intact right up until 1987. This meant that the 
cumbersome medical disciplinary procedures outlined in the previous chapter, remained 
in place during that period and that in turn meant that the medical peer review principle 
was cocooned from the impact of the major social and political developments of the 
1960s and 1970s.    
 
However, it was precisely in that decade that new social and political forces, anithetical 
to professional privilege and autonomy, began to make themselves felt. In writing about 
this phenomenon, Habermas argued that the "new conflicts" which emerged in that era 
were not about distributive issues and no longer concerned the sphere of material 
reproduction. 
Rather these new conflicts arise in domains of cultural reproduction, 
social integration, and socialization. They are carried out in 
subinstitutional - or at least extra-parliamentary - forms of protest; and the 
underlying deficits reflect a reification of communicatively structured 
domains of action that will not respond to the media of money and power. 
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…This new type of conflict is an expression of the "silent revolution" in 
values and attitudes … (Habermas, 1968 p388) 
He cites the antinuclear and environmental movements, the peace movement the 
alternative movement and the women's movement as examples of the "new movements" 
which emerged to challenge "the system" in West Germany. In Australia similar 
phenomena were evident in the anti-Vietnam war movement while social movements 
with origins that went much further back in time, moved to the forefront of public 
consciousness. Some of these, such as the women's movement and the movements 
concerned with the preservation of the environment, duplicated those of Germany; others 
such as the Aboriginal land rights movement were unique to this country.  
 
One movement not mentioned by Habermas was that of lifeworld medicine, which 
became known as alternative medicine. It has been argued earlier that alternative 
medicine did not spring spontaneously into life in the 1960s, but was based on and rooted 
in lifeworld medicine which had been weakened, but never extinguished, during the 
previous two decades of the 20th century. The critiques of scientific medicine and its 
institutional embodiments which, as described in Chapter Four, played such a notable 
role in the issue of medical regulation before 1900, had not been diminished by the 
successes of scientific medicine in the intervening period.  
 
Those critiques began to be broadened and made more formidable through being taken up 
academic sociologists. In the words of Canadian defenders of the medical profession, 
Cruess & Creuss:“The concept of professionalism came under intense scrutiny during the 
1960s and 1970s. The belief that physicians would be altruistic was greeted with 
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scepticism by social scientists, and medicine was accused of putting its own welfare 
above that of society”. They also note that: “The intellectual basis for the criticism was 
articulated largely in the sociology literature, not readily available to physicians” (2000 
p688). A leader in this regard on the international scene was the American Professor Eliot 
Freidson of New York University, while in Australia Evan Willis of Monash University 
stands as a typical and towering example. As can be seen from the preface, his book 
Medical Dominance (1989) based on his PhD thesis, was the culmination of more than a 
decade of thinking and theorising together with many others at the university. In the 
preface to the second edition he remarked on "the way that the concept of medical 
dominance has become part of the discourse of health care policy analysis in Australia" 
(unpaginated).   
 
Another "new social movement" not mentioned by Habermas, but which is of particular 
relevance to this study, was the consumer movement. The word "consumer" is a loaded 
one, implying that the buyer of goods and services has rights which need to be respected 
and which, if they are violated, merit legal redress. That notion was evident in the speech 
by the NSW Minister of Labour Mr Eric Willis when he introduced the first Consumer 
Protection Bill into the NSW parliament in 1969. He quoted an article in the Boston Law 
Review,  (NSWPD 3:78 12/3/1969, p4447) which stated:  
Caveat emptor, according to both celebrants and mourners, is dead - 
buried by the vast flood of new consumer protection status. Indeed, 
changes wrought in the substantive law of the marketplace have defined 
and established new consumer rights and merchant duties in recognition 
of the fact that mass advertising, distribution and merchandising have 
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radically differentiated modern consumer transactions from the feudal 
antecedents up which so many common law principles are based. 
That development was to have important consequences for power relationships in the 
health sphere when the word "consumer", with its connotations of the active participation 
and the power of buyers in commercial transactions, began to be used to describe 
patients. Taking up the point made by Willis above, the word "consumer" also helped to 
change the discourse of health care policy and in itself constituted a challenge to the 
principle of peer review.  
Since "consumerism" played such an important part in that challenge, it is important to 
examine the origin and growth of the consumer movement in Australia. That movement 
had begun to emerge in institutional form in the United States as far back as 1929, and 
three decades later the Australian Consumers Association (ACA)  was established in 
1959. But rather than being the generating force behind the wave of consumerist 
sentiment which burgeoned over the next ten years, the ACA like a surfboarder, merely 
rode that wave, which had obviously been in powerful although inchoate and unorganised 
existence for a long time. The initial membership of the ACA, garnered from public 
meetings and other activities, was 500 and these members were the recipients of the first 
edition of Choice published early in 1960. Writing about that event 25 years later, one of 
the founder-leaders of the ACA, Dr Roland Thorp of the School of Pharmacology at the 
University of Sydney, stated: 
When those magazines were delivered … subscriptions started to pour in, 
and our initial print-run of 5000 was soon exhausted and another 15,000 
were ordered. Offers of help came from all sides – we could see that ACA 
was going to be a huge success (Halpin, 1974). 
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Strangely, no records of the early growth of the ACA other than that given above, seem 
to have survived. The first firm indication of the number of subscribers to Choice (who 
automatically became members of the Association) appeared in its Annual Report for 
1980, in which a graph illustrated the rise in membership since 1969. In that year, a 
decade after the establishment of the ACA, there were 60,000 subscribers. That figure 
rose to a peak of just under 200,000 but thereafter underwent some major fluctuations, 
falling away to 100,000 in 1979 (Australian Consumers' Association, 1980 p2). Even so, 
the ACA ranked as a major organisation.   
 
Supporting Habermas’s contention that this “new social movement” was not based on 
distributive issues is the statement by Professor Thorp (Halpin, 1974) that the strongest 
support came from “teachers, academic staff, public servants etc.” but that “unfortunately 
the less affluent workers and their unions took little interest in us…”. In other words, this 
was a middle class movement; according to Thorp, its best recruiting ground was among 
the membership of Rotary, Lions and the Apex clubs, which in many ways epitomise the 
ethos of middle class suburbia.  
Government takes up the consumerist cause. 
From the point of view of this study, the most important result of the consumer 
movement was not so much its effects on commercial transactions in the private sector, 
but the way in which it influenced both government and also governance in the public 
sector. Of crucial importance in the latter regard was the emergence and implementation 
of "administrative law" which will be more fully dealt with shortly. At this point we 
should note that like mass media, governments became aware of the popularity of the 
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consumer cause in fairly short space of time. The first governmental response to the 
consumer movement in NSW was the passing of the Consumers' Protection Act of 1969 
which established a "Consumer Affairs Council" composed of consumer representatives 
who acted in an advisory capacity to government. The Act also set up a "Consumer 
Affairs Bureau" as a unit within the Department of Labour and Industry, to give advice to 
consumers and to receive complaints about sub-standard goods and services.   
 
In introducing the Act, the Minister of that Department, Mr Eric Willis, explained that 
NSW was following the lead of Britain, Western Europe, the USA, Canada, Japan and 
New Zealand, all of which by that had time had fully established government-sponsored 
agencies to look after the interests of consumers. Expressing a significant new 
governmental attitude towards the issue of consumer rights, he declared: "Consumers 
need help and this is a government responsibility" (NSWPD 3:78 12/3/1969, p4447). It 
could be cynically observed that the NSW government had come to that conclusion only 
after seeing the successes of the ACA and realising that there were electoral rewards to be 
gained from jumping on the consumer bandwagon. None the less, that government had 
made the move indicated that consumer rights had entered into societal discourse.  
 
This first foray into the field of consumer rights was a limited one. The function of the 
newly established Consumer Affairs Bureau was simply to give advice to consumers and 
to receive complaints about the quality of mainly foodstuffs and everyday commodities 
(NSWPD 3:78 12/3/1969, p4485). Moreover, the CAB had no regulatory or punitive 
powers. However, like the Australian Consumers' Association, its activities evoked an 
enormous public response. After the first year of its operation, the Consumer Affairs 
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Bureau (CAB) reported that "complaints continue to be received in ever increasing 
numbers and rate of intake tends to outstrip the growth in staff resources…" (p11). The 
Annual Report of 1972-73 noted that the 6,658 complaints received during the year 
represented a 63% increase over those of the year before. After a Labor administration 
replaced that of the Coalition in 1976, the work of the CAB was transmuted into that of a 
fully fledged department with Mr Sydney Einfeld as its Minister. By then its staff had 
grown from the eight people operating a single office in Sydney to 92, many of them 
working in the nine regional branch offices which had been established around the State. 
By 1980 the Department was dealing with 250,000 complaints per annum (NSWPD, 
3:160 24/2/1981, p3996).  
The advent of “administrative law” 
While it signaled the beginning of a new approach by government to consumer rights, the 
Department of Consumer Affairs was solely concerned with interactions between 
consumers and providers in the private sector. However, the consumer movement also 
had another much less visible but in many ways profoundly more important effect on 
government, in that it spurred the adoption from the 1970s onwards, of the notion of 
administrative law. In the very simple terms of Davis et al  administrative law "…is 
designed to ensure external review and checks on the individual actions of officials" 
(Davis, 1993) . The adoption of administrative law, in Wilenski's words "brought judicial 
power into administration in order to redress the balance of bureaucratic power" 
(Wilenski, 1986).  
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The idea of administrative review was not new. According to Corbett "… common law 
processes for seeking redress against wrongful administrative decisions are so ancient as 
to be archaic …" The problem was that these processes could only be invoked by using 
legal means and going through the courts. Law reformers in Australia in the 1960s and 
1970s,"like their British counterparts in the 1920s and 1930s, were convinced that these 
ancient remedies were too expensive, complex and technical to serve the needs of modern 
societies …" (Corbett, 1992). In Australia that thinking led, in both the Federal and State 
spheres, to the establishment of government-sponsored and financed agencies such as 
Ombudsperson's offices, the institution of freedom of information legislation and the 
establishment of Administrative Appeals Tribunals. Such devices were designed to make 
it possible for individual citizens to have their complaints and concerns about 
bureaucratic actions and decisions taken up and investigated at little or no cost. Freedom 
of information, in principle anyway, gave individual citizens the complete right of access 
to hitherto closed bureaucratic records.  
 
The results of the introduction of administrative law were set out by Ms Pat Brazil, 
secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney General's Department, in 1987.  
Never before have administrators and government decision-making been 
so exposed to public scrutiny and criticism, particularly when increased 
parliamentary scrutiny is taken into account. It is a major aspect of the 
new climate of accountability within which administrators must work and 
which is also reflected in the Government's initiatives for public sector 
reforms (Brazil, 1989 p13).    
Brazil also expressed the view that the process of opening up the bureaucracy to public 
scrutiny was probably irreversible "given the demands of fairness and of an ever more 
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articulate and sophisticated community". As noted above, that development was to have 
far-reaching consequences for governance since one of its chief characteristics was its 
demand for accountability and "open government". That applied not only to visible sector 
of governmental bureaucracies working in Ministerial departments, but also to statutory 
authorities such as MRBs which under the banner of professional autonomy and peer 
review, had for over a century been operating in the non-accountable fashion described 
elsewhere in this thesis.  
 
That administrative law was bound to affect such agencies became clear after the 
establishment of the NSW Ombudspersons' Office in 1975 (a year before the 
establishment of a similar office in the Federal sphere). This made it possible, for the first 
time, for members of the public and also of the health workforce, to have their complaints 
about health care institutions investigated. From 1976 onwards, around 30 such 
complaints were taken up annually, and while that number is minute, none the less that an 
entirely new in-principle situation had been created within the State bureaucracy is clear 
from the first annual report of the Ombudsperson. In the section dealing with 
investigations affecting the NSW Health Commission, the Ombudsperson cited the case 
of a long-term patient who had been denied access to his hospital records.  When the 
Ombudsperson put the patients' request to the Health Commission, officials replied that 
patient records had always been kept confidential on the grounds that:   
Medical records often contain important subjective observations of the 
patient, his [sic] attitudes and behaviour which is important that the 
medical officer should record for his [sic] own future guidance or for the 
guidance of other members of the therapeutic team. This would be 
particularly so in the case of psychiatric records. It would not be 
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conducive to the maintenance of rapport between the doctor and patients 
if such observations were to be shown to the patient, and it would have an 
undesirable inhibiting effect on the medical office in his compilation of 
the records if he knew that this was likely to happen (New South Wales, 
1976b p39).   
The Ombudsperson replied by pointing out that "the position is different in my case as 
under the provisions of the Ombudsman Act … I am entitled, in investigating a 
complaint, to obtain the production of such records". While no finality was reported in 
this case, it illustrated the way in which individuals had  been provided with a state-
sponsored champion in their encounters with bureaucracy. In any case, the reasons 
advanced by the Health Commission for denying patients access to their records were 
soon to be swept aside by the introduction of freedom of information legislation (FOI). 
While in many ways FOI is honoured in the breach rather than in practice and bureaucrats 
have found new ways of keeping information to themselves, none the less FOI has 
created a convention in terms of which nothing appears in governmental records which 
cannot stand public scrutiny.  
 
It is significant that when, in an interview with the NSW Labor Minister for Health, Mr 
Laurie Brereton, sometime in the early 1980s, a delegation from the Pensioners and 
Superannuants Federation raised their difficulties in obtaining redress from doctors with 
whom they were dissatisfied. They told him that what was needed was "something like a 
health Ombudsman" (Hewitt, 1993). That indicates two things: firstly, these consumers 
believed that accountability in health care needed to extended beyond public institutions 
and into the sphere of private medical practice. Secondly, this incident indicates that the 
discourse of administrative law had moved beyond governmental and bureaucratic circles 
 220
and had been taken up by consumers. And when that happened, as has been noted above, 
those in government,  in pursuit of their own electoral interests, were invariably inclined 
not only to listen, but also to act.   
 
The stage was being set for the formation of the Complaints Unit as a typically "counter-
bureaucratic" bureaucracy. As such, it exemplified the way in which administrative law 
was making it possible to fight the fire of Weberian bureaucracy with a counter-
bureaucratic fire and as Wilenski, said, was helping "to redress the balance of 
bureaucratic power" (Wilenski, 1986). In doing so it provided both those in the 
community population/equal-health advocate and those in the government structural 
interest, now eager to please voters in the light of the rise of the consumer movement, 
with a new weapon in struggles to prise open the bastions of bureaucratic non-
accountability. On that score, as the incident related in the Ombudsperson’s Annual 
Report noted above indicated, the interests of those in the government structural interest, 
tended to diverge markedly on this point, from the those of the corporate rationalists. The 
opinions of the latter on this issue are probably best encapsulated by the reactions of “Sir 
Arnold”, the Cabinet Secretary in the Yes Minister series, to demands for open 
government. Constituted “a contradiction in terms. You can either be open or you can 
have government”. The growing insistence that all of government should indeed be open 
(and Yes Minister was probably one of the deftest weapons fashioned by proponents of 
that demand) was obviously going to affect the MRB. This was not only an old (in fact 
the oldest) corporate rationalist agency in the NSW government, but because it was 
comprised of co-opted experts, i.e. medical practitioners, also formed one of the strongest 
power bastions of the professional monopolisers.   
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The health consumer "movement" 
The ferment created by the growth of the consumer movement in the 1960s inevitably 
spread to the field of health care. Baldry (Halpin, 1974) points out that "consumer 
consciousness" here was stimulated by the growth of the women's movement. A major 
concern among feminists was birth control and also to secure legalised abortion but this 
soon broadened to other health issues. Baldry quotes the case of a Sydney-based group 
known as "Control", in which the "initial focus on birth control and abortion expanded 
rapidly as the group became aware of the deep and widespread dissatisfaction amongst 
women with medical services" (p124). That in turn led to the establishment of the 
Leichhardt Women's Community Health Centre in Sydney. "It and the many similar 
centres which opened around Australia in the following decade, emphasised the right of 
women to be fully informed about their physical health and to have access to counselling 
and support in their social settings" (p.125).    
 
Still, it took almost two decades after the advent of the consumer movement in Australia 
for the first health-specific consumer body to emerge in NSW, this being the Medical 
Consumers' Association (MCA) formed in 1976. It is significant, in the light of what has 
been said above about the emergence of the academic sociological critique of scientific 
medicine, that the leading lights in the MCA were just such academics. The first 
president was Dr Erica Bates of the School of Health Services Management at the 
University of New South Wales and a widely published author of sociological texts on 
health care. Another figure was Dr Fran Hausfeld, who became its second president. 
Hausfeld had begun her academic career late in life, but having obtained her PhD, she 
was appointed to the staff of the Department of Administrative, Sociological and Political 
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Affairs in the new Kuring-gai College of Advanced Education. Here she soon developed 
a reputation as a leading activist in the field of health care and was frequently consulted 
by government, especially after the more radical Wran administration gained power in 
NSW in 1976. Among other things, she was appointed by the Minister for Health, Mr 
Kevin Stewart, to the Health Advisory Council of NSW.  
 
Hausfeld decries the idea that the formation of the MCA was due to the irresistible rise of 
health consumer power (1993, 2002). She states that the main motivation for the 
establishment of the MCA was instead provided by a group of members of the Health and 
Research Employees Association whose jobs in the community health programs set up 
under the Labor Whitlam government in the Federal sphere, were being threatened by 
cuts under the Liberal/National Fraser administration which came to power in 1976.51 
There was a heavy presence of these unionists and members of the left faction of the 
Labor Party at the "wild and woolly" inaugural meeting of the MCA, reports Hausfeld 
(1993, 2002). Also prominent among those present, were a group of what she calls 
"crazies, whose main objective seemed to be to lynch doctors". These were people who 
having suffered injury or harm during the course of treatment, and whose efforts to obtain 
redress from either the medical profession or from government having proved fruitless, 
saw the MCA as vehicle for pursuing their ongoing vendettas against the medical 
profession.  Hausfeld states that it was always difficult to control the members of this 
                                                 
51 Their hopes of being able to use the MCA as a front for the advocacy of their interests were thwarted by a 
clause in its constitution which prohibited anyone who derived their income from institutions or activities 
concerned with health care delivery, from being office-bearers. This stipulation, according to Hausfeld, was 
included at the insistence of Bates, who feared that it would by taken over by the AMA. In fact she states,  the 
AMA remained supremely indifferent to the MCA.   
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group whose activities and demands were in time to cause the resignation from the 
presidency of Dr Bates.  
 
Despite that, wrote Bates in her book Health Systems and Public Scrutiny (1983), this 
body was "the most active of consumer groups in Australia and between 1976 and 1978 
obtained a great deal of media coverage for its exposure of doctors' high incomes and its 
complaints at the gradual erosion of the protection afforded to consumers by health 
insurance" (p137). In 1978 the MCA published a Charter of Patients' Rights and 
Responsibilities which Bates noted, was praised by the AMA Gazette and adopted in a 
modified form by the Australian Hospital Association.  
 
However, the MCA appears never to have duplicated the success of the ACA in 
recruiting 
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members. While few of the records of its early period survive, one pointer to the size of 
the MCA was a membership survey carried out through the medium of its newsletter in 
1978. This evoked 72 responses, which the authors calculated to be about 15% of those 
surveyed. While that would mean that around 1,000 people were surveyed, these would 
have included all the recipients of the newsletter rather than simply the actual 
membership and no doubt for public relations purposes, the newsletter was being 
circulated much more widely than to the membership. The survey indicated that a little 
over half of those surveyed comprised people either involved in or who had been 
involved in the past, in health care occupations (four were medical practitioners.) This 
indicates that despite being given good coverage in the media, the MCA was not 
attracting large numbers of the general public.  
 
Hausfeld states that in their dealings with media and figures in government, "we were 
careful never to let them know how small our membership actually was". The newsletters 
of the MCA, which consisted of poorly produced cyclostyled sheets, confirms Hausfeld's 
statements about the weakness of the organisation.  In a passage of the article assessing 
the results of the membership survey referred to above, the authors stated in response to 
suggestions as to where the MCA might direct its activities:  
Unfortunately the Association, given its present membership, financial 
resources and lack of volunteers, cannot undertake any activity which is 
costly, time consuming or labour intensive. We lack human and financial 
resources; and we lack basic facilities such as a desk, chair, typewriter and 
telephone. (Medical Consumers Association, 1978 pp2-5) 
These weakesses were remedied to some extent when the MCA merged its activities with 
those of the ACA in 1980, which says Bates, allowed the MCA to benefit from the 
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administrative and public relations resources of the ACA.  This does not appear to have 
led to any significant increase in either the membership of activities of the MCA, 
although Bates (1983, p138) asserted that its lobbying led to the establishment of a 
special section in the Department of Consumer Affairs to investigate health consumer 
complaints. This was soon being fairly well-used by health consumers. As Donnelly 
(1992) states: 
The Annual Reports from the Department of Consumer Affairs for the 
years 1978/81 all comment on the increasing number of complaints 
against doctors particularly in regard to incompetence, unskilled treatment 
and inadequate services. For those three years a total of 265 complaints 
against doctors were received …(p51). 
That development probably resulted from the fact that soon after its establishment, the 
MCA found that besides the "crazies", other aggrieved patients also saw it as a channel 
for registering their complaints against doctors and the health system. However, given its 
organisational weaknesses, it was powerless either to investigate or to pursue these 
complaints and could do nothing little more than refer them to other bodies such as the 
Consumer Affairs Bureau which in turn however, did little other than settle financial 
disputes between doctors and patients. 
 
Hausfeld states that to the best of her recollection the MCA never did any lobbying and 
certainly there are no reports any lobbying activities in its newsletters. The one time the 
MCA did approach government as a group was when its leaders visited Einfeld, who 
became Minister for Consumer Affairs after the election of the Wran government in 
1976, to ask him for financial support for the MCA.. He said he was unable to help 
because his Department was new and because it was "at the bottom of the governmental 
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heap", was itself short funds. However, Hausfeld is fairly certain that that the special 
health complaints section of the Consumer Affairs Bureau referred to above, resulted 
from this encounter, which confirms the point made by Bates above in this regard. Both 
Hausfeld and Bates, as respected academics, served on bodies such as the government's 
Health Advisory Committee; in August 1982, Hausfeld was selected by Brereton after he 
became Minister for Health in 1981, to join a team of three to review the planning, 
development and co-ordination of Community Health Services in NSW (Medical 
Consumers Association, 1982 p1). Appointments such as these gave Bates and Hausfeld 
privileged access to the Minister, with whom they could raise issues thrown up by the 
MCA as well as their other more generalised sociological critiques of the medical 
profession.   
 
In Brereton, they found a sympathetic audience. After the accession of the Wran Labor 
government to power in 1976, the NSW legislature had in many ways reverted to type 
with Labor Party members in the Lower House in particular, being much more critical of 
Medicine than had been its members at the time of the passing of the 1963 Medical 
Practitioners Act, when Sheahan was Minister. The ancient enmity between Labor and 
organised Medicine had burst into the open at the Federal level when the AMA mounted 
a million-dollar fighting fund to block the introduction of Medibank, Australia's first 
universal health insurance scheme. As detailed in their book The Making of Medibank by 
Scotton & Macdonald (1993) the resistance generated by the forced the Whitlam 
government into a double dissolution and fresh elections in order to get the legislation 
passed.  
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In the State sphere in NSW, a new willingness on the part of government to attack the 
privileged and exclusive position claimed for themselves by the professions was 
embodied in a clause of the 1980 Consumer Protection Amendment Act which enabled 
the Consumer Commissioner "to receive complaints about fraudulent or unfair practices 
by professional persons" in the words of Minister Einfeld (NSWPD, 3:159 19/11/1980 
p3160). This evoked some heated opposition both outside and also inside the parliament, 
where Mr K. Rozzoli (Coalition, Hawkesbury) argued that the proposal had been opposed 
unanimously by the professions, and in particular by the Law Society of New South 
Wales, the AMA, the Australian Hospital Association and the Dental Association and by 
organizations such as the Council for Civil Liberties" (NSWPD, 3:160 24/2/1981 p3973). 
He further argued that: "No matter how strongly the Minister may assert that there is no 
difference between going to the doctor and … going to the butcher and buying a pound of 
sausages, there is a considerable difference". That statement was contested by the 
Brereton when he said: "One is compelled to ask oneself what is so sacrosanct about the 
so-called professions. Are not consumers entitled to every protection from 
professionals?" (NSWPD, 3:160 24/2/1981, p3975).  
 
Another participant in the debate, Mr John Hatton (Independent, South Coast) argued: 
In the past ten to fifteen years the professions have come under great 
scrutiny. Experience has revealed that merely because a person is a 
professional does not mean that improper practices are beneath him [sic]. 
This has been made quite clear in the professions of medicine and law. In 
many instances the improper practices have been evident to an extent that 
could be described only as shocking. (NSWPD, 3:160 26/2/1981, p4203)  
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That these parliamentary critics of professional immunity from investigation did not stand 
alone was evident from the report of the NSW Law Reform Commission which had 
averred that "The … proposition that professionals can be trusted always to put the public 
interest ahead of sectional professional interests, is one which few people will accept 
today" (New South Wales, 1982 p122) 
 
Brereton was certainly aware of the lack of effective pathways for the registration of 
patient, or as they can now be termed, health consumer complaints. Donnelly (1992) 
states that 
Health Dept records reveal that in 1977 there was concern in the senior 
levels of the Dept. about the difficulties the then Health Commission was 
having in investigating and dealing with complaints about medical 
services. At the direction of the Minister, internal procedures for dealing 
with complaints referred direct either to him or the Commission were 
drawn up (p48).  
It may be that in their encounters in other capacities with Brereton, the leaders of the 
MCA helped to make him aware of the difficulties faced by health complainants. 
Whatever the case, the shared attitudes of the Minister and the academics who led the 
MCA, was yet another pointer to the alliance being forged between the government and 
the community population/equal-health advocates structural interests.  
 
There were pragmatic as well as ideological reasons for this. As was argued in the 
previous Chapter and will be argued much more fully shortly, a very powerful factor was 
simply that of electoral arithmetic. The popularity of the consumer movement made it 
much more attractive to politicians than the cause of providers of goods and services. 
From the point of view of the equal health advocates, the pragmatic advantage of an 
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alliance with corporate rationalisers was that the consumer interest groups, in the words 
of Palmer and Short (2000, p42-3) were "diffuse, not well organised, poorly financed, 
and generally lacking in bargaining power in the political arena" and therefore any 
alliance with government was bound to help their cause.  This applied even to 
organisations that were much stronger than the MCA, such as Australian Community 
Health Association and the Victorian-based Health Issues Centre. Among the myriad 
issues of health care, challenges to medical autonomy and peer review from groups such 
as these were unlikely to succeed; what was needed in the terms of Albrow (1998, p177) 
cited in Chapter One, was "participation in everyday bureaucracy". It will be argued that 
attaining such participation depended not so much on the efforts of those in the 
community population structural interest, but on the willingness of members of the 
government executive such as Brereton, to enable that to happen.  
Mass media perceptions of the consumer movement 
The driving force of the consumer movement swept governments along with it in a 
comparatively short space of time. This no doubt was due to some elements and 
personalities, such as Einfeld, among the ranks of politicians. Equally important however, 
was the mass following behind the consumer movement, evident for instance, in the 
growth figures of the ACA and the CAB cited above. An even more telling indicator of 
the popularity of the movement was the way it was taken up by mass media. The 1975-76 
Annual Report of the Department of Consumer Affairs noted for instance: 
Consumer protection has become a fashionable subject with the 
Australian media recently. Business malpractices are valued as scoops 
while advice regarding consumer law and wise buying is sought after as a 
good programme content. Consequently, the demand on the Bureau for 
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such publicity is considerable and has increased since the annual report of 
1974-75 (New South Wales, 1976a p26). 
 In fact, the CAB was being "a bit slow on the uptake" on this score; in 1969 during the 
debate on the first Consumer Protection Act, Einfeld, then in opposition, had noted in the 
parliament that "In September 1966, the Sun newspaper commenced its Hot Line service 
and since that time it has received about 80,000 complaints from consumers. (NSWPD 
3:78 12/3/1969 p4450). That was one indication that those in media had quickly 
perceived that the enormous popularity of consumer issues was a very useful means of 
boosting audience size in both print and electronic media. Thus an alliance based on the 
mutual interests of media and consumer organisations including those in government, 
quickly emerged. In the CAB's Annual Report for 1971-72 for instance, it was stated: 
Mention should be made of the public media and its representatives which 
have been most helpful and co-operative. The Bureau's policy is to make 
as much time as possible available to journalists and other media 
representatives and, within the limits of discretion, to be frank and open in 
its discussions. Virtually without exception, press, and other media have 
responded in similar fashion and the Bureau's confidences - necessary at 
times - have been respected (New South Wales, 1976a p33).  
The report acknowledged the "substantial contribution to consumer education" by 
columns and features in media. The 1975-76 Annual Report noted that "with regard to 
adult consumer education, top priority has been given to publicity through television, 
radio and newspapers…" The heavy schedule of media activities was reported as follows: 
 Television appearances apart from news items included a regular weekly 
spot on the programme "Eleven a.m." on Channel 7, weekly segments on 
Channel 2's teenage pop programme "Flashez", a monthly appearance on 
"The Mike Walsh Show" on channel 10, and a guest spot in Don Lane's 
"Tonight Show" on Channel 9. In November 1976, with the advent of the 
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"Willesee at 7" programme, the Extension Services officer began regular 
participation in this national evening show as an integral part of her 
consumer education activities with the Bureau (p26-7). 
There had also been a variety of radio programs in which the Bureau had participated 
while in the print media, with whom daily contact was maintained, "some weekly and 
monthly magazines, in particular, Woman's Day have featured regular consumer articles 
for the shopper's or homemaker's information" (New South Wales, 1976a pp26-7).   
    
Importantly, the newspaper space and electronic airtime given to the Bureau had been 
provided free. In other terms, consumer affairs constituted a public relations "dream run" 
for the Bureau and certainly the readiness of government executives to take up the 
consumer cause would have resulted from their realisation that its popularity meant it was 
a vote winner.  
Mass media perceptions of the AMA 
This phenomenon might be compared to the difficulties faced by the AMA in its public 
relations efforts. As noted in the previous chapter, the NSW branch of the AMA had 
established a "Public Relations Committee" (PRC) in 1956. The minutes of this 
Committee52 reveals that public and particularly mass media perceptions of the medical 
profession remained deeply ambivalent, even during the profession's heyday of power 
and prestige between the 1940s and 1970s. While educational and instructional material 
provided by the AMA's public relations efforts was readily accepted, both print and 
electronic media maintained a critical stance towards Medicine which led to constant 
                                                 
52 Held in the AMA Records Archive in the Mitchell Library, Sydney (in Bay2E12 of Level 2).  Accessible 
only with the permission of the president of the NSW branch of the AMA.     
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complaints within the profession about its poor public image. In notes presented to the 
PRC in 1965, the branch Director of Communications, Mr C.V. Crockett, stated: 
When I joined the staff in 1940, I was asked to suggest some means of 
countering Press criticism of the profession. I suggested radio talks on 
"health and medical " subjects and newspaper and other articles because 
these would be given as written and approved by the Branch, whereas 
there could be no control over newspapers' use of contributed articles, in 
respect of headings and shortening or alteration of text" (Australian 
Medical Association, 1965).  
The acceptance by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation of this proposal gave an 
added benefit to the AMA in that it received £4,000 (on the basis of the calculation made 
in the previous chapter, the equivalent of $400,000 in 2002) in payment for its 
contributions.  
 
Such publicity successes and the much more extensive efforts launched after 1956 by the 
PRC did little to change media ambivalence towards the medical profession in general 
and the AMA in particular.  While on the one hand, the ever-increasing technical 
expertise and successes of Medicine called forth praise, the mass media proved more than 
willing to carry strong critiques of the profession53. The PRC was criticised on more than 
occasion for this "bad press" by regional sub-branches of the AMA. In 1962 for instance,  
                                                 
53 At the PRC meeting of 14/6/1962, the following typical examples of hostile articles were considered: 
The Sun "Ðeath of a Child" (editorial) "Boy's death report" (29/5/1962); "Ethics legislation. A code for doctors" 
(5/6/1962) "The scandal of American doctors" (7/6/1962); Daily Mirror "Sheahan to push bill on doctors" 
(31/5/1962); Sunday Mirror "Medicine men talk gibberish" (10/6/1962). 
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the Eastern District Medical Association, reacting to the Windsor Hospital incident, 
expressed regret "at the lack of active steps taken by the Council in the interests of the 
profession and the lack of publicity in this and similar disputes in the daily press". In 
response the Director of Communications prepared a submission to the PRC which is 
worth quoting at length because it so well encapsulates the public relations dilemmas in 
which the AMA found itself. 
It may be useful to point out how Public Relations policy differs from 
direct publicity, used on particular occasions. Publicity for the most part 
has to be conducted through statements to the Press, which naturally finds 
much more "news value" in criticism of the medical professional 
profession than in the Association's replies. For these, necessarily 
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temperate, must seem by comparison merely defensive [original 
emphasis]. 
The Association has very friendly relations with the press. Whenever 
strong criticisms are made (as on several occasions recently), they usually 
come, not from the Press, but from members of the public, who, whether 
rightly or wrongly, feel they have some cause for resentment against an 
individual doctor. But the Press, then, will always feature their 
complaints; not in the least because is hostile to the profession, (for it is 
not), but purely because such occasions are specially rich in what it calls, 
"human interest". …Direct publicity, if it is forceful, tends to produce 
controversy from which the profession never gains advantage (Australian 
Medical Association, 1962 pp3-4).  
While the publicity director was correct in stating that there was no hostility to the AMA 
on the part of individual journalists, he was of course, also underlining the fact that in 
pursuit of expanded readership and audience, mass media ruthlessly pursues its own 
interests by carrying material which owners and journalists sense has popular appeal. As 
has been demonstrated above, the cause of consumers was enormously popular because 
of course, as consumers themselves, the great bulk of media audiences had and still have 
infinite sympathy for fellow consumers subject to unjust treatment or incompetent service 
by providers. Against that and the "human interest" value of stories of people with 
grievances against doctors, the very considerable publicity efforts of the AMA were 
bound none the less, to seem ineffective.    
 
One illustration of that was a letter sent in 1966 by the General Secretary of the AMA to 
its sub-branches advising them on ways of dealing with media statements which "are 
unjustifiably critical of and derogatory to the Association or its members…" He reported 
that efforts to refute or correct "undesirable publicity on a variety of contentious subjects 
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have met with scant success" and were mostly ignored by media. One method which did 
seem to work however, was getting statements into the "Letters to the Editor" columns of 
newspapers (Australian Medical Association, 1966 pp1-2). That amounted to a counsel of 
desperation since the material appearing in correspondence columns generally represents 
individual rather than official views and therefore lacks the authority of official 
statements. 
 
In short, the records of the PRC indicate that during the 1950s and 1960s when the AMA 
was seemingly at the height of its power, in terms of public perception its position was 
not strong compared to the growing force of the consumer movement. Nothing illustrates 
that better than the difficulties and criticism the AMA and Medicine encountered in 
dealing with the media compared to the uncritical and almost adulatory way with which 
even so weak an organisation as the MCA was treated.  
 
That the overall position of medicine was in fact weakening during this period is most 
evident from the fact that from the mid-1960s onwards, the PRC found it necessary to 
open a "second front" to try to boost the image of the AMA within the medical profession 
itself due to falling membership and particularly, its failure to attract young recently 
qualified doctors into its ranks. A table presented to the PRC in 1964 showed that the 
proportion of graduates from the University of Sydney who entered its membership had 
shrunk from 58% (110 out of 192 graduates) in 1958 to 11% (21 out of 197 graduates) in 
1963. Thus the PRC proposed to send a newsletter to hospital boards decrying the fact 
that honorary medical staff of major hospitals "are not impressed by the necessity for 
unity in the profession as expressed by membership of the Association, nor are they 
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aware of the considerable advantage to be derived by membership of this Association" 
(Australian Medical Association, 1964 pp2-3). 
  
The most obvious indicator of even professional disenchantment with the AMA appeared 
in 1973 when the Doctors' Reform Society was founded in Victoria, followed by 
branches in NSW and the Act in the following year. This organisation tended to share the 
sociological critiques of traditional scientific medicine in that it "sought to improve the 
health of populations, recognising the social components in health maintenance … It 
therefore not only strongly supported and fought to save the redistributive economic 
decisions taken by the Whitlam Government to provide universal health insurance but 
also those which aimed to improve housing, pollution, control, food standards and citizen 
participation in health policy" (Baldry, 1992 , p127). Its membership, which reached 
1,000 in 1981, never approached that of the AMA, but none the less, as stated by Baldry, 
it was big enough "to be listened to by government".  
 
Yet while the public prestige of that section of the medical profession represented by the 
AMA was in decline during the 1960s and 1970s, none the less its grip on the controlling 
body of Medicine, the MRB, remained untouched and that meant that whatever else 
happened, the power of the MRB remained untouched as well. That would not have 
surprised Weber; bureaucracy, he had pointed out "is a power instrument of the first order 
for the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus" (Weber, 1978 [1922] p987).  
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The Chelmsford “deep sleep” scandal 
The far-reaching consequences of the pure application of peer review under which the 
MRB operated made themselves felt in the case of the Chelmsford Private Hospital in 
Sydney, where from the 1963 onwards, Dr Harry Bailey and his colleagues began to 
apply  "deep sleep therapy" to patients with various psychiatric disorders. The "therapy" 
consisted of administering large doses of barbituates, rendering the recipients 
unconscious for periods of up to a fortnight, during which time they were drip-fed and 
also subjected to electro-convulsive treatment. Patients were kept naked and often 
chained to beds to prevent them from falling out, while their bodily excretions were 
simply emptied on the sheets. The treatment was not new, but according to Walton 
(Walton, 1990 p283) in her Masters thesis54: "Most psychiatrists had rejected deep sleep 
therapy as a mode of treatment in the 1930s."  Twenty five of the 1,430 patients subjected 
to deep sleep in Chelmsford between 1963 up to the time when it was stopped in 1979, 
died as a direct result, while large numbers suffered varying degrees of trauma and brain 
damage.  
 
The situation first came to light as a result of an inquest into the death of a Chelmsford 
patient in 1967 while investigative work by the Church of Scientology also resulted in 
major media coverage from that date onwards, the nature of which was set out by Walton 
(1992)    
The material generated by the print and electronic media tended to show 
one side of the story, repeating anecdotal information and building on the 
                                                 
54 She had also, since 1985, been the director of the Complaints Unit of the NSW Department of Health, which 
figures prominently in the next chapter. 
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previous layer of chronicles of a horrific and ugly treatment. Everything 
associated with Chelmsford Hospital became exotic. Dr. Bailey became 
the 'mad doctor', the sleep ward became the 'zombie ward' (p8).  
 In other words, the story provided the kind of sensationalist material which media 
typically uses to boost its audience sizes, its one-sidedness not being readily apparent to 
anyone who did not read or see the reports analytically or critically.  
 
Despite the storm generated, it was not until 1985 that official action against anyone 
involved in the deep sleep therapy was taken, when the newly-formed Complaints Unit of 
the NSW Health Department brought actions against three Chelmsford doctors before the 
Investigating Committee of the MRB (Bailey, having become a semi-alcoholic, 
committed suicide in 1985). The Committee found that strong enough prima facie 
evidence existed for the matter to be referred to the Medical Tribunal.  The actions of the 
Tribunal were however, halted by a successful appeal by the doctors in question to the 
Court of Appeal, which ruled that the case was ultra vires because of an excessive delay 
in the submission of the complaints (Complaints Unit, 1988 p10). Finally, in 1988 a 
newly elected Coalition government appointed a Royal Commission under Mr Justice J.P 
Slattery, to investigate the Chelmsford case. It sat for 288 days, examined 258 witnesses 
and produced more than 18,000 pages of transcript (Complaints Unit, 1990b p15). In his 
findings the Commissioner not only condemned the Chelmsford deep sleep treatment and 
the doctors responsible for it, but also expressed especial disapproval of the Health 
Department's "failure to investigate complaints" (New South Wales, 1990 Vol 1 p23) in 
the period before 1985.  
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There was never any official explanation for this failure, although as recounted in the 
next chapter, in his Chelmsford Royal Commission Report of 1990, Mr Justice Slattery 
speculated that it was due to sheer bureaucratic inertia within the Department of Health. 
The fact that even so powerful a Minister as Brereton was not able to overcome that 
inertia, is indicative of the way in which corporate rationalists are on occasion, able to 
thwart the government executive. On this score however, the power of the corporate 
rationalisers was reinforced by that of the professional monopolists who dominated the 
MRB. As the chief custodian of medical discipline and in terms of peer review, 
responsibility for taking action against the Chelmsford doctors rested with them. 
However, the interpretation of “infamous conduct” or “misconduct in any professional 
respect”, bolstered by legal precedent, as not applying to practice issues, meant that the 
Chelmsford doctors were safe from being called to account for their actions. In other 
words, the Chelmsford case constituted perhaps the starkest example of how the 
institutional autonomy of the medical profession as realised through the MRB, 
guaranteed the non-accountability of individual practitioners. It is significant that when 
the “counter-bureacratic” CU did initiate action at the behest of Brereton, even the 
Investigating Committee, which had proved notoriously unresponsive to health consumer 
concerns, found there were strong grounds for putting the issue before the Medical 
Tribunal. That the case never got to that stage meant that the Chelmsford doctors were 
never formally called to account for their actions.  But while they escaped any legal 
investigation and possible retribution, Chelmsford immeasurably strengthened the 
arguments of the representatives of the community structural interest that there was a 
prevailing ethos among the providers of health care which made it acceptable and even 
imperative, to cover up and deny medical error.  
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The appointment of the Royal Commission in 1988, which even if it was powerless to 
inflict retribution. at least damningly exposed and condemned the Chelmsford 
happenings, indicated that those in the government, regardless of political affiliation, 
were very aware of public reactions, were increasingly of the same view.  None of this 
boded well for the survival of the peer review principle in NSW.  
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the period under review, i.e. in the early 1960s, an alliance between 
the professional monopolist, government  and corporate rationalist structural interests had 
almost totally closed the pathways which could be used by people in the community 
population interest wanting to register their grievances by means of the Investigating 
Committee and the MRB. However, it has been demonstrated that mass media in general 
and Wran’s Labor Administration in particular, reflected changing societal attitudes 
which questioned the authority of the professions, including Medicine, and this led to the 
breakdown of the alliance between the governmental  and the professional monopolist 
structural interests groups. The impact of “new social movements”, particularly the 
women’s movement and the consumer movement, as well as the development of 
administrative law, had by the end of the period created several alternative pathways for 
health complaints in the form of the Ombudsperson’s Office and also the special section 
of the Department of Consumer Affairs dealing with health matters. In fact, by the end of 
the period under review, the scope for the registration of grievances had become much 
wider than this, as was pointed out in a speech to the national conference of the AMA in 
1990 by Ian Siggins, the Health Commissioner in Victoria: “Consumers could voice their 
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complaints to MPs, Health Ministers and Departments, Consumer Affairs, the AMA, 
MRBs, Hinch55, or lawyers”. However, said Siggins, the lack of a coherent complaints 
pathway meant that for complainants, the results of their efforts to register their 
grievances were both inconsistent and frustrating. It was that feeling which at least 
partially accounted for the “energy of medical consumerism” (Siggins, 1990 p1). The 
dawning of a new era of health “complaints coherence” not only in NSW but in each 
State and Territory in Australia, was signalled by the establishment of the CU in NSW in 
1984. When that was transmuted into the Health Care Complaints Commission in 1993 it 
brought to an end the system of medical peer review which had prevailed in this State for 
almost a century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Derryn Hinch the abrasive presenter of a current affairs program on Channel 7 TV at the time, was a typical 
media personality who made the most of the “human interest” hostility voiced by aggrieved patients about both 
health institutions and individual doctors.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE TWIN ASSAULT ON MEDICAL AUTONOMY 
1983-1994 
 
The final section of this thesis discusses the two-pronged assault on medical autonomy 
which resulted from the impact of the social and political forces described in the previous 
chapter. On the one hand government executives, both Labor and Coalition, mounted an 
attack which destroyed the type of the institutional autonomy of Medicine which had 
been embodied in the MRB since 1838, i.e. autonomy exercised outside the parameters of 
responsible government. On the other, there was an equally destructive attack on the 
individual autonomy of physicians led by the equal health advocates from the community 
population structural interest group. They had ensconced themselves in the “counter-
bureaucratic” organisation, which forms one of the central foci of this study, the 
Complaints Unit of the NSW Health Department.   
 
The attacks on both institutional and individual autonomy developed simultaneously and 
for that reason, the chapter considers events in each sphere separately, although as will be 
demonstrated, they were closely interlinked. The chapter is thus not presented in a linear 
chronological fashion. It concludes with a separate section which examines the ongoing 
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linkages between the drives of both the corporate rationalists and the equal health 
advocates in the Complaints Unit (CU) which led to the establishment of the "co-
regulation" or collaborative regulation of medical discipline.  
 
That system, it is argued, constituted a coup de grace for the autonomy of medicine in 
NSW in terms of which it had exercised exclusive control of medical discipline. There is 
also an examination of the attempts by the chief protagonist of the professional 
monopolist structural interest group, the AMA, to defend that autonomy. The reverses it 
suffered in the process probably negatived any attempts to reconstruct that autonomy in 
the near future. This closes the argument of this thesis that not only medical autonomy 
but also medical peer review in matters of discipline, ceased to exist in NSW after 1993.     
The assault on individual medical professional autonomy 
In the study of this issue, attention is focused on the CU since it was the establishment of 
this organisation that set in train events which, during the course of the next decade, were 
to bring to an end not only individual medical autonomy but also the type of institutional 
autonomy of which the MRB had enjoyed since 1838. It should be stressed that this 
process cannot be seen as the result of far-reaching strategies based on theoretical models 
of medical autonomy as advanced in the literature and in this thesis. Instead the process 
was one of ad hoc advance which, far from representing the flight of an arrow aimed at a 
target, should rather be compared to a stream of water finding its way around whatever 
obstacles it finds in its path.  
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Thus at the time of its establishment, there was no thought that the (CU) would have such 
far-reaching effects. When it began functioning in January 1984, it was the first body of 
its kind in the world.  Not surprisingly no one, including Brereton who decreed its 
formation, knew exactly how it would operate. Thus the form it was to take by the time it 
was transformed into the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) in 1993, was not 
the result of forethought or planning.  That it did reach that point represented the close-
run victory of one particular group which, over the course of a decade had engaged in 
major ideological and political struggles with proponents of competing philosophies. 
Before embarking on an investigation of those philosophies, described as  "agendas", 
some historical issues need to be dealt with, particularly the circumstances surrounding 
the formation of the CU. 
The establishment of the Complaints Unit 
It could be said of the CU that while its formation was unexpected, it was not a surprise. 
The announcement by Brereton in April, 1983 that he was establishing the CU as a unit 
within the Health Department, seems not to have been preceded by any consultation with 
stakeholders, such as the MRB, in the health care field (Donnelly, 1990 p56).  From that 
point of view, it was unexpected. However, given factors such as the rise of the consumer 
movement, the emergence of administrative law and the lobbying by health consumer 
groups described in the previous chapter, the emergence of the CU was not surprising. 
Long before Brereton became Minister in 1981, there had been concern about the rising 
level of complaints in the health care system. In her Masters thesis on the CU, Donnelly 
(1990) (who was one of its Investigations Officers at the time) reports that:  
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Health Dept [sic] records reveal that in 1977 there was concern in the 
senior levels of the Dept. about the difficulties the then Health 
Commission was having in investigating and dealing with complaints 
about medical services. At the direction of the Minister56, internal 
procedures for dealing with complaints were…drawn up (1990 p56) .  
That Brereton shared these concerns after becoming Minister was indicated by his 
institution of a second Medical Tribunal, as mentioned in the previous chapter, in an 
attempt to speed up the processing of complaints.  The Chelmsford case was one of the 
first tasks he delegated to the CU, which indicates that the need to remedy the failures of 
the Health Department in this regard, loomed large in his thinking (New South Wales, 
1990 p289).  
 
Although there were no precedents for an agency specifically devoted to handling health 
care complaints, Brereton was probably aware of the work of the NSW Law Reform 
Commission, which in 1982 had recommended that "Lay persons should participate in 
the investigation and resolution of complaints and in the work of the Professional 
Standards Boards and of the Disciplinary Tribunal" (New South Wales, 1982 p53). 
Brereton did not envisage similar lay participation in the complaints-handling processes 
of either the MRB or the Medical Tribunal. Instead he chose to establish the CU as an 
entirely lay body to investigate and pronounce on medical professional conduct. He may 
also have been aware of the moves being made towards the formation of a health 
complaints body in Victoria which had commenced in 1982 (Barraclough, 2002 356p). 
But precisely because there was so much forethought, planning and consultation with 
                                                 
56 At that time, Mr Kevin Stewart (Labor, Canterbury) 
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stakeholders in that State, it took much longer for the process to be finalised there. 
However, when that happened in 1988, the Victorian "Office of the Health 
Commissioner" had the great advantage of being established as a statutory authority with 
its own legislative base. The CU had no such base and those who worked in it were 
always uneasily aware that having been established simply by Ministerial fiat, it could be 
just as easily disbanded by a less sympathetic Minister.  
 
The immediate issue which provided Brereton with a reason for bringing the CU into 
existence was not the level of complaints about medical practice issues, but medical 
fraud. When he announced the formation of the CU on April 26, 1983, he stated that it 
had become necessary “because of the growing number of complaints about fraud and 
overservicing…”. In a press release on the same day, he quoted the report of the Joint 
Public Accounts Committee of the Federal parliament (the Georges Committee) which 
had found that “between 1975 and 1982 more than $100 million a year in medical 
benefits had been ‘ripped off’ in fraud and overservicing by doctors”.  There was a high 
public consciousness of what was known as “medifraud” at the time (Crichton, 1990 
pp82-6); (Hicks, 1982 pp46-7), something which leads Donnelly (1990) to conclude that 
Brereton was acting opportunistically in order to gain electoral advantage for his party 
(p56).  Medifraud however was not his sole concern. In his letter to the Public Service 
Board announcing the formation of the CU, he stated that it would also “enable the 
investigation of the many incidents within the health care field which cannot be 
encompassed with the present resources and expertise in the Department [of Health]”  
(Department for Health NSW, 1984 p2). And in his press release of April 26, he 
identified “the standard of care provided in institutions governed by state legislation” as 
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another major justification for the formation of the CU. This could only have been a 
reference to Chelmsford. In other words, as an astute politician Brereton probably 
believed that the medifraud issue constituted the best launching pad for a "counter-
bureaucratic" agency to deal with health complaints.   
 
Still, the way in which it was created made for uncertainty and ambivalence about the 
direction and purpose of the CU, and there was conflict on this issue between the time of 
its formation right up until 1993, the cut-off point of this thesis. Because the outcome of 
that conflict had such a vital bearing on the issue of medical accountability and the way it 
was to be enforced, it is necessary to investigate competing philosophies or "agendas" 
within the CU and the wider issues they raised, under the following headings:  
1. The fraud agenda. 
1.1 The "prosecutorial" vs the "conciliation" approach to dealing with health 
complaints. 
2.  The consumer/victim agenda. 
2.1 Individual redress or public interest? 
3. The professional monopolist/AMA agenda. 
3.1 The continuity of government support for the CU.  
4. The “public interest” agenda. 
The fraud agenda  
While he did have concerns about health complaints issues, medifraud was Brereton’s 
priority and in fact he can be characterised as the chief proponent of the “fraud agenda” 
which figured prominently in the early stages of the CU’s existence. This was somewhat 
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anomalous, since the financing and administration of Australia’s public health insurance 
system, which even before it became a universal system in 1984 under the name of 
Medicare, was the responsibility of the Commonwealth Department of Health and more 
specifically, of the Health Insurance Commission. As was pointed out by the Sydney 
Morning Herald in an editorial, the pursuit of medical practitioners who defrauded the 
system was a Commonwealth and not a State responsibility (27/4/1983). Brereton 
appears not to have set down any guidelines on this issue and the role of the CU had to be 
negotiated by the newly appointed manager of the CU, Ms Philippa Smith. One of her 
first meetings was with senior officials of the Investigation Section of the Commonwealth 
Department of Health, which had responsibility for policing medifraud. It was agreed at 
that meeting that a letter be sent to the Commonwealth Minister of Health requesting that 
the CU be included on the Co-ordinating Committee on Medifraud, which included 
representatives from the Federal Police, Crown Solicitors, the Health Insurance 
Commission and the Commonwealth Department of Health. It was also agreed that 
“liaison … be maintained on fraud matters” (Department for Health NSW, 1984p6).   
 
Whatever the niceties regarding the division of responsibilities between Commonwealth 
and States, as noted in the Chelmsford Royal Commission report, Brereton was “quite 
insistent” that he wanted the NSW State police to be involved in CU investigations 
related to fraud (New South Wales, 1990 p296). Thus a police officer, Detective Sergeant 
Bruce Coates, was appointed to the CU as one of its first four staff members. (Later 
another police constable was appointed to help with the investigations into Chelmsford). 
Coates was very active in the first year of the CU's existence. In a report he wrote in 
1984, he recommended the appointment of six more police officers to the CU stating that 
 249
10-15% of the 800 complaints received to that date by the CU, required legal/police 
attention and interpretation. These were "mainly allegations of fraud committed by 
medical practitioners".  There were also some cases which related to “services performed 
by persons on the periphery of the medical profession and their actions which require 
investigation by police”. For instance he had instigated a major case against five doctors 
who were accused of defrauding the Macksville District Hospital of large sums of money  
(Complaints Unit, 1984? p1).  
 
The fraud agenda did not last long within the CU. For one thing, there was no obvious 
proponent of this approach among those who were qualified or willing to direct the CU. 
Indicative of the impulsive and ad hoc way in which the CU was brought into existence, 
was that Brereton was still casting around for a director seven months after he made the 
announcement about its formation (New South Wales, 1990 p280). Eventually he 
appointed Ms Philippa Smith, who at the time was acting as a consultant to the Health 
Department and before that had played a prominent role in consumer-oriented 
organisations such as the Australian Council for Social Service (ACOSS). This was as a 
result of her, when she heard about the imminent formation of the CU, sending him a 
memorandum making suggestions as to how it should operate. After interviewing her, 
Brereton decided she was the right person for the job. That circumstance constituted a 
classical illustration of the working of the “expert co-optation principle” as set out in 
Chapter 2 (see p75-8), in terms of which government brings in non-government experts 
not only to staff but also to set directions for newly-created governmental agencies. This 
was of course, the basis on which the MRB had been established and had run ever since, 
the co-opted experts in that case being members of the medical profession. 
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Although Brereton did not realise it, Smith posed a major threat to his fraud agenda. She  
was a typical "equal health advocate" and for her  the question of medifraud was an issue 
between government and doctors and therefore was not a consumer issue. Moreover, as 
noted above, the government in question was that of the Commonwealth and not of the 
State. Much more important to Smith was the question of redressing individual consumer 
complaints, and in fact this was the issue which prompted her to draw up the 
memorandum mentioned above, in which she urged that the CU be based on “a much 
broader perspective of consumer perspective as opposed to the criminal view " and that it 
"look at broader issues of quality of care, matters of administration and matters of policy, 
as they affected consumers” (New South Wales, 1990 pp279-80).   
 
Once she had been installed as director of the CU, Smith set about downgrading the 
medifraud agenda. Her task in this respect was made easier by Brereton ceasing to be 
Minister of Health in February 1984, one month after the CU commenced operations. His 
successor, Mr Ron Mulock, was never as concerned about medifraud and obviously had 
not been involved in the issues which led to the formation of the CU. Smith’s success in 
imposing new priorities on the CU is evident from a document of 14 May, 1984, in which 
it was reported that during discussions between her, the new Minister and the Secretary 
and senior officers of the Department, it was agreed that the CU would become much 
more focused on health issues. Among its main functions it would: 
(a)  Examine and monitor complaints  
(b) Provide recommendations regarding the implications for the 
ongoing policy and practices of the Department 
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(c) Liaison [sic] with major 'community' interests, and develop projects 
and actively seek 'feedback' on the quality and availability of 
services (Department for Health NSW, 1984 pp1-2). 
As will be seen, these were very much consumer concerns, which from that time onwards 
moved to the forefront of the work of the CU. While as can be seen from the reports of 
Coates, fraud investigations continued to form a prominent part of its operations, the 
police presence proved increasingly problematic. The police officers saw themselves as 
being responsible to their superiors in the Police Service rather than to the CU itself, 
which therefore lacked the power to control their actions. Justice Slattery called some of 
the police investigations into question in his Chelmsford report, particularly because they 
had diverted resources and time from the CU’s work on the Chelmsford case. As an 
example he cited the “goats' milk case” which arose out of a complaint by a farmer “who 
took the view that the Health Inspector was ‘on his back’ as to the quality of his goats’ 
milk … because a competitor was ‘getting some corrupt advantage’.’’ The inquiry, which 
took up some time and led to nothing, “highlighted my concern about the priorities within 
the unit", stated Justice Slattery. Later, the case against the Macksville doctors went 
disastrously wrong and ended up with the police having to pay $500,000 in compensation 
for wrongful charges (NSW 1990, Vol 8, p300). 
 
For ideological reasons which will be set out shortly, Ms Merrilyn Walton, who became  
Director of the CU in April 1985, was even more impatient than Smith of the fraud 
agenda, which without Brereton, had no champion in government. In 1986, the police 
officer's secondment to the CU was terminated at Walton's request (Walton, 1993). That 
fraud had been moved from the purview of the CU is evident from its first Annual Report 
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of 1987, which stated that "Cases of fraud and overservicing are referred to the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and the Health Insurance Commission" 
(Complaints Unit, 1990bp10). None the less, the fraud agenda left a crucial legacy within 
the CU; fraud of course, is a criminal offence and the pursuit of fraud is usually 
undertaken by police acting through the courts. Brereton’s intention was plainly to 
prosecute miscreant doctors by legal means and to expose them to the full force of 
punitive law. This was emphasised by the fact that a lawyer was also among the first 
appointees to the CU and had the task of the legal investigation of health complaints. 
Thus, from the outset, the CU adopted what is termed a "prosecutorial" approach which it 
has retained up to the present day.  
The "prosecutorial" vs the "conciliation" approach 
Its prosecutorial approach means that the CU and later the HCCC, have occupied a 
unique position in Australia. None of the other States and Territories, which by now have 
all set up health care complaints mechanisms of their own, followed its "prosecutorial" 
lead (Thomas, 2002). Instead they adopted the model of the Victorian Health 
Commissioner's Office, which is based on “conciliation” and which in contrast to 
adversarial legal processes, uses the techniques of "alternative dispute resolution". In 
terms of this approach, complainants and practitioners against whom a complaint has 
been made are brought together on a face-to-face basis and attempt, with the help of a 
trained conciliator, to come to mutual understandings and acceptance of the circumstance 
which prompted the complaints in the first place. The first Victorian Commissioner, Mr 
Ian Siggins, was a champion of conciliation, as is the current Commissioner, Ms Beth 
Wilson.  In one of the few articles on the topic, conciliation is lauded by Wilson and co-
authors precisely on the grounds that it “operates as an alternative to litigation” (Wilson 
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& Punshon, 1998 p59). The rationale quoted is that of a joint submission made by the 
National Association of Specialist Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and the Royal 
College of Obstetricians to the Law Reform Commission: “Liability is arrived at by 
consensus, and theoretically, both parties should be satisfied with the result.” This, say 
Wilson & Punshon, , is the opposite outcome to the adversarial (read “prosecutorial”) 
system, in which “the notion that … there are winners and losers is not always true - all 
too often there are losers and losers…” (Wilson & Punshon, 1998 p59). They concede 
however, that not “all cases in which medical negligence is alleged, or where damage has 
occurred as a result of medical procedures, are suitable for conciliation…” (p61). This 
applies to a very small minority of cases and these are referred to MRBs. If those bodies 
adjudge disciplinary action to be necessary, they in turn refer the cases to Medical 
Tribunals.  
 
In contrast to that model (which prevails in all other jurisdictions in Australia), ever since 
the passing of the Medical Practitioners' Amendment Act of 1987, first the CU and later 
the NSW Health Care Complaints (HCCC) Commission themselves undertook the 
investigation and also directed the prosecution of accused practitioners before the local 
Medical Tribunal. Because of their emphasis on recourse to law and the prosecution of 
offenders, the CU/HCCC always maintained a strong legal section; as already noted, one 
of the first four staff members of the CU was a lawyer and ever since, its legal section, 
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although small in number (five out of a total staff of 44 in 1993) has formed one of its 
core operating divisions. 57  
 
The unique prosecutorial powers of this body are to some extent an expression of a 
particular ideology known as “Public Interest Law” which will be dealt with more 
extensively shortly. However, it can also be argued that the groundwork for the 
prosecutorial approach was laid by Brereton’s long-forgotten fraud agenda which from 
the outset involved the CU in legal and punitive action against not only individual doctors 
charged with medifraud, but also the Chelmsford doctors. I will further argue that without 
the legal and investigatory resources and expertise it accumulated as a result of its 
prosecutorial approach, the CU/HCCC would never have been equipped to become co-
regulator of medical discipline along with the MRB. Thus, while it was discarded after a 
relatively short period of time, the fraud agenda played an historically formative role in 
the history of the CU/HCCC by setting it on the prosecutorial path. 
The “consumer/victim” agenda 
The "consumer/victim" agenda is so-called because its spokespeople, while describing 
themselves as "consumers", were also the victims of medical and other types of 
misadventure, for which they demanded financial compensation from government. 
Prominent among these were the Chelmsford Victims Action Group, the Vietnam 
Veterans’ Association of Australia and also the MCA. The members of the first two 
groups mentioned were aggrieved because they had been denied financial compensation 
                                                 
57  This is not to say that the concept of conciliation is rejected in NSW. In terms of the 1993 Health Care 
Complaints Act, a "Conciliation Registry" was established as a separate statutory authority attached to the 
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for injury. In the case of the Chelmsford victims this was because of the Supreme Court 
judgement which prevented any action being taken against the doctors involved in deep-
sleep therapy (see pp225-30). The Vietnam Veterans’ Association was particularly 
concerned about the fate of ex-soldiers who had been exposed to the effects of the “Agent 
Orange” defoliant used during the Vietnam War. A Royal Commission found their claims 
for compensation had no basis since at that stage, the case against Agent Orange had 
never been medically proven.  
 
The coalition of the MCA with these groups at first sight, seems somewhat incongruous. 
As was pointed out in the previous chapter, in its earlier years the MCA was not 
particularly concerned with the issue of consumer complaints, let alone consumer 
compensation. Its stance on this issue changed when Mr Andrew Allan, one of its earliest 
members, became general secretary in 1991. However weak the MCA was in terms of 
numbers and resources, it had in Allan a formidable and combative intellect. He had 
formerly been an engineer, his interest in the MCA arising out of having suffered medical 
injury for which his attempts to obtain recompense had proved fruitless. Their demands 
for financial compensation created a common interest between the Chelmsford victims 
and also the Vietnam veterans and those in the MCA like Allen.  
 
However, their compensation-focused agenda brought them into sharp conflict with the 
CU because in terms of its prevailing "public interest" agenda, which will be described 
shortly, it refused to support their claims for compensation. As pointed out by Alford 
                                                                                                                                                 
newly formed Health Care Complaints Commission and complainants can make use of its services, if they so 
choose, rather than following the normal complaints process. 
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(1975, p14), conflicts within structural interest groups can be just as fierce as those 
between structural interests themselves. There was in fact, a tectonic fault-line in the 
consumer movement between the drive on the one hand, to secure individual consumer 
satisfaction and redress, and on the other, to serve a much broader “public interest” by 
making the supply and production of goods and services, more reliable and safer.  The 
way this dichotomy affected the issues arising from health complaints, were summed up 
in the Phillips Fox Review of the Complaints Unit commissioned by the NSW Health 
Department and published in January, 1988.  
Handling concerns and complaints about the provision of health services 
can be primarily directed at keeping consumers happy, or primarily be 
concerned with protection of the public interest. Sometimes it can be 
difficult to pursue both objectives at the same time. 
Although there are many occasions on which individual and public 
interest co-incide, they can diverge when a complaint about the manner of 
delivery of a professional service is considered. If individual consumers 
and providers have difficulties, these can be resolved to their individual 
satisfaction without the public interest necessarily being protected. The 
immediate problem between two people may be solved, but the fault 
remains with the system  (New South Wales, 1989 p6).58  
The dichotomy between the “individual redress” and the “public interest” approaches was 
at the root of the conflict between the consumer/victim groups and the CU, which under 
the leadership of Smith and her successor Walton, became wholly committed to the 
                                                 
58 It might be remarked in passing that this passage also contains one of the main critiques of the conciliation 
approach. Proponents of the prosecutorial approach argue that while conciliation may restore trust between 
provider and consumer, it is a weak instrument for dealing with systemic faults and thus fails adequately to 
serve the public interest Newby (2002).  On the other hand, supporters of conciliation argue that the proponents 
of the public interest approach are often more concerned about complaints as indicators of systemic pathology, 
than they are about the fate of complainants.  
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"public interest" approach. This was not so much the case as far as Smith was concerned. 
While as we have seen above, she quickly moved to de-prioritse Brereton’s fraud agenda, 
there is little evidence to suggest that she had thought through the individual redress vs. 
public interest issue, and most of the time, simply failed to differentiate between them. 
Thus in a paper entitled: “Consumerism – how to cope with the Publics [sic] need and 
wants” dated August 24, 1984, she stated:  
The Complaints Unit should play an important role in providing a 
consumer window into the standards of care provided (and whether they 
meet consumer needs). Over time the Complaints Unit should also assist 
in the developments of procedures which meet the needs of the consumer 
(Complaints Unit, 1984 p2).  
While this statement includes some concern for public interest issues, she also went on to 
say that “in some ways, the Complaints Unit role is one of an internal Ombudsman”, 
which suggests that she also saw it as an organ of consumer redress. However Walton, 
who 
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replaced her when she resigned after having been director for little over a year, was much 
more strongly and definitely committed to the public interest approach.  
 
The consequent refusal of the CU to take up the cause of individual redress, led the 
members of the consumer/victim group to see it as part of a "bureaucratic/medical 
conspiracy" to deprive them of their compensatory rights. Their suspicion of the CU is 
evident from Allan’s accusation that its actions were “cosmetic” and "… designed not to 
upset the power holders, and not able to provide compensation for poor service to what is 
a largely alienated segment of the total health customer base" (Allan, 1993 p6). 
 
The activities of the consumer/victim group were to cause immense difficulties when in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, Walton initiated moves to upgrade its status to that of a 
statutory authority, the "Health Care Complaints Commission”. While that move was 
supported by the government of the day, the MCA in response took the lead in the 
formation of a coalition entitled "Community Organisations Concerned with the Health 
Care Complaints Bill," which claimed to have recruited 40 member organisations 
representing some 300,000 people (Coalition of Community Organisations Concerned 
with the Health Care Complaints Bill, 1993 p2). These organisations were not merely 
"concerned" with the Bill, they furiously opposed it, not so much because they were 
against upgrading the status of the CU to that of a statutory authority, but rather because 
they believed (rightly) that that would entrench the public interest approach behind 
virtually insurmountable barriers.  
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The critique of the CU by this coalition was set out in a long and closely argued 
document prepared by Allan and published by the MCA in April 1993 in which it was 
stated: 
When you see a document saying that something is being operated “in the 
Public Interest” (as the cover the Complaints Unit Annual Report proudly 
proclaims) you may feel that it is automatically a good thing. But just stop 
and think[:] is the public interest always congruent with your own 
personal interest? The surviving victims of Chelmsford hospital found a 
government adopting the view that payment of compensation to them was 
not in the public interest as it would be too costly. … Millions of dollars 
have been absorbed by the extended governmental-legal system in order 
to protect the “public interest”. This does not demonstrate the essential 
need in a democracy for personal access to action law as a final right 
…(Allan, 1993 p6). 
The consumer/victim coalition was given strong support by at least one NSW Labor 
M.P., Mr Paul Gibson, and also elements of the media, particularly the Sun-Herald 
weekly newspaper which had a circulation of over two million. It was used by the 
maverick columnist/commentator, Alan Jones, to attack the CU in typically strongly 
worded views  (Sunday Telegraph, 21/11/1993). This was the first time the CU had 
experienced any media hostility; like the MCA, its consumerist credentials had up to that 
time always ensured that it received favourable treatment from mass media. 
 
The consumer/victim-led coalition posed the most formidable threat to the public interest 
agenda approach of the CU to that date. As will be related in the final section of this 
chapter, it came very close to defeating the CU and government in the struggle to 
transform the CU into a statutory authority. That would also have constituted a defeat for 
the public interest approach which might possibly have followed the fraud agenda into 
 260
oblivion. Strangely enough, one likely effect of that development would have been the 
survival of medical disciplinary autonomy since neither governments nor the MRB, the 
other major stakeholder in that field, would have been prepared to work with any 
organisation dominated by the consumer/victim approach.   
 
As far as governments were concerned, recognition of the compensatory demands of this 
group threatened to make enormous demands on the public purse. Medicine would have 
felt equally threatened because the consumer/victims agenda was even more fiercely 
"prosecutorial" than that of the CU; its proponents were spiritual descendants of those 
who, as Dr Fran Hausfeld had noted, wanted to "lynch doctors" if not physically then  
through legal processes in the courts. This resort to law held out the prospect of the 
complaints process being mired in incessant and long-drawn out legal wrangling. Both 
Medicine and government refused to contemplate that situation, which accounts for the 
"rock solid" support accorded to the CU throughout the struggle with the 
consumer/victim group. Thus in the 1992 annual report of the CU, the then Minister for 
Health, Mr Ron Phillips, stated in his introduction:  
[S]ome complainants have viewed the Complaints Unit as the official 
body to assist them with civil claims and as a result some have had  
expectations of the Unit (Complaints Unit, 1992 p7). 
Their mutual agreement on this point cemented a growing alliance between the equal 
health advocates as represented by the CU and both government executives and  
bureaucrats in the corporate rationalist structural interest group.   
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The AMA agenda 
Although they strongly rejected the consumer/victims' agenda, those professional 
monopolists represented by the AMA and the specialists' Royal Colleges, were just as 
hostile to the CU's public interest approach. While there was a recognition in this group 
of the need for change in the structural instruments used to enforce medical 
accountability, they did not see the CU as an appropriate body to achieve this end. Not 
surprisingly, their agenda was very much based on peer review principles. Those 
principles had been defined during a three-day conference on the subject of peer review 
staged by the AMA in 1977. In the following year the Federal Assembly of the AMA 
"endorsed the progressive introduction of formal methods of the evaluation of medical 
care under the general term 'peer review'" (Anderson, 1983 p7). In reporting the general 
conclusions, Anderson said that in fact a definition of peer review had been difficult to 
find since peer review "meant different things to different people in different places at 
different times and in different contexts". It was easier to say what it was not: 
It is not centralised, nor is it controlled by either the government or the 
AMA. The AMA Federal Assembly made this abundantly clear in 1978 
when it rejected the creation of any centralised bureaucratic organisations 
to run peer review (Anderson, 1983 p9).  
The CU of course, was exactly this kind of "centralised bureaucratic organisation" and 
the AMA in NSW expressed strong opposition to the establishment of the CU after  
Brereton made his announcement of April 1983 (Donnelly, 1990 p). However Walton 
states that when she first became Managing Director the AMA tended to ignore the CU 
since “they saw it as small and not really a player” (Walton, 1993). This was true as long 
as the CU was able to investigate only complaints relating to public health institutions 
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and could take no action against private practitioners. The situation changed drastically 
when this provision was swept away by the watershed 1987 Medical Practitioners’ 
Amendment Act, which is fully discussed in the next section. 
Even before the passing of the 1987 Act, the case against the Chelmsford doctors, 
although eventually unsuccessful, demonstrated the investigatory potential of the CU. 
Another example of that was an investigation undertaken by the CU into the Cumberland 
psychiatric hospital,59 the results of which led to the Minister for Health to appoint an 
Advisory Committee to review standards of care in all 25 psychiatric hospitals in NSW 
(Complaints Unit, 1987 p19). 
 
The unease these activities might have caused the AMA could only have been magnified 
by a passage in the CU's annual report of 1987 which noted that that year had been a 
remarkable one, in that the 1,946 new complaints registered constituted a 47% increase 
over the previous year. The report noted that 80% of these complaints were against the 
medical profession, two-thirds of them doctors in private practice (Complaints Unit, 
1987, p13). Whereas between 1966 and 1979 only eight cases went before the old 
Medical Tribunal, in 1988 alone the CU brought 15 matters before the Tribunal and 
another 12 before newly constituted "Professional Standards Committees" (Department 
for Health NSW, 1990   p1). 
 
                                                 
59 On the basis an abnormally high number of complaints identified by the CU  “which gave cause for concern 
about the standard of patient health care and safety” (Complaints Unit. 1987, p19).    
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Even though when introducing the 1987 Act, the Health Minister, Mr Ron Anderson, 
asserted that the AMA had been consulted about and had assented to the proposed 
changes, documentary evidence does not support his claim. In its submissions to 
government before the passing of the Act, the AMA argued: “If complaints are made to 
the Department, then the Department should pass these on to the [Medical] Board for 
investigation and action.” It further stated that the role and function of the CU had never 
been made clear to the medical profession and therefore constituted “a source of deep and 
lingering suspicion” (Australian Medical Association, 1986 p4).  
After the passing of the 1987 Act, the AMA began stridently to demand of government 
that the CU be terminated, or at least restructured so that its powers were limited to 
investigating complaints against the Health Department only. In a letter to the NSW 
Premier in October, 1989, the AMA State president, Dr Bruce Shepherd, charged that the 
CU had proved itself unfit to deal with complaints referred to it directly, since it was 
pursuing trivia with “excessive zeal” and showed “a grave lack of understanding of the 
practice of medicine and how doctors are required to work and what matters are in the 
best interests of patients” (Australian Medical Association, 1989 p3). The continuity of 
this thinking is evident in yet another letter to the Minister for Health dated 17th February 
1992, in which the AMA submitted that “all complaints should initially be referred to the 
MRB for consideration” (Australian Medical Association, 1992)]. Even though, as will 
be made clear shortly, it had lost control of the MRB by that stage the AMA clearly saw 
the MRB as a lesser evil than the CU. 
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The AMA had several professional allies in its campaign against the CU. The Royal 
Australasian College of Surgeons for instance, called for the CU to be shut down (Sydney 
Morning Herald 24/3/1989) while the local AMA magazine, The New South Wales 
Doctor had earlier noted that a hope that the CU would disappear “is the only thing the 
doctors and nurses throughout NSW have in common” (20/8/1988 pp8-9). In a letter to 
the Minister for Health of April 10, 1989, the AMA went so far as to state that “members 
of the medical profession insist on a mechanism whereby elected representatives (say 
A.M.A. branch Councillors) could overview the workings of the Unit from time to time 
in order to create confidence that the Unit was conducted on equitable lines”(Australian 
Medical Association, 1992 p3). 
 
Government  support for the CU 
The AMA however, had largely failed to take into account the huge societal changes in 
thinking about the professions and on questions of accountability which had occurred 
from the 1960s onwards.  Among others, these changes had also affected its traditional 
allies in the Coalition parties, who gained power in a landslide victory in the State 
election of 1988. They proved just as resistant to the AMA’s peer review agenda as had 
Labor administrations. This came as something of a surprise; there were fears in the CU 
that the new Coalition administration would follow the traditional support its 
predecessors had given to Medicine in general, and the AMA in particular. However, the 
administration of the young new Premier, Mr Nick Greiner, was driven by a “market  
liberal reform strategy” (Laffin & Painter, 1995 p9). As representatives of that novel 
phenomenon, the radical right, perhaps best embodied on the global scene by the British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the Greiner government was characterised by a 
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strongly reformist bent. For that reason, the new administration did not attempt to reverse 
the reforms introduced under Brereton and his successors in the health portfolio. 
According to Degeling and Thomas,  
[T]he Liberal record in health care between 1988 and 1995 was 
characterised by continuity as much as by change and … rather than being 
reformist in its own right, much of the Liberal program consisted of 
fleshing out the reforms introduced by the previous Labor administration 
(p202).  
That assertion is supported by the way the Coalition continued government's unstinting 
support for the CU, which it had enjoyed since its inception. The expansion of CU 
activities is reflected in the fact that in comparison to its initial staff establishment of 
four, by 1987, Labor’s last full year in power, the CU was employing 33 staff while its 
expenditure totaled just over $1m (Complaints Unit, 1987 pp27-8). By 1993, after five 
years of Coalition government, staff numbers had risen to 44 and expenditure to 
$2,639,971 (Complaints Unit, 1994 ppA-1, A-2).   
 
One major contrast between the old Liberal leadership and those in Coalition 
governments between 1988 and 1993, was that they had far less sympathy for Medicine 
and very little for the AMA.60 This is evident in the way the first Coalition Minister for 
health, Mr Peter Collins, vigorously defended the CU when it was attacked by the AMA.  
In a letter written to Collins, the AMA president, Dr Bruce Shepherd, claimed that the 
CU had been established as a deliberately provocative move by an “antagonistic Labor 
                                                 
60 Nothing illustrates that better than the way Collins and his successor in the Health portfolio, Mr Ron Phillips, 
reversed the disastrous losses to the public purse incurred by the previous Labor administration’s poor handling 
of the “doctors’ dispute” of the early 1980s. The Coalition did not hesitate challenge on the AMA in a series of 
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government” that Coalition backing for it could only “reflect badly on the Government 
and its Health Minister in the minds of all members of the profession” (Australian 
Medical Association, 1992).  
 
In response, Collins asserted that the CU “was established after many years of inactivity, 
on  
                                                                                                                                                 
actions in industrial courts which it won, leaving the AMA to pay a $1m in costs (Degeling and Thomas, 1995, 
pp199-202).   
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the part of the Department of Health, in dealing with complaints about health 
professions” and that the CU had developed “considerable expertise in assessing 
complaints, undertaking investigation, and initiating disciplinary action where 
necessary.” Contrary to Shepherd’s assertions, wrote Collins, “the Unit does not pursue 
frivolous or vexatious complaints” (Department for Health NSW, 1990).  That response 
made it clear that gone were whatever hopes the AMA had of imposing its own agenda 
on the CU and the health complaints process, as was any chance of re-vitalising the 
alliance between the professional monopolists and the government executive under the 
Coalition administrations. 
The Public Interest Agenda 
That the public interest agenda had as its chief proponent Ms Merrilyn Walton, director 
of the CU and later the HCCC between 1985 and 2000, is a major reason for its eventual 
success in dictating the direction of the CU. Walton however, did not merely follow the 
"public interest" approach; she was also a devotee of one of its most powerful 
embodiments, the "Public Interest Law" (PIL) movement. She had started her career as a 
social worker, but by the time she joined the CU she had been working in legal advocacy 
circles for some time. As a member of the Legal Aid Commission, she had been 
appointed to the Board of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) (NSW 1990 Vol 8 
p298) which betokened that she had become a convinced supporter of the PIL movement.  
 
Here she met Smith, the first director of the CU. Smith informed Walton early in 1985 
that she was resigning from the CU and suggested that Walton apply for the post (NSW 
1990 Vol 8 p298). That Walton successfully did so meant that the emphasis on the public 
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interest approach over against that of individual redress, was entrenched even more 
strongly in the CU, since as mentioned above, Walton was a strong proponent of the 
"Public Interest Law" movement. Because the philosophy of that movement had such a 
decisive influence in prompting the assaults on medical autonomy described later in this 
chapter, it deserves calls for some special attention.  
 
While proponents of the PIL movement constitute a typical interest or pressure group, 
they do not seek to act by garnering mass membership or through use of the media. 
Instead, as its name implies, the PIL movement operates through the legal system and its 
proponents, all of whom are lawyers, use the courts as their chief means of attaining their 
objectives. While the term “public interest” is a vague one, PIL has been given strong and 
definite connotations by its advocates, who encapsulate its aims and objectives by means 
of the aphorism “representation of the under-represented”. Like the consumer movement, 
this particular movement has its origins in the United States, where, as explained by Aron  
(1989): 
Public interest law is the outgrowth of diverse efforts stretching deep into 
American history to secure legal representation for the powerless and 
disenfranchised. The legal aid movement of the 1800s, Progressive Era 
reformers … the civil liberties activities of the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) in the early 1900s, the watershed civil rights cases of the 
1950s – these are some of the roots of public interest law (p86). 
Aron points out that the immediate antecedents of the contemporary PIL movement in the 
USA are evident in the efforts of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) to assert the rights of and counter the disadvantages suffered 
by Afro-American people through the courts. The advent of PIL in a later form dates 
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from 1970 when the Ford Foundation began financially to support advocacy bodies 
practicing PIL principles in the legal arena. 
Australia was not far behind; Professor Ben Slade (1992), Principal Solicitor of the 
Redfern Legal Centre in Sydney, dates the official institutionalisation of PIL here to 1972 
when the first community legal centre was opened in Fitzroy, Victoria. Since then a large 
number of legal centres have come into existence, “some with a general service aim and 
others with a specific brief such as the Communications Law Centre or the Consumer 
Credit Legal Centre”. The impetus for these centres, according to Slade, was “the desire 
by lawyers and others to provide representation for a class of people who were otherwise 
being denied access to legal services” (1992 p1).  
 
One of the bodies referred to by Slade included the Queensland Aboriginal Legal Service, 
in which Walton served before moving to Sydney. As its name suggests, the Aboriginal 
Legal Service constituted an archetypal PIL institution, seeking to represent in the legal 
arena, one of Australia’s most under-represented groups. Before that, Walton had been a 
social worker among psychiatrically ill people and prisoners, and in that situation had 
seen and experienced at first hand the powerlessness of these groups in the face of a 
largely non-accountable medical profession and governmental bureaucracy. In the health 
care field, she saw the patients as a disadvantaged and under-represented group. This is 
clear from her Masters thesis in Social Work presented in the University of Sydney in 
1989. In a discussion of the power implications of doctor/patient relationships she wrote: 
"The relative powerlessness of patients is also reflected by the fact the medical profession 
has been largely free from lay control and remains publicly unaccountable" (Walton, 
1990 p5). She saw the Complaints Unit as a major means of remedying this situation. By 
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making Medicine more accountable through the use of legal, prosecutorial powers, the 
CU would help redress the doctor/patient imbalance. In Walton's words: “The trend 
towards public accountability will ultimately change the way doctors and patients relate” 
(p105).  
 
The PIL agenda differs significantly from that of the consumer movement in that its focus 
is on the rights of disadvantaged and disempowered groups rather than on those of 
injured individuals. This also differentiates PIL from administrative law in that  
… a public interest legal issue [is] one where the results have 
ramifications which go beyond the immediate parties and affect a broad 
community of interest either immediately or in the foreseeable future” 
(Selby, 1992 p12). 
In terms of this reasoning, the ramifications of the injury or harm suffered by an 
individual at the hands of the provider of goods and services sound a warning that the 
community at large may be at risk. In other words, individual injury is indicative of 
systemic pathology and this in turn means that in terms of PIL, systemic reform is more 
important than individual redress.  
 
It is in this context that the words: “In the Public Interest” appearing on publications of 
the CU during the period under review, must be understood. In its first published annual 
report, the rationale of the CU was described as “a philosophical commitment to a 
complaints mechanism focusing on accountability and the public interest” (Complaints 
Unit, 1987 p6). The systemic implications of the complaints mechanism referred to are 
evident from the fact that in terms of the Medical Practitioners' Act of 1987, these 
included more than simply the complaints made by individuals. The CU was empowered 
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to launch its own investigations without waiting for complaints to be made, on issues 
raised by a wide range of both governmental and non-governmental institutions and 
significantly, also those raised by the media. This was in terms of defending the “public 
interest”. Perhaps the most famous case undertaken by the CU under that brief in its early 
years, was the prosecution for professional fraud launched against Dr McBride of 
thalidomide fame, after a program attacking him had been broadcast by ABC radio.  
 
The other dimension of the PIL philosophy of course, consisted in the utilisation of legal 
processes to promote the interests of “under-represented” groups. Having been equipped 
with a legal section and the resources to use prosecutorial legal processes in terms of 
Brereton’s fraud agenda, the CU constituted an ideal, ready-made instrument for the 
implementation of the PIL agenda. It was used to the full particularly after Walton was 
appointed its director in 1985. It is interesting that while only a very small minority of 
health complaints61 were ever adjudged to be serious enough to require legal remedies, 
the prosecution of medical practitioners accused of serious offences became one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of the CU. Its “prosecutorial” activities also made it unique 
among health complaints bodies in Australia, which as we have seen, based their 
operations on conciliation or alternative dispute resolution process. While they were 
obliged to refer cases which they adjudged to be worthy of prosecution to their State 
MRBs, they had no control of, or share in, the conduct of cases once they had been 
referred on.  
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The 1987 annual report of the CU showed that by that stage it had four qualified 
solicitors on its staff, one of their tasks being to support the prosecution of cases brought 
before the Medical Tribunal. The annual report stated that while the prosecution of some 
complex and time-consuming cases required the briefing of a barrister, and that the 
services of the Crown Solicitor were used for this purpose   
the Complaints Unit has a view that in some cases it would be more 
efficient to have the capacity to brief Counsel directly itself. In many 
cases, the legal officer from the Unit has prepared all the material and has 
intimate knowledge of the case, making it unnecessary to duplicate this 
exercise" (Complaints Unit, 1987 p12).  
That indicated that the CU was accumulating a significant and unique store of legal 
knowledge and expertise. That expertise was to prove of crucial importance in the 
relationships which were developing between the CU and MRB. While only the MRB 
had the power directly to refer disciplinary cases to the Medical Tribunal, it lacked the 
investigatory and legal resources of the CU, and therefore came to rely increasingly on 
the CU to undertake the prosecution of cases it did refer to the Medical Tribunal. Their 
complementary of capacity thus created a symbiotic relationship between the two bodies 
which constituted the foundation of the co-regulation of medical discipline in NSW 
which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. What needs to be noted here 
is that this system developed as a result of the application of the PIL agenda to the 
operations of the CU. However, it was only as a result of changes and developments in 
overall mechanisms of medical discipline between 1983 and 1993 that co-regulation 
became possible, and it is to these that we now turn our attention.  
                                                                                                                                                 
61 In 1989 the Phillips Fox Report on the CU noted that 86% of complaints were resolved without any special 
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The assault on individual practitioner autonomy 
Although they had to devote much energy to defeating attempts by the proponents of 
other agendas to take over the CU, neither Smith nor Walton allowed this to divert them 
from their primary objective, which was to obtain for the CU the power to investigate 
cases against individual medical practitioners. This was not possible during the first 
stages of the CU’s existence because it was allowed only to investigate complaints made 
against public institutions and their staff. This prohibition against the investigation of 
doctors in private practice, constituted one of several lines of defence of individual 
medical autonomy. Any hope of making individual practitioners more accountable would 
also involve changing the deliberate “indefinability” of the disciplinary clauses of 
Medical Practitioners’ Acts which had applied ever since 1900 and so strip away any 
latitude allowed for the interpretation of “misconduct in professional respect”.    
 
From the outset of their respective tenures of office, both Smith and Walton stressed in 
memoranda and other submissions to government that the CU could never be fully 
effective until it was able to investigate and take action against individual medical 
practitioners. The needs here were evident from the statistical records which began to be 
accumulated by the CU; as early as February 1985 (one year after its establishment) 
Smith reported that the largest category of the 1,800 complaints registered to that date 
were in the area of "what patients perceive to be alleged negligence, incompetence or 
inadequate treatment" by doctors in private practice (Complaints Unit, 1985 p2). 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
action other than explanations from providers being required, while only 2.7% went to the prosecution stage 
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In an earlier memorandum, Smith pointed out in November 1984 that this number of 
cases indicated that the current legislation and complaints-handling mechanisms were 
inadequate. She stated: 
They cannot effectively deal with certain circumstances which reflect on 
standards of care. The Act should cover a wider range of professional 
conduct such as incompetence or negligence; and should do more to 
improve the performance of practitioners providing inadequate services. 
(Complaints Unit, 1984 p1). 
She thus recommended a wide array of changes to the Act, and it is significant that the 
first of these was that the term “misconduct in professional respect” should be replaced 
by “unprofessional conduct" which would include improper or unethical conduct as well 
as incompetence or negligence (p3). This proposed change was a radical one in that it 
was proposed for the first time, to bring hard and fast definitions of professional 
misconduct into the law of NSW.  
 
Smith’s recommendations were circulated widely to other bodies, and according to Dr 
Bernie Amos, then the president of the MRB who will figure prominently later in this 
chapter, they provoked major discussions within the Department of Health, about change 
in the system of medical governance (Amos, 2002). In November 1985 the Department 
produced a Green Paper containing “Proposals for Amendment to the Medical 
Practitioners Act”, many of which were based on those put forward by Smith.  That in 
turn within a short space of time, resulted in other bodies including the Australian 
Consumers Association, the Combined Pensioners Association, the MCA, the Public 
                                                                                                                                                 
New South Wales. (1989). Phillips Fox Review of the Complaints Unit for the Department of Health.   
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Interest Advocacy Centre, the NSW Council for Civil Liberties, the Doctors Reform 
Society and the NSW Consumer, also putting forward requests and submissions to 
government about the reform of the Act. Most significantly they were joined by the MRB 
for reasons which will be set out shortly. 
The representations made by these bodies were accepted by the Labor Administration and 
in 1987 it introduced amendments to the Medical Practitioners’ Act which were not only 
the most extensive since 1963, but also brought about the most radical change to the 
system of medical regulation since 1900. The Act created an entirely new disciplinary 
system in which “professional misconduct” was even more closely defined than in the 
original recommendations made by Smith; Section 27 of this Act among other things, 
defined professional misconduct as including “any conduct that demonstrates a lack of 
adequate (i) knowledge (ii) experience (iii) skill (iv) judgement; or (v) care”. In other 
words, incompetence and negligence on the part of individual physicians now constituted 
punishable offences in terms of the law.  
 
In his doctoral thesis The Disciplining of Doctors Under the Medical Practitioners Act 
1938 (NSW) presented to the Faculty of Law at the University of Sydney, Francis Smith 
(Smith, 1994) notes that the new definition of professional misconduct under s.27 of the 
Act occupied three pages and asserts that this definition was “far wider than that deriving 
from common law” (p47). He was highly critical of it on those grounds, stating in his 
conclusion that the definition “… exceeds the justifiable limits of disciplinary control of 
the medical profession” and also that the Act had been “changed in ways which far 
exceed established norms of professional discipline” (p110). Whether Smith’s view is 
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valid is an argument for lawyers to sort out. It is quoted here to illustrate how far the 1987 
Act went towards extinguishing the individual non-accountability and therefore 
autonomy of medical practitioners as far as their practice standards were concerned.  
 
The discarding of the old wording of the disciplinary clauses of Medical Practitioners' 
Acts, also imperiled the whole philosophy of peer review which had been entrenched by 
the  Allinson judgement of 1894.   But in fact, according to Francis Smith, under s.27, 
“bare transgression” of the Act would result in a conviction whether or not there was 
“peer disapproval” of the action in question. On this point he notes an obiter dictum made 
by the Medical Tribunal that “s.27(1) (a) does not depend upon proof that conduct would 
meet with the reprobation of fellow practitioners” (p108). However, he also noted that 
while the issue had been before the Court of Appeal a number of times “no authoritative 
determination of the question has yet been made” (p108). It seems strange in this regard, 
that Smith makes no reference to the Rogers vs. Whittaker case determined by the High 
Court of Australia in 1992, in which as was argued in Chapter Two, had rejected the peer 
review principle. In the words of Whitelaw (1995), “The present Australian position is 
that the final determination of the applicable standard is the task of the law and the courts, 
not the medical profession” ( p83).While that judgement was made in a Federal Court, it 
reflected radically changed thinking in the State sphere as well about the autonomy and 
non-accountability of individual physicians.  The legal manifestation in NSW had been 
the 1987 Medical Practitioners’ Amendment Act, but of course that Act itself represented 
the result of a multi-rooted movement which from the mid-1970s had mounted an 
increasingly fierce assault on the legal barriers which had sheltered individual medical 
autonomy. The CU from 1984 took the initiative in the developments that resulted in the 
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destruction by the 1987 Act, of the deliberately vague concept of “misconduct” based, as 
we have seen, on the older “infamous conduct in professional respect”.   
 
Not only were the concepts relating to individual professional discipline changed. The 
1987 Act also brought about major changes in the mechanisms used to enforce discipline, 
again in line with the recommendations originally made by Philippa Smith.62 In terms of 
the new legislation, the prohibition on the CU investigating private practitioners was 
abolished. Now it was empowered to investigate on behalf of the Department of Health 
and also the MRB, all complaints against medical practitioners from whatever source 
they came, including media. And in carrying out those investigations, it was also given 
new powers which  included those of subpoena and search. The Investigating Committee 
was abolished, and a two-tier system of applying discipline was introduced. In the words 
of the MRB’s annual report for 1987-88, “Complaints which would prima facie justify 
suspension or deregistration are required to be referred to the Medical Tribunal”, while 
complaints “of a lesser gravity” were to be referred to newly constituted Professional 
Standards Committees composed of two medical practitioners and a lay person appointed 
by the MRB. The powers of these Committees  
… are to caution, reprimand, require counselling or treatment, impose 
conditions, or completion of an educational course, require reporting on 
the practice or the seeking of management advice or to impose a fine of 
up to $5,000 (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1988 p7). 
In other words, the principle of making the punishment fit the crime was greatly extended 
and the creation of softer sentencing options had made the taking of disciplinary action 
 278
more likely, since it no longer would constitute an occupational death sentence for those 
found guilty of less serious offences. 
 
In narrowing the definitions of medical professional misconduct, the 1987 Act also made 
the instruments of discipline much more widely applicable.  Thus the Act can be said to 
have greatly limited if not altogether extinguished individual professional autonomy in 
NSW and it should be clear that the CU had played a major role in bringing that about.  
The challenge to institutional medical autonomy 
The assault on individual medical autonomy ran in tandem with the assault on the 
institutional embodiment of Medicine’s autonomy, the NSW MRB. In Chapter Six it was 
demonstrated that the AMA had established what seemed to be an immovable dominance 
of the MRB as a result of the provisions of the 1963 Medical Practitioners’ Amendment 
Act. Almost immediately on becoming Minister for Health, Brereton launched moves to 
break that dominance. One of the people he used to achieve this aim was Dr Bernie 
Amos. He states that after he was appointed to the MRB as the representative of the 
Royal Australian College of Medical Administrators in 1981, he was very conscious of 
AMA dominance. Amos also states that although he was a member of the AMA, he often 
used to wonder why. In other words he was far from being an AMA activist, let alone a 
member of its controlling establishment. He had developed a reputation as a reformist 
“do-er” in the planning of the major new hospital at Westmead, erected to meet the 
hitherto neglected needs of the Western suburbs of Sydney and served as its Chief 
                                                                                                                                                 
62 She and those who colluded with her in the drawing up of the recommendations, had in turn relied heavily on 
the disciplinary model for the legal profession put forward by the Law Reform Commission in 1982. 
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Executive Officer once it became operational. He speaks disparagingly of the general 
ethos of the MRB as he experienced it when he became a member. Then in his mid-40s, 
he was told only half-jokingly that his appointment to the MRB had reduced the mean 
age of its members by half. One of its priorities, it seemed to him, was embodied in its 
Advertising Committee, “which spent a lot of time talking about things like the wattage 
of bulbs doctors used in the red lights outside their surgeries” (Amos, 2002).   
In 1982, only 18 months after first joining the MRB, he was appointed as its president in 
a move which he says took him by surprise and was badly received by the AMA; it had 
its own preferred successor to the current president who was retiring on reaching the age 
of 75. Brereton had probably selected Amos for the presidency not only because of his 
relatively young age, but also because he appeared to be reform-minded. This was the 
first installment of major changes which were to impact the activities of the MRB over 
the next three years.  
Also betokening the onset of a new era was that from 1986 onwards, the MRB began 
once again to publish annual reports, although this was not so much due to the reformist 
spirit imported by Amos as to the passing of the Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Act 
of 1984 which as its name implies, required all statutory authorities to produce annual 
reports to be laid before parliament. That legislation was a typical example of the 
application of the efforts being made in terms of administrative law, to render all parts of 
government more transparent and accountable.  
Brereton’s next step to break the AMA’s grip on the MRB occurred when in 1983 he 
piloted through the parliament an amendment to the Medical Practitioners’ Act (No. 177, 
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1983). This legislation brought to an end the convention in terms which the Minister 
simply rubber-stamped the nominations of MRB members by the AMA and the Royal 
Colleges. From that time onwards, whenever a vacancy occurred, they were required to 
submit panels of three names to the Minister, from which he would nominate one for 
membership of the MRB. The aim of that requirement, charged the Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition, Ms Rosemary Foot in the debate on the Bill in the Lower House, was 
“obviously … to allow the Minister greater control over the MRB by being able to 
determine its membership”. (NSWPD, 3:174 23/3/1983, p4991). Mr Bob Debus (Labor, 
Blue Mountains) in response said he was “inclined to the view that that is true. The 
government has every right to ensure that its policies are implemented by the MRB” 
(NSWPD, 3:174 23/3/1983, p4995). In another significant move, Brereton increased the 
membership of the MRB from 9 to 11 and specified that the two extra members would be 
nominated by himself on the grounds that they were “conversant with the interests of 
patients as consumers of medical services”.  Among those he appointed under this 
heading was Philippa Smith, who at the time was managing director of the newly 
constituted Complaints Unit while he appointed Dr Marcus Einfeld, an outspoken 
champion of human rights, as the legal representative.  
 
The AMA reaction to these moves was expressed in a resolution taken by its NSW 
Council in response to the 1985 Green Paper on the Health Department’s proposal for  
reforms to the Medical Practitioners’ Act mentioned above.. The Council resolved that it 
had “no confidence in the mechanism for appointments” to the MRB and demanded that 
“the Board be reconstituted as it was prior to …1983” (Australian Medical Association, 
1986 p1). In its comments on the Green Paper, the Branch Council noted that: 
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The composition of the MRB was significantly changed by legislation in 
1983, and while it might be argued that 7 out of 11 board members are 
required to be registered medical practitioners, it is the strong view of the 
profession that the nomination procedures and the fact that the ultimate 
selection is a political matter mean that there is a significant lack of 
representation from the practising profession. It is the practising 
profession which is, generally speaking, the subject of the Board’s 
attention, and on the principle of judgement by one’s peers, this current 
situation is far from satisfactory (Australian Medical Association, 1986 
p2). 
While the statement did not spell out the differences the Council saw between "medical 
practitioners" and the "practising profession", it is clear that the latter term applied to the 
AMA. With Amos as its president, the MRB was unlikely to support this call for a 
reversion to the pre-1983 situation. In any case, the AMA’s demands fell on deaf ears at 
governmental level, where the preparation of the watershed amendments to the Medical 
Practitioners' Act, based on the Green Paper, were in full swing.  The Labor 
administration also ignored vociferous protests against the Green Paper proposals put 
forward by numbers of other medical professional associations (Smith, 1994,  p46).  
The dilution of AMA influence was extended as a result of the 1987 legislation. The Act 
expanded the number of MRB members to 18, and although two of these were to be 
nominated by the AMA and another eight by the Royal Colleges, the Act also specified 
that there be four “general nominees of whom not less that 2 shall be conversant with the 
interests of patients as consumers of medical services” (Medical Registration Board 
NSW, 1988 p3).   Signifying that a new era had commenced was that only three of the 10 
medical representatives on this new MRB had been members prior to 1987.  
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Moreover, the structure of the MRB had been completely changed by the passing of the 
Act. Up to that time, it had occupied an anomalous position, in that while it was a 
statutory authority established by its own Act, it was also seen to be part of the 
Department for Health and its income and expenditure continued to be administered 
under the general accounts of the State. Despite being included in the Department, as its 
long inaction on the Chelmsford case indicated, it was left to its own devices and there 
was little or no attempt to make it subject to outside control. In other words, its high 
degree of autonomy as described earlier in this thesis, remained intact. That situation was 
drastically changed by the 1987 Act in terms of which, for the first time since its 
establishment in 1838, the status of the MRB was clearly spelled out in law. Its new legal 
status set out in its annual report for 1987-1988 was as follows: 
… the Board has been established as a corporation consisting of 18 
members appointed by the Governor, with the ability to appoint its own 
staff and a Registrar. It is required to collect its own revenue which is 
generated by fees payable under the Regulations; and to meet expenses in 
accordance with the Act (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1988 p6). 
In other words, the MRB was for the first time, established as a regular statutory 
authority, which while empowered to act autonomously, like all similar governmental 
agencies, was directly accountable to a Minister and through him/her, to the parliament.  
Thus, after almost 150 years, the MRB had been finally brought within the ambit of the 
system of responsible government. While it enjoyed a legislatively defined autonomy in 
those terms, the special and high degree of autonomy which had characterised its 
existence  since its establishment, had been terminated. 
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The operations of the MRB were also radically altered after 1987 in that for the first time, 
it developed an internal bureaucracy since the administration of the regulatory affairs of 
the 20,000 doctors in NSW required the appointment of a growing number of full-time 
staff. After the passing of the 1987 Act, it immediately engaged nine employees, 
including a Registrar and Deputy Registrar, and by 1993 that number had grown to 17.  
Signficantly its first Registrar, Mr Andrew Dix, appointed in 1988, was a lawyer, not a 
medical practitioner, and in fact there were no other medical practitioners on the staff at 
that stage at the cut-off point of this thesis. 
In noting that the registration boards of other health occupations adopted the 
organisational model laid down for the MRB, Smith (1994) states that as a result of this 
"deliberate policy …the role of the professional Boards … has been waning since the 
1987 watershed" (p286). This however, was certainly not true of the MRB, which by no 
means became just one more administrative body run by bureaucrats. According to 
Amos, although the dominance of the AMA had been broken and it was left with only 
two out of 18 members, the other medical representatives jealously guarded their role as 
the legal supervisors of their profession and there was never any suggestion that they had 
been reduced to ciphers in that process.  
From this point of view, the institutional autonomy remained intact. However, the MRB 
had lost its autonomy in one crucial respect, that of control over medical disciplinary 
processes. In place of the old system in terms of which it was the exclusive arbiter in this 
field, by 1993 it had been legislatively compelled to share its disciplinary processes with 
the HCCC and it is to that development that attention is now turned.  
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The emergence of co-regulation 
It has been remarked in the introduction to this chapter, that while the developments 
undermining medical autonomy in NSW are best considered separately, they were 
continuously interlinked among other things, by informal and personal contacts between 
the leaders of the MRB and the CU.  While Amos states that the members of the MRB 
were initially suspicious of the CU, seeing it as “some kind of star chamber”, none the 
less he knew and respected both Smith and Walton. The latter especially, established 
what she describes as “professional and cordial” relationships with the MRB and states 
that “we were able to persuade them to use us as their investigatory agency”. This 
function was extremely useful as far as the MRB was concerned, because while it was 
empowered to receive consumer complaints, it lacked the capacity, resources and 
knowledge to deal with them (Walton, 1993).  Amos in any case was critical of the 
MRB’s complaints mechanisms dating back to 1961; the Investigating Committee he 
said, did very little investigation of anything as far as he could see. Thus he was open to 
changes to the complaints procedures recommended in the Green Paper issued by the 
Department of Health in 1985 (even though he was critical of that document) and 
incorporated into law in the 1987 Act. 
 
Formal links between the MRB and the CU were strengthened by the stipulation of the 
1987 Act which laid down (s.28(4)) that they should inform each other of the complaints 
each received.63 Moreover, the MRB had perforce to hand to the CU any complaints 
which it believed to be worthy of investigation, since as noted above it had no 
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investigative resources of its own (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1989 p17).  
However, there was much more than simply the exchange of information.   More direct 
CU participation in the Board’s affairs is evident from the fact that the 1988 annual report 
of the CU listed among the duties of Walton, its director, was that of “attending Medical 
Board meetings and taking appropriate action on matters raised” (Complaints Unit, 1988 
p3). 
 
The meetings she attended included not only those of the MRB itself, but also of its 
“Screening Committee” set up in terms of the 1987 Act, which had the task of reviewing 
complaints received by both the MRB and CU and deciding how they should be dealt 
with.  The large majority of the members on this Committee, which met monthly, were 
doctors (Medical Registration Board NSW, 1992 p11). But while the MRB seems to have 
been the senior partner in this process, that the CU was having significant inputs into it is 
denoted by a statement in its 1988 annual report that the CU had “established protocols 
for referring and consulting with the MRB on complaint matters” (p7). These kinds of 
linkages were adding to the symbiosis between the two bodies. 
 
However, the status of the CU as a mere administrative unit with the Department for 
Health, meant it was a somewhat weak and unstable partner, as was spelled out by 
Walton in a memorandum sent to government in 1989. 
The bottom line is that the Unit with clearly defined functions and roles 
has no basis for implementing and carrying out those functions except by 
the good grace of the Secretary of the Department of Health and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
63 The same applied to all the other nine health occupational registration boards in the State.  
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Minister of the Day. There is some protection from the negative effects of 
an unsympathetic Secretary because the current Minister has directed that 
the Manager of the Unit report to him directly on any matters not being 
resolved. This though again depends on the Minister and his/her 
commitment to a Unit such as this (Complaints Unit, 1990a p2) 
This remained Walton's chief motivation for her view that the CU needed to be 
transformed into a statutory authority based on its own legislation. That view had been 
supported by both Mr Justice Slattery in his Chelmsford Report and also by the Phillips 
Fox report. Moreover, all the other health complaints commissions which had been or 
were being established in Australia to that date were constituted as statutory authorities. 
Even the MRB had put forward a proposal to establish a “Health Standards Commission” 
which Walton noted in a letter to the Registrar Mr Andrew Dix “is not too dissimilar 
from the model the Complaints Unit has suggested” (Complaints Unit, 1990a p1).  
 
Walton's pleas for the transformation of the CU into a statutory authority were eventually 
taken up by the government executive.  On September 14, 1991, the Minister for Health 
and Community Services, Mr John Hannaford, sent a Cabinet Minute to the Premier Mr 
Nick Greiner, “setting out proposals to establish a Health Care Complaints Commission” 
(Department for Health NSW, 1991).   This was approved in March 1992 and in 
November of that year, without any consultation with interested parties or stakeholders 
outside the health care sphere, a Health Care Complaints Commission Bill was brought 
into the parliament.  
 
This was obviously seen by the government executive as a tandem measure to the 1992 
Medical Practitioners’ Act. Although this Act did not do much more than refine and 
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update the 1987 Act,64 one point of significance was that it explicitly established the co-
regulatory system in law. Instead of the CU and MRB being merely required to inform 
each other of complaints received, the new Act laid down that before any action was 
taken on a complaint, the MRB and the new HCCC were to “consult to see if agreement 
can be reached between them as to the course of action to be taken concerning the 
complaint". That such consultation had already been taking place is evident from what 
was stated by the Minister, Mr Ron Phillips, when moving the second reading debate on 
the Bill: “In practice the board and the complaints unit – the commission – have been 
able to reach consensus regarding the handling of complaints” (NSWPD 3:232, 
24/9/1992, p6501).  
 
That it seemed to contain no important new principles was reflected in the effortless 
passing of the Act with bi-partisan support. However, the co-regulation of medical 
discipline could not officially be put into place until the HCCC had been established by 
its own Act. The process of getting that Act passed contrasted starkly with the smooth 
passage of the Medical Practice Act.  Although the initial HCCC Bill got as far as the 
second reading stage in the parliament, even groups which supported the Bill in principle 
charged that it was badly drafted and their protests were vociferously supported by the 
consumer/victim groups. As a result, the Bill was withdrawn for redrafting at the end of 
                                                 
64 One point worth noting in passing was that following the precedent set by the Nurses Registration Act of 1991, this Act introduced a distinction in its disciplinary provisions 
between "unsatisfactory professional conduct" to cover less serious complaints and “professional misconduct” which was applied to complaints serious enough to be brought 
before the Medical Tribunal. However this was simply a refinement of the way complaints were assessed rather than any change of the grounds on which discipline was to be 
applied and therefore is not of great concern to the argument of this thesis.  
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1992.65 The legislative hiatus gave the MCA time to organise the anti-Bill coalition 
mentioned earlier, which in its submissions charged that  
The Government is set upon making the present Complaints Unit into an 
unaccountable Commission despite a massive report concerning delay, 
inefficiency and corrupt investigations (Coalition of Community 
Organisations Concerned with the Health Care Complaints Bill, 1993 p2).  
This was a reference to a report about to be published by the office of the Ombudsperson, 
the contents of which can be appreciated from its title: Report of Investigation into 
Unnecessary and Excessive Delays in the Handling of Complaints by the Complaints 
Department of the Department of Health. These had been leaked to media outlets and that 
in turn increased the pressure on the Coalition administration which was in an extremely 
weak position at the time. Its landslide majority won in 1988 was reversed by the State 
election of 1991 and in order to hold on to power, it had to govern as a minority 
administration. This made it a hostage to four independent MPs who held the balance of 
power in the Lower House. Among other expedients it adopted in order to get its 
legislative program enacted, was the avoidance of any kind of controversy which had the 
potential to alienate the independents. The HCCC Bill of course, held out the prospect of 
exactly this kind of controversy and thus, even after it was re-drafted in the light of 
submissions from no fewer than 70 different organisations and re-introduced into the 
parliament, the government made no moves to advance it to the second reading stage.  
 
The government might have found it even more difficult to pass the Bill had it not had an 
ally equally as vocal, articulate and probably more politically skilled than bodies like the 
                                                 
65 The immediate cause of the withdrawal was not the objections in general but rather the unwillingness of 
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MCA and other groups in the consumer coalition. This was the Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre (PIAC), founded ten years earlier by the Law Foundation of NSW to embody and 
act as an executor of the principles of the PIL movement. In the word's PIAC's Principal 
Policy Officer, Clare Petre, who was to become its leading activist in the HCCC Bill 
struggle: 
PIAC's charter is to pursue matters in the public interest through advocacy 
and representation of citizens, consumers and communities, and in 
particular those people disadvantaged in asserting their rights (Petre, 
1993.). 
The major public interest issues for PIAC in 1993, declared Petre, were "access to 
information and the community's right to know". In pursuit of these objectives, it had set 
"health products and services" as one of its main target areas for action and on that basis 
became closely interested in the HCCC Bill. Professing itself to be disappointed with the 
Bill, PIAC proceeded to discuss the legislation with 10 other consumer and social welfare 
groups whose interests were affected, or who took an interest in it. These groups, which 
included important peak organisations such as the Australian Consumers' Association and 
the New South Wales Council of Social Services, were able to come to a consensus about 
the Bill and how they thought it should be amended, and thus called themselves the 
"Consensus Group". PIAC, as well as Petre proved very adept at lobbying and 
"reticulating" with interested parties, including the Labor Opposition's Shadow Minister 
for Health, and as will appear in a moment, the four independent MPs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
government to risk industrial action being taken by the NSW Nurses' Association, which favoured a 
conciliation model for the complaints process and therefore opposed the Bill in toto (1:301192; 14/12/92). 
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Backed by the Consensus group, PIAC made a submission to the Minister for Health in 
October 1992 suggesting an extensive range of amendments, the most important being 
"in relation to issues of independence, access, public accountability, and the role of the 
Commission" (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1992 p1). Not surprisingly, all were 
aimed at aligning the Bill more closely with the PIL agenda. For instance PIAC argued 
that the functions of the proposed HCCC were too narrowly defined and that while it was 
vital to offer a means of redress for complaints by individual consumers 
… this is not enough, unless the complaints are recognised and acted upon 
as a valuable source of information to the Commission about trends in 
complaints, significant areas of problems, suggestions for change and 
reform on a broad level in areas such as health training, ethics, and 
operations or health facilities (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1992 p4).  
This was the heart of the PI agenda and the government proved amenable to this and 
other suggested amendments. That representatives of both the government and corporate 
rationalist structural interests had become advocates of the public interest approach 
indicates just how close an alliance they had established with the equal health advocates, 
among whom PIAC now figured prominently. This is also evident from a letter to PIAC 
sent by Amos, who by then had become Director-General of the Department for Health, 
in which he thanked the organisation for co-ordinating community views. "I understand 
that this has been a most successful means of obtaining the input of a large number of 
community groups within a short timeframe on what is clearly an important initiative" 
(Department for Health NSW, 1993). The Department professed to be so impressed by 
the way PIAC had fulfilled its role that in March 1993 it was asked to act as an "honest 
broker" and adviser as far as community responses were concerned. It might be remarked 
that however "honest" it was, PIAC was not an impartial broker and this must obviously 
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have been realised by corporate rationalists like Amos. Equally obviously these corporate 
rationalisers were also willing to adopt a partisan position and on that score, their role in 
shaping the HCCC Act is reminiscent of that played by the health bureaucracy in getting 
the 1900 Medical Practitioners' Acts passed. 
 
As to why the corporate rationalisers supported the Consensus Group, one answer may be 
simply that they knew its proponents better. As noted above, both Smith and Walton 
established good personal and working relationships with Amos in the MRB which 
would have persisted once he was appointed as Director-General of the Health 
Department in 1988. Another powerful factor was probably that to the corporate 
rationalisers, the PIL agenda was a much more palatable than that of the 
consumer/victims' groups. As already mentioned, the adoption of the views of these 
groups on compensation would have been hugely expensive for government, while 
governments would also have been reluctant to adopt the confrontational stand against 
the medical profession demanded by the proponents of this consumer/victims agenda. In 
any case, while mounting strong attacks on the HCCC Bill, the consumer/victim groups 
never put forward any comprehensive or well-thought out alternative. 
 
Still, the force of these groups and the support they found in media would have made the 
government cautious, particularly because after an internal coup, one of the leading 
bodies in the Consensus Group, the Combined Pensioners’ Association, defected to the 
consumer/victim coalition. The government had not brought the HCCC Bill forward in 
the main parliamentary session of 1993 and there was no indication that it would be 
raised in the short, end-of-year parliamentary session which commenced in November. In 
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this situation, the imminent publication of the Ombudsperson's report referred to above 
might have acted as a catalyst.  The report, compiled in response to 19 complaints about 
"inordinate delays" in CU procedures, contained a damning assessment of the 
management of the CU which thereby had of course, itself been burned by "counter-
bureaucratic fire".  
 
The report was due to be tabled in the Lower House on December 13, 1993, but as 
mentioned earlier, its contents had been widely leaked before that and had been used 
among others, by media commentator Alan Jones, to attack the CU. The Ombudsman's 
report would not only in all likelihood have prevented the passage of the HCCC Bill 
because of its effect on the independents, but could also have threatened the survival of 
the government itself by inviting a censure motion. While there is no evidence that these 
considerations were a major motivating factor, it seems more than co-incidental that the 
second reading of the HCCC Bill was introduced, unannounced, into the Lower House in 
late October, 1993, probably the last occasion on which it could be launched with any 
hope of getting it through both Houses through before the Ombudsperson's report was 
published.  
 
In the Lower House the passage of the HCCC Bill was hotly debated, since the 
opposition Labor party, while not opposing it outright, none the less argued that it should 
be referred to a parliamentary inquiry before it was finally considered. Obviously the 
government could not afford that, but in order to have the Bill passed, needed the support 
of the independents, and here the lobbying by PIAC proved crucial. For instance, in a 
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letter to one of their number, Dr Peter Macdonald, Petre had urged the importance of 
getting the Bill through the short session of parliament, stating: 
We are fearful that if the Bill is put off to a Parliamentary enquiry or 
elsewhere, then it will not come back. It has been up twice and it would 
have to be a dedicated Minister to bring it back a third time. We also fear 
that further debate would bring out the health provider lobby, particularly 
the doctors, and that the result might be an outcome far worse than the 
current Bill. … we do not have the faith in a parliamentary enquiry that 
some groups seem to have (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1993). 
The independents were persuaded by these arguments and gave their support to the Bill. 
However, just how close the issue was in the Lower House is clear from the fact that it 
was passed only on the casting vote of the Speaker, while some clauses which one or 
other of the independent MPs opposed, were lost (NSWPD 3:239 16/11/1993 pp5429-
5454). However, the Bill emerged virtually intact and had a quick and much more 
peaceful passage through the Upper House in the proverbial “nick of time” before the 
publication of the Ombudsperson's report. By the time that document was officially 
published, the major issue at stake, namely the continuance of the PIL agenda as the 
guiding principle of the newly established Health Care Complaints Commission, had 
been settled. More importantly from the point of view of this thesis, the passing of the 
HCCC Act signalled that at last the co-regulation of medical discipline by the MRB and 
the new HCCC had been recognised in law.  
 
That the application of medical discipline had legally ceased to be the exclusive province 
of the MRB, meant that the institutional autonomy of Medicine in this sphere had been 
extinguished. That development, coupled with the extinction of individual practitioner 
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autonomy as outlined earlier, closes the argument of this thesis that in this respect, 
medical autonomy had ceased to exist in NSW.  
Conclusion 
There is added evidence of the extinction of medical autonomy with respect to 
disciplinary issues since 1993. As was noted earlier, at that time joint assessment of 
complaints was being carried out through the nine-member Screening Committee of the 
MRB, the monthly deliberations of which were attended by the Director of the CU. 
However, that system changed drastically over the next few years and was described in 
the Annual Report of the MRB for 1999 as follows: 
Complaints received by either body are now assessed jointly at a weekly 
assessment meeting held at the Commission with representatives from 
both the HCCC and the Board consulting on the proposed action (Medical 
Registration Board NSW, 1999 p18) . 
That the meetings of this “Assessment Committee” take place in the HCCC offices, and 
that the two HCCC representatives include its Director while the MRB is represented 
solely by its Medical Director, could lend itself to the interpretation that the MRB has 
become the junior partner in the process. If this is indeed the case, it would be another 
indication that pure peer review with regard to medical discipline, had almost entirely 
ceased to exist in NSW and that of course, a situation which is conclusive evidence of 
“the recession of medical autonomy” referred to in the title of this thesis. 
 
Given what has been said above about the jealous guarding by its members of the 
controlling functions of the MRB, it is significant that this body has expressed no 
objection to the "co-regulation of medical discipline"; in fact, it is held up as a 
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praiseworthy model. This was evident for instance in a paper delivered at the Third 
National Health Care Complaints Conference in March 2001, by the Medical Director of 
the MRB, Dr Alison Reid. She stated that while there was a legislative requirement for 
consultation between the two bodies, “the success of the approach is largely attributable 
to our shared commitment to public protection and quality in health care”. She noted 
further: 
The New South Wales system provides a rigorous and consistent 
approach to the assessment and subsequent management of complaints 
and notifications received by the MRB or the Health Care Complaints 
Commission. Central to the success of the approach is the collaborative 
relationship between both bodies (Reid, 2001 p18). 
Since to speak of autonomy and legally-required collaboration in the same sentence 
would be an oxymoron, Reid was in fact confirming that medical autonomy with respect 
to medical discipline had ceased to exist in NSW.  That this statement was made by so 
senior a member of the MRB would hardly seem to make it necessary for the point to be 
further argued by the author and it is on that note that this study could be closed. 
However, some concluding comments are called for, because what has been 
demonstrated in this chapter has some major implications for the notions not only of 
medical autonomy, but also of medical professionalism. These are discussed in the final 
chapter.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The conclusions drawn from the arguments presented in this thesis give rise to some 
reflections about the theoretical frameworks which have been used to analyse the subject 
matter as well as the notions of medical autonomy and professional status.  
Bureaucratisation vs “community” power 
The power that bureaucratisation confers on an occupational grouping  
(rechtsgemeinshaft) so brilliantly set out by Weber at the beginning of the 20th century, 
has often been demonstrated. The importance of the bureaucratisation process is reflected 
in the fact that earlier studies on the professionalisation of Medicine in NSW, especially 
those of Davis (1983), Lewis & MacLeod (1988) and Lloyd (1993), all made the 
attainment of genuine bureaucratic power by the MRB in 1900, one of their focal points. 
This study has attempted to go further by suggesting that not only bureaucratisation itself, 
but the form that the bureaucratisation of Medicine took in this State, was of crucial 
importance in determining how medical regulation and especially how medical discipline 
was exercised in terms of the  "infamous conduct" clause.  
 
It seems strange that the bureaucratic power of Medicine, based as it was on typically 
Weberian calculative considerations (for example its specification of the educational 
qualifications of doctors), should have had at its heart the wholly irrational notion of 
“infamous conduct”, which Dr John Creed in 1900, openly described as "indefinable"  
(Hansard 1:106  1/11/1900 p 4637). That the only challenge to that statement in the 
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parliament of NSW was made by a fellow medical practitioner, was due to the 
unquestioning attitude to the professions among the elite elements of society as 
represented in the Upper House at the time. No doubt feelings of class solidarity also 
played a role, but it also says much about the capacity of the most highly educated and 
powerful leaders in the land to be either awed or traduced by interest group claims when 
clothed in the language of “priestly mystery”.  The representatives of lifeworld medicine 
in the Lower House also taken in by this mumbo-jumbo, but they can hardly be blamed 
for failing to see the significance of the “infamous conduct” terminology and the way it 
would entrench the non-accountability which would characterise medical practice in 
NSW over the next 80 years. When eventually the representatives of the community 
population structural interest questioned the “infamous conduct/misconduct in 
professional respect” terminology, they were also questioning the irrationality which lay 
at the heart of the system of medical discipline in this State.  Their consequent demand 
that the framework within which medical discipline was applied be fully and completely 
rationalised, was more than satisfied by the Medical Practitioners (Amendment) Act of 
1987. As noted in Chapter Seven, that Act replaced the old, single-phrase terms on which 
medical discipline was based with three pages of specifications as to exactly constituted 
professional negligence, incompetence and misdemeanour.  To a lawyer like Smith 
(1994) this was rationalisation gone mad; however, the pendulums of history seldom 
swing in moderate arcs and practically never go back to their starting points.  
 
From today’s perspective, it might seem that the acceptance by legislators and courts in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries of the indefinable “infamous conduct” terminology 
was irrational, it should be remembered that this was a small element of an overall move 
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to rationalise the practice of allopathic Medicine in NSW. Certainly Weber would not 
have been surprised by this indication that the rational and irrational not only co-exist but 
flourish side by side. While Mommsen (1989) argues that the onset of the rationalisation 
and bureaucratisation of life in industrialised countries constituted for Weber an 
apocalyptic vision "of the eventual mechanised petrification of Western individualistic 
societies, directly inspired by Nietsche's Zarathustra" which might well “end in the 
creation of a completely ossified social order in which there would no longer be any room 
for individual initiative, let alone a sophisticated personal culture like the one which 
developed in the West” (p109),  Albrow (1996) points out: “Weber took it for granted 
that against rationality was counterposed by irrationality” (p129). For example, he saw 
human emotions as “a complex and differentiated field of forces interfering with rational 
thought and action” (p129) and “never ceased to reiterate, when it comes to the ultimate 
elements of a world-view, feeling is as important as reason” (p131).  
 
However, it is true that Weber’s main focus and his fame rest on his studies of the way 
rational calculation and bureaucratisation seemingly came to dominate life in both the 
public and the private spheres in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This means that 
his work provides little or no explanation of how lifeworld/alternative medicine 
continued in vigorous existence sans bureaucratisation over that same period. It was clear 
from the time of the passing of the 1838 Medical Witnesses Act that their diffuse nature 
and non-scientific "irrationality" would always preclude the practitioners and followers of 
lifeworld epistemologies from recognition by the modern state, in which supreme value 
was placed on what Weber called "legal rationality".  
 
 300
What that indicates is that while according to Pusey (1976) "bureaucracy is one of the 
most dramatic inventions of our time", and therefore an extremely important 
phenomenon, it is not all-important. On that score, writers such as Ouchi (1980), 
Taylor(1982), and  Colebatch & Larmour (1993) provide a useful counterpoint with their 
postulation that bureaucracy is only one type of organisation, or as they term it 
“organising”. They indicate two other powerful non-bureaucratic forms which 
characterise processes of organising in the modern world, those of market exchange and 
also “community” or “clan” organising, to use Ouchi’s term (1980). In terms of this type 
of organising, action is not based on or bound by on impersonal rules or hierarchy as in a 
bureaucracy, but instead results from the commonly-held beliefs, values and relationships 
(hence the appellation of “clan”) within groups. In many ways this type of “non-rational” 
action constitutes the most powerful form of organising, as is certainly indicated by the 
way in which the World Trade Centre in New York was destroyed on September 11, 
2001. 
 
If it is true that “community organising” supplies the most likely explanation for the 
survival and success of lifeworld/alternative medicine, it follows that by concentrating 
entirely on developments in the rational/bureaucratic sphere of scientific medicine, 
studies of health care (including the present one) only tell half the story. To date however, 
apart from Siapush (Siapush, 1999), few in Australia anyway, have attempted to 
investigate medical history from the perspective of lifeworld/alternative medicine. 
Obviously there are some very rich research potentials awaiting exploration in this field.    
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The structural interest perspective 
This study has also set out to demonstrate that Weber's macro analyses of 
bureaucratisation can also usefully be supplemented by the more micro-analytical tools 
supplied by Alford (1975).  These add convincing reasons for the total dominance of 
Medicine in NSW during the first half of the 20th century. Thus, while scientific medicine 
encountered significant resistance from the adherents of lifeworld medicine in NSW both 
before and after the granting of responsible government, from the 1890s onwards it 
enjoyed total support from those within both the corporate rationalist and government 
executive structural groupings. As was demonstrated in Chapter Four, the latter actually 
took the lead when the politically incompetent medical elite failed to get the necessary 
changes in the legislation on to the statute books. That development clearly points to the 
fact that those who comprise "the government", derived as much benefit from the 
bureaucratisation and professionalisation of Medicine as did the members of the 
profession themselves. The advantages of medical bureaucratisation for those in both the 
legislative and administrative arms of government were twofold. On the one hand, the 
willingness of government executives to allow Medicine to assume control of the MRB 
as a bureaucratic apparatus, demonstrated to voters in the higher socio-economic strata at 
least, that their calls for the establishment of "order and protection" in the health  field 
(Weber, 1978 [1922]  p972) was being heeded.  As far as corporate rationalists were 
concerned, the establishment of the MRB satisfied the demands of the "bureaucratic 
imperative", while the use of legislatively legitimated medical professionals as "co-opted 
experts" provided an excellent means of administering this highly specialised section of 
the government apparatus.   
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The mutual benefits derived from medical bureaucratisation by these two structural 
interest groupings, created an alliance between them and the professional monopolisers 
which lasted for 60 years after 1900.  As was noted in Chapter Five, in the face of that 
alliance, those who comprised the lower socio-economic strata of the community 
population structural interest stood little chance of having their voices or complaints 
about the delivery of health care, heard or heeded. Even the passion of the proto-typical 
"equal health advocates" such as Nurse Welsh and the Buledelah loggers failed to make 
any impression on the three-way alliance of the structural interest groups.  
 
That alliance, as already noted, endured through the first six decades of the 20th century. 
However, when as a result of growing media interest in health care issues, the electorally 
dangerous stirrings within the emergent community population structural interest (in 
which socio-economic divisions were probably beginning to fade) became apparent, 
government executives found themselves locked in to their alliance with the professional 
monopolists. Thus the Labor-dominated government executive of the early 1960s was 
unable to prevent the professional monopolisers from blocking its attempts to pare back 
their power following the Windsor Hospital incident. Government executives were 
equally powerless to assuage the public outcry which resulted from Chelmsford scandal, 
since as their lack of action indicated, the corporate rationalisers seem to regard that 
situation with equanimity, or more probably, were still too closely aligned with the 
professional monopolist interest power to want to do anything about it. It is also probably 
true that government executives themselves were still wary of too directly challenging 
professional monopolist power at that stage.  
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Fighting bureaucratic fire with counter-bureaucratic fire 
The popularity of the consumer movement and the emergence of new ideological forces 
antithetical to professional privilege in the 1960s, gave government executives the 
motivation to break their alliance with the professional monopolists in the 1970s. Their 
determination to do so was signalled, as detailed in Chapter 6, by the consumer-orientated 
legislation which was passed in the NSW legislature during that decade. In addition, the 
advent of administrative law had created the weaponry which could be used directly to 
assault the power of the professional monopolisers. Thus the most effective assault was 
launched by the newly created "counter-bureaucracies" which included the office of the 
Ombudsperson and of course also the CU/HCCC.  
 
Weber cannot be blamed for never anticipating this development, although perhaps it 
might not have surprised him to learn that the best method of fighting the fire of 
bureaucracy was with the fire of counter-bureaucracy. However, on this score he may 
also be included in Albrow's critique of the Habermasian notion of "the colonisation of 
the lifeworld" as set out in Chapter One, viz that Habermas fails "… to take forward the 
possibility that the encroachments of the modern state on everyday life actually assisted 
in the empowerment of people, through education of course, but also in requiring 
participation in everyday bureaucracy" (1996, p177). This is exactly what happened as far 
as the CU/HCCC was concerned. The "colonial culture" of bureaucratisation was 
replicated and effectively used by the equal health advocates  to attack the power of the 
MRB.  
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The emergence of these "counter-bureaucracies" also puts a different gloss on Weber's 
warning that once established, bureaucracies are "among those social structures which are 
hardest to destroy" (1922 p987). What is evident in the case of the MRB, is that the 
power of the professional monopolists which it embodied proved unable to resist the 
challenge it faced in the 1980s from a new alliance between government executives and 
consumer/equal health advocate interests. Of course the MRB has never been 
"destroyed"; if it were, the "bureaucratic imperative" would demand that it immediately 
be re-invented. But while it still operates as an autonomous statutory authority, none the 
less it has undergone profound change. Its autonomy, exercised within the parameters of 
responsible government, is certainly very different to the almost totally non-accountable 
autonomy it enjoyed right up to 1987. And of course, from the point of view of this 
thesis, one of the most important aspects of its existence after that date, has been the loss 
of its right to autonomous control over medical discipline. The implications of that 
development have some far-reaching consequences for the whole concept of 
professionalisation.  
Dynamics without change 
Before considering that issue, the oxymoronic postulation by Alford (1975) of "dynamics 
without change" (p254) calls for some comment.  On the basis of the material presented 
in this thesis, it can be concluded this observation can be seen to be valid in some senses, 
but not in all. It is true from the point of view that although, as is particularly evident 
from Chapter 7, the professional monopolisers experienced little but defeat in their 
struggles with government executives and consumer interests during the last two decades 
of the 20th century, none the less this has had little or no effect on the overall shape of the 
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health care system in NSW. It remains a mix of private and public health care delivery 
and there is not the remotest suggestion that, even if NSW State governments could act 
on their own without reference to the rest of Australia, they would ever try to take 
advantage of the weakened state of the professional monopolists to, for instance, move 
the State towards a system of "nationalised medicine" under which all doctors became 
government employees. However, only a change of that magnitude would in Alford’s 
terms, upset the "dynamic stasis" which has prevailed in this State ever since the start of 
the 20th century.   
 
On the other hand, the purpose of this thesis has been to argue that the destruction of both 
the institutional and individual autonomy of the medical profession as set out in Chapter 
7, does indeed constitute a major change in the power balance between the structural 
interest groups. The loss by the professional monopolisers of their autonomous control 
over medical discipline is extraordinary not only in historical terms in NSW, but also in 
terms of the present-day situation in other jurisdictions.  While health care complaints 
bodies in other States and Territories in Australia, do have consultative relationships with 
MRBs, some of them closer than others, none have the legislatively-supported system of 
co-regulation which was established in NSW in 1993 (Thomas, 2002). In Britain and the 
United States, medical discipline remains the sole preserve respectively of the GMC 
(Stacey, 1992) and the State MRBs (Ameringer, 1999).  
 
But while the dominance of the professional monopolisers in NSW has been broken, it is 
not true that they are powerless. They remain in place as one of the four major structural 
interests and neither governments, corporate rationalists, equal health advocates or 
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academic theoretical analysts could ever afford to ignore the way in which the power of 
the professional monopolisers continues to shape the health care system. As suggested 
elsewhere, despite the outcome of the surface struggles described in this thesis, the basic 
structures of the system, based on private, fee-for-service delivery of health care services 
by medical practitioners, remains in place. In fact it may actually have been strengthened 
by the growing corporatisation of medical practice, as pointed out by Dr Con Costa, 
president of the Doctors' Reform Society, in its magazine, New Doctor, in March, 2001. 
He reported that increasing numbers of GPs in private practice were being attracted to 
corporate service by the $200,000 transfer packages offered by corporations "with 
unlimited investment capital" and also by "the prospect of regular holidays, … being able 
to take time off if they need to" as well as the prospect of special deals such as childcare 
for women doctors. Costa reported a prediction by one corporate entrepreneur that within 
a year 50% of all medical consultations would be taking place in corporate medical 
centres.  That figure was in all likelihood an inflated one, but it none the less reflected the 
rapidly growing situation of medical corporatisation not only in Sydney but in Australia 
as a whole.  
 
One consequence of that development is that not only the medical profession, but also  
major capitalist enterprises now have a vested interest in the maintenance of the status 
quo as far as the delivery of curative services is concerned. From this point of view, the 
position of the professional monopolisers has actually strengthened and on this score, the 
material presented in this thesis relating to Medicine's loss of the total control of medical 
discipline, does little to disturb Alford's conclusions relating to "dynamics without 
change" or dynamic stasis.  
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Rethinking professionalism 
However, the changed situation of the professional monopolisers at the beginning of the 
21st century, raises broader questions with regard to theories relating to 
professionalisation. As was set out in Chapter 1, authorities such as Freidson (1970; 
1975; 1985; 1990; 1994), Daniel (1994; 1995), Wolinsky (1993) and Southon and 
Braithwaite (1998) among others, agree that autonomous control of the discipline of 
practitioners is a distinguishing feature of professional status for any occupational group. 
Its loss of that control in NSW would be interpreted by some as another step towards  
process of "proletarianisation" of the medical profession, as argued by Oppenheimer 
(1973)), Haug ((1975; 1976; 1988), McKinlay & Stoeckle (1988). However, to describe 
an occupation which ranks as the highest paid in Australia and which consistently attracts 
the brightest and best of the student population into its ranks as being part of the 
"proletariat", is to stretch the meaning of that word impossibly far. While it may be true 
that as a result of their increasing corporatisation, members of the Medical profession are 
being forced to defend their interests in the same way as other "proletarian" occupational 
groupings, none the less their status and exclusive expertise gives them a head-start in 
any economic struggles in which they find themselves embroiled. It would be difficult for 
instance, to conceive of government guaranteeing any other occupation against indemnity 
suits in the way that it has the medical profession as a result of the crisis of 2002.  
 
The same applies to technical definitions of autonomy. Strictly applied, these would 
mean that because Medicine has lost its autonomous control of professional discipline in 
NSW, it has gone a long way towards deprofessionisation if it has not already been 
deprofessionalised. But given the continued public regard for Medicine as perhaps the 
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pre-eminent profession, the notion of deprofessionalisation is also difficult to sustain in 
the “real world”. Rather than measuring Medicine against a yardstick of strict 
sociological criteria for professionalisation, what seems to be needed is a re-examination 
and probably some adjustment of those criteria.   
Thus, while the NSW MRB has lost its exclusive power over the medical discipline, it 
has been extending its controls over the medical profession in other directions. For 
instance, in the late 1990s it initiated moves that culminated in the passing of the Medical 
Practice (Amendment) Act of 2000 (No. 64) which had as its centrepiece the introduction 
of a "Performance Assessment Program". That program has enabled the MRB "to address 
the longstanding problem of practitioners who are not impaired or guilty of misconduct, 
but whose standards of practice appear to be unsatisfactory" (Medical Registration Board 
NSW, 2000 p3). Remedying that problem of course, means assessing the performance of 
individual practitioners in a fashion which would have been unthinkable for the MRB 
during the greater part of the 20th century. The incorporation of the "infamous conduct" 
clause in the Medical Practitioners Further Amendment Act of 1900 (No. 70) signaled 
that for Medicine at that stage and indeed until 1987, the protection of individual 
autonomy as far as practice was concerned, was one of the major functions of the MRB. 
Since the Performance Assessment Program represents a far-reaching diminution of that 
individual autonomy, it could be argued that it represents yet another step towards "de-
professionalisation". On the other hand, it could be equally be argued that since in the 
words of Salter (2001), one of the basic functions of medical regulatory bodies is to 
"provide explicit standards" for the certification and registration of practitioners, the 
Performance Assessment Program is actually contributing to the professional standing of 
Medicine.   
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That statement however, begs the question of what exactly constitutes and determines 
"professional standing". On that score, the following statement by Daniel (1996), herself 
a leading sociologist, is useful.  “Public perceptions of a profession will be governed by 
the way discipline is seen to be applied and enforced in a profession”. That sentence 
contains a crucial preposition in the last line; Daniel uses the word “in” rather than “by”. 
In those terms, how professional standards are applied becomes less important than the 
assurance that they are indeed being applied, no matter by what means. In that light, peer 
review is simply not an issue as far as "public perceptions" are concerned. In fact, on the 
basis of the evidence presented in this thesis, peer review can actually have counter-
productive effects for a profession, in that its seemingly cabalistic nature arouses 
suspicions that disciplinary mechanisms are simply a façade behind which professionals 
protect each others' backs.  
 
On the other hand if the community population structural interest, i.e. consumers of 
health care, as well as government executives, have confidence that discipline is being 
applied in a transparent and non self-interested fashion, that there are no attempts to 
defend the indefensible, then strict technical definitions of “profession” are not of any 
great significance. This is true not only for academic analysts; on the basis of the 
statements made by Reid (2001) quoted in the previous chapter, the professional 
monopolists are comfortable with and have confidence in, the way medical discipline is 
being applied in this State. This is despite the fact that in terms of the system of co-
regulation, the MRB has been forced to share its disciplinary function with the HCCC. 
The lesson seems to be that peer review is not necessarily a sine qua non as far as 
 310
professionalism is concerned. Thus it might be argued that as long as confidence in the 
system of co-regulation in NSW is maintained by all structural interest groups involved, 
the professional status of Medicine is much safer than ever it was during the era of its 
complete autonomy and control over discipline. 
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APPENDIX A 
Failed Medical Practitioners Bills, Parliament of NSW 1876-1898 
The following  shows the fate of the Medical Practitioners' Bills between 1876 and 1898: 
(References show NSWPD dates and pages): 
 
1876 Bill passed by the Upper House. Committee stage not completed (Sydney 
Morning Herald 7/4/1876) 
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1880 Bill debated in the Lower House. Debate adjourned due lack of a quorum. Bill 
lapsed. 14/5/1880, p2328 
1886 Bill debated and passed by the Lower House 16/7/1886, pp3420. Upper 
House committee stage not completed. Lapsed. 19/10/1886, p5866. 
1889 Bill presented to the Upper House. Withdrawn 21/9/1889, p3420. 
1890 Bill passed by the Upper House, not considered in the Lower House. Lapsed, 
4/10/1900, p3538. 
1891 Bill passed by the Upper House, not considered in the Lower House. Lapsed 
4/10/1900, p3538. 
1892 Bill introduced into the Lower House. Lapsed after second reading. 
21/9/1898, p732. 
1893 Bill passed by the Upper House. Lapsed after first reading in the Lower 
House. 12/10/1893, p353 
1894-5 Bill passed by both Houses. Upper House refused amendments proposed by 
the Lower House. Lapsed 6/6/1895 p6944. 
1897 Bill passed by the Upper House. Lapsed after first reading in the Lower 
House.  
4/10/1900, p3538 
1898 Bill passed by the Upper House. Lapsed after the committee stage. 21/9/1898, 
p739 
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APPENDIX B 
The Medical Practitioners Act 1912 
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APPENDIX C 
THE COMPOSITION AND DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS OF 
THE NSW Medical Registration Board, 1838-1992 
1838-1938 
Constituted by: 
• Medical Witnesses Act,  (2 Victoria 22) 1838 
• Medical Practitioners’ Act, (No.26) 1898 
• Medical Practitioners’ Amendment Act (No 33) 1900 
• Medical Practitioners’ Amendment Act (No. 29) 1912  
 
Specified membership: 
Minimum of three legally qualified medical practitioners nominated by 
government. [Note: the numbers mostly varied between six and 12.] 
 
Disciplinary mechanisms:  
1900-1912  None specified  
1912-1938 The MRB constituted as a court to try disciplinary cases. 
 
Official complaints pathway: None specified 
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1938-1963:  
Constituted  by the Medical Practitioners’ Act (No 37) 1938 
 
Specified membership 
Minimum seven, maximum nine, to consist of: 
• Seven medical practitioners nominated by government 
• One nominated by the Senate of the University of Sydney 
• One member, nominated by the BMA, representing doctors outside the County of 
Cumberland [i.e. outside the Sydney metropolitan area] 
 
Official complaints pathway:  
Complaints to be registered with and assessed by the Board of Health. Those 
found to have prima facie validity referred to the Disciplinary Tirbunal  
 
Disciplinary mechanism: 
 Disciplinary  Tribunal:   
• President: Judge of the Local Court 
• Members: Members of the Board 
 
 
1963-72 
Constituted by: The Medical Practitioners (Amendment) (No 22)  Act 1963. 
 
Specified membership 13. 
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 One nominee of each of the following:   
• Royal Australasian College of Physicians   
• NSW branch – Royal Australasian College of Physicians 
• Royal Australasian College of Surgeons 
• NSW branch – Royal Australasian College of Surgeons 
• Royal College of General Practitioners, NSW branch 
• University of Sydney 
• University of New South Wales 
• Minister for Health 
• Department of Public Health 
Three representatives of the AMA  
One barrister nominated by the Minister 
 
Disciplinary mechanism 
 Disciplinary Tribunal: 
 President: Judge of the Local Court 
 Members: Members of the Board 
 
Complaints pathway 
Complaints to be registered with the Investigating Committee which refers those 
adjudged to have prima facie validity to the Disciplinary Tribunal. 
 Membership:  Chairperson – Stipendiary magistrate 
   One nominee of the AMA 
   Director-General (or his nominee of) Department of Health 
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1972-1987:  
Constituted by the Medical Practitioners (Amendment) Act, (No 52) 1972 
 
Specified membership 13. Consisting of: 
 One nominee of each of the following:  
• NSW branch – Royal Australasian College of Physicians 
• NSW branch – Royal Australasian College of Surgeons 
• Royal College of General Practitioners, NSW branch 
• Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologies 
• NSW Universities Board 
• University of Sydney 
• University of New South Wales 
• Minister for Health 
• Department of Public Health 
 Three representatives of the AMA  
One barrister nominated by the Minister 
Disciplinary mechanism 
 Disciplinary Tribunal: 
 President: Judge of the Local Court 
 Members: Members of the Board 
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Complaints pathway 
Complaints to be registered with the Investigating Committee which refers those 
adjudged to have prima facie validity to the Disciplinary Tribunal. 
 Membership:  Chairperson – Stipendiary magistrate 
   One nominee of the AMA 
   Director-General (or nominee of) Department of Health 
 
1987-1992 
Constituted by the Medical Practitioners’ (Amendment) Act (No 127) 1987 
 
Specified membership 18, nominated by the following:,   
The Department of Health – one medical practitioner 
The Minister for Health:  
One barrister or solicitor 
Four general nominees, “two to be conversant with the interests of 
patients as consumers of Medical Services”; 
Eight Royal Colleges – one medical practitioner from each; 
The AMA –  two representatives 
The Ethnic Affairs Council (one medical practitioner) 
The Universities of Sydney, New South Wales and Newcastle – one joint 
representative. 
 
 324
Complaints pathways 
Complaints may be registered with either the MRB or the CU. They inform each other of 
complaints made. Complaints adjudged to have prima facie validity referred to 
the Medical Tribunal 
 
1992+ 
Constituted by the Medical Practice Act (No 94) 1992 
Specified membership: Unchanged  
 
Complaints pathways 
Complaints may be registered with either the MRB or the CU. They consult each other 
inform and collaboratively decide on action to be taken. each other of complaints made. 
Complaints adjudged to have prima facie validity referred to the Medical Tribunal 
  
  
 
 
